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LETTER FROM THE EDITOR
On behalf of our entire executive board, I am proud to present the inaugural issue of the
Dartmouth Undergraduate Journal of Politics, Economics and World Affairs. Over the past six
months, DUJPEW’s staff has worked tirelessly to compile an issue that would not only allow
undergraduates to share their own ideas, but also contribute meaningfully to a wide field of
academic research. For this reason, the articles we have chosen to publish are not necessarily
connected by theme, but rather approach.
The effects of globalization have resulted in a massive shift in the standard frameworks of
interaction at every rank. Global power dynamics are evolving in a way and at a rate that many
would not have predicted even 20 years ago. While these large-scale transformations are
typically dictated by central institutions, their effects are felt, often most strongly, in
disenfranchised and distant locales. As a result, it is necessary not only to construct these broad
trends at the global scale, but also contextualize their impact on marginalized communities. We
received over 200 submissions for this issue and selected the eight which provided the most
thoughtful and thorough investigations of topics both representative of and anomalous among
these social formations, providing nuanced analysis with an interdisciplinary approach.
Above all, it is the hope of our executive board that this issue and future issues of DUJPEW will
serve as a means for undergraduates to create and communicate meaningful scholarly content in
a world where they will inevitably emerge as the next-generation of policy-makers, business
leaders, and societal innovators. Nelson Rockefeller, a member of the Dartmouth Class of 1930,
once said “it is essential that we enable young people to see themselves as participants in one of
the most exciting eras in history, and to have a sense of purpose in relation to it”. While his era
has passed, the sentiment remains as true today as it was then.
I want to thank the entire DUJPEW staff for the time that they’ve committed to the journal over
the past half-year. On top of all of the work that went into publishing this issue, every member of
the team played a role in founding this journal. Without knowing what kind of success DUJPEW
would experience or what direction it would take, everyone agreed to work towards one goal and
nothing would have been possible if it weren’t for that commitment. To Jacob, thank you for
your keen judgment and support throughout this project. To Emma and Sahil, thank you for your
meticulous dedication to both the selection and editing processes. To our authors, thank you for
your intellectual curiosity, commitment to your ideas, and continued effort in working with us
through the first iteration of a rapidly improving process. Finally, thank you to Dean Lacy,
DUJPEW’s faculty adviser. Your guidance is the reason we were able to turn a simple idea into
something we are all immensely proud of. The influence of each of these individuals, as well as
the rest of our team, is reflected in the pages that follow.
Mason Wegener ’20
Editor-in-Chief
Dartmouth Undergraduate Journal of Politics, Economics and World Affairs
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Growth Ambitions and Rising Powers: Sino-Indian Asymmetric Balancing in Bilateral, Regional,
and Multilateral Settings
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Abstract
This paper applies the legal framework of forum shopping to three levels of Sino-Indian
relations: bilateral border disputes, regional balancing, and multilateral competition. Brantly
Womack’s asymmetric power theory is often used to explain the behavior of India and China,
two emerging states of unequal capabilities.

However, shown by the application of forum

shopping, his theory fails to consider the increasing costs to non-cooperation as relations move
into the regional and multilateral realms. Multilateral competition is, therefore, the forum with
the highest likelihood of Sino-Indian cooperation, which can spill over and reduce tensions in
bilateral and regional relations as well.
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Introduction
In a meeting between Chinese President Xi Jinping and former Indian Prime Minister
Manmohan Singh at the 2013 BRICS summit, Xi described the two states as “the world’s two
largest developing nations with a similar historic mission to boost their social and economic
development.”1 While BRICS summits are just one forum in which China and India interact, an
analysis of their bilateral, regional, and multilateral relations paint pictures quite different than
Xi’s idealistic statement. As competition increasingly divides these two emerging powers, the
policy decisions made by both New Delhi and Beijing do not always reflect this sense of a
shared historic mission.
Applying the legal framework of “forum shopping,” the paper will analyze three forums
of Sino-Indian relations—bilateral border disputes, regional balancing in the Indian Ocean and
Southeast Asia (SEA), and multilateral power competition—to expose how each emerging power
views the other.2 Traditionally, scholars have relied on Brantly Womack’s asymmetric power
theory to examine Chinese relations with its neighbors, including India. Using a model of a
larger state (A) and a smaller state (B), Womack predicts how neighboring states with
asymmetric capabilities will interact.3 As he explains, B has proportionally more to gain or lose
in its relationship with A than A does in its relationship with B.4 The consequent asymmetry in
vulnerabilities creates different expectations for the relationship:

B primarily wants A to

acknowledge its autonomy, while A primarily expects deference from B—meaning B
acknowledges the real difference in power between the two states.5 If an action of the opposing
state breaches these expectations, both states feel threatened, and a vicious, conflictual cycle
between B’s search for recognized autonomy and A’s search for deference will emerge.6 Overall,
Womack’s asymmetry theory concludes that actions taken by A will have a greater impact on B
than that of B on A, which has characterized the relationship between China (A) and India (B)
since the takeoff of Chinese economic growth.7
However, while the ongoing border disputes between China and India follow asymmetry
theory’s policy predictions, the cases of regional balancing and global power competition
uncover a changing Sino-Indian dynamic. In the case of each country’s economic presence and
political influence in the Southeast Asian region, India’s security involvement in the Indian
Page 8! of !174
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Ocean and “Look East Policy” interfere with Beijing’s goal of regional hegemony, thus
challenging its own asymmetric relations with China. Moreover, relative soft power and shared
interests in multipolarity at the multilateral level are essential to India’s ability to defy its
traditionally asymmetric relations with China. Although Womack predicts that any disturbance
in an asymmetric power relationship will cause conflict between state A and state B, the pressure
for cooperation at the global level will improve Sino-Indian relations overall, as the costs of noncooperation multiply. Thus, multilateralism is the ideal forum for India to equalize its current
asymmetric balance with China.

Forum 1: Border Disputes in Sino-Indian Bilateral Relations
Borders have played a vital role in Sino-Chinese bilateral relations since the 1950
Chinese annexation of Tibet, immediately following the victory of the Chinese Communist Party
(CCP) in China’s 1949 civil war.8 Since that 1950 annexation, border disputes between China
and India have been a principle source of distrust between the two powers, which has reinforced
their asymmetric power relationship. India—the smaller state—has worried for the past halfcentury about Chinese security presence along its borders, and China has done very little to
assuage such fears among Indian leaders and scholars.
asymmetric nature of bilateral Sino-Indian relations:

Two border disputes exemplify this

the cases of Tibet and the Jammu and

Kashmir region.

Tibet and the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence
The Chinese annexation of Tibet in 1950 eliminated the historic buffer space between
colonial India and China, which left some Indian leaders uneasy.9 China viewed Tibet as a part
of its empire stolen by European imperial powers, and this annexation is just one example of
China’s attempts to win back lost lands through negotiations with neighbors.10 Despite their
concern over this aggressive CCP border policy, Indian leaders agreed to sign the Panchsheel
Agreement of 1954, which not only recognized Chinese control of Tibet but also established the
Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence between China and India.11 The Five Principles include
the following—largely superficial—rules for Sino-Indian bilateral relations: respect for each
Page 9! of !174
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other’s territorial integrity and sovereignty, non-aggression, non-interference in each other’s
domestic affairs, equality and cooperation for mutual benefit, and peaceful coexistence.12
Although Indian leaders pushed to include these principles in the main text of the Panchsheel
Agreement, China succeeded in downplaying their significance by limiting the principles to the
preamble.13
It is, therefore, not surprising that distrust grew into an armed conflict along the border
area of Tibet in 1962, which created a “Nehru-induced delusion”—referring to the postindependence Indian Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru—that India was a victim of unprovoked
Chinese aggression. 14 To apply Womack’s theory to this victimization, China, the larger power,
invaded the autonomy of India, the smaller power. Not only did Nehru create this sense of
victimhood among Indian leaders but his views supporting Tibet’s independence also infringed
on what China viewed as its historical right to the area.15 Distrust and suspicion continued to
grow, for the actions of both the larger state and the smaller state invaded their respective desires
for deference and autonomy. Shen Dingli argues that China and India’s “problematic handling”
of this border dispute prevented the long-term cultivation of the Five Principles of Peaceful
Coexistence, thus foregoing the opportunity to build a bilateral partnership at an early stage in
their relations.16 This conflictual beginning to Sino-Indian politics hurt their historic capability
to cooperate bilaterally, regionally, and multilaterally, as distrust continued to plague their
asymmetric relationship.
Rajiv Sikri argues that Tibet remains “the single most important factor driving SinoIndian relations,” a view that originated from Mao Zedong and still influences contemporary
Chinese thinking.17 In fact, the Beijing Review, News from China, and People’s Daily Online—
all publications controlled by the CCP—still reiterate that Tibet is a part of modern China.18
Although China’s hold on Tibet has become more economically motivated, the Tibet question
continues to cloud Sino-Indian relations. It enforces the asymmetric power relation between the
two states, for Indian leaders—just as they did when signing the Panchsheel Agreement—have
been unable or unwilling to counter growing Chinese security and economic presence. This
border dispute will remain a major challenge to Sino-Indian bilateral relations as long as both
powers abide by the predictions from Womack’s asymmetry theory.
Page 10
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The Princely States of Jammu and Kashmir
In addition to Tibet, the princely states of Jammu and Kashmir between India and
Pakistan are a notable source of Sino-Indian border conflict. The complicated history of these
two princely states dates back to March 26, 1846, when the Treaty of Amritsar drew out their
borders following the Anglo-Sikh War.19 In 1947, the princely states were divided into three
main sub-units:

India-controlled Jammu and Kashmir, Pakistan-controlled Azad Jammu and

Kashmir, and Gilgit-Baltistan, a part of which Pakistan ceded to China in 1963.20 Pakistan gave
over 5,000 square miles of the Gilgit-Baltistan territory to China as a part of a border agreement,
which arguably marked the beginning of today’s close Sino-Pakistan relationship.21 However,
the cooperation between China and Pakistan since that agreement has only enforced suspicions
among Indian leaders, and as long as Sino-Pakistan relations remain strong, Sino-Indian bilateral
relations are unlikely to improve.
Even excluding China’s presence in the Jammu and Kashmir region, India sees Kashmir
—a majority Muslim province in secular India—as “a jewel in the crown of Indian
nationalism.”22 At the same time, Pakistan, a Muslim-majority country, views Kashmir as a part
of its own nation, following the arguments of the post-independence “two-nation theory” of
Pakistan and India.23 Pakistan’s ceding of the Gilgit-Baltistan region to China further threatened
the deeply identity-based rationale for India’s partition of the princely states. Similar to the
Chinese image of Tibet as belonging to the “motherland” of China, India views Jammu and
Kashmir as belonging to its own motherland.24 This border dispute, thus, exemplifies Womack’s
asymmetry theory in that China, the larger state, does not care about India’s rationale for
controlling Jammu and Kashmir and, therefore, does not accept Indian autonomy. Furthermore,
the role of Pakistan in the case of Jammu and Kashmir further complicates the asymmetry, as
China cooperates with a historical adversary of India.
In the past few years, the political significance of the Gilgit-Baltistan region has
expanded with Chinese economic growth.

In November 2014, the Chinese government

committed 45.6 billion US dollars to the building of the China Pakistan Economic Corridor
(CPEC), which will run directly through Gilgit-Baltistan and give China direct access to
Pakistan’s Gwadar Port.25 Because of the region’s rich hydro resources, mineral wealth, and
Page 11
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forest reserves, Priyanka Singh argues that it is “almost impossible” to imagine CPEC without
Gilgit-Baltistan.26 Not only will CPEC increase China’s economic stakes in Pakistan but it will
also inevitably increase Chinese security presence along India’s northwest border in the Jammu
and Kashmir region.27

An increased Chinese economic and security presence along this

contested border area will further invade Indian autonomy, but China has shown no concern for
such an intrusion. CPEC, therefore, very clearly exposes both China’s indifference towards India
and its expectation for deference from its less-powerful southern neighbor.
To conclude, the border disputes along Tibet and the Jammu and Kashmir region still
greatly define—and impede—Sino-Indian bilateral cooperation. Border disputes are the origin
of a significant amount of distrust between the two powers, which will continue as long as China
intrudes into Indian domestic autonomy. This analysis of border disputes shows that Womack’s
asymmetry theory does apply to the Sino-Indian relationship today, and as a result, bilateral
relations are the least likely forum for a softening of their asymmetric power balance. Neither
India nor China will likely overcome their conflicting historical or economic interests in these
border regions, therefore preventing future cooperation.

Forum 2: Regional Cooperation and Competition in Asia
As China and India grow economically, both powers will compete for increased security
presence in the Indian Ocean and greater economic cooperation with Southeast Asia (SEA).
Sino-Indian regional balancing actually presents an opportunity to transform their asymmetric
relationship, for India’s “Look East Policy” (LEP) intrudes upon the traditionally asymmetric
power relations between Southeast Asian nations and China. China’s growing presence in both
the Indian Ocean and SEA poses three potential outcomes that require a consequently aggressive
Indian regional policy: Beijing as a maritime power, Beijing as a maritime economy, and Beijing
as a “polygonal power” in both security and economics.28 At the same time, India’s increased
maritime involvement creates new dynamics for China’s regional policy. This second forum of
Sino-Indian relations, thus, presents a transition from the two countries’ very asymmetric
bilateral relations to more balanced regional competition.

Page 12
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Security in the Indian Ocean
Indian and Chinese maritime strategy has grown more aggressive in the Indian Ocean,
reflecting a slight shift in their asymmetry. China sees ocean politics as a “new frontier,” not
only to consolidate its regional power but also to ensure its access to global markets.29

In

addition to CPEC, other policy actions recently taken by China in the Indian Ocean Rim (IOR)
include the construction of ports, pipelines, and commercial bases—some of which run directly
through India’s South Asian neighbors.30

At first, New Delhi ignored China’s expansionary

strategy across the Indian Ocean because its leaders falsely believed Beijing would fail to
challenge Indian IOR dominance.31 However, while New Delhi failed to respond, China built
ports in Sri Lanka, deployed nuclear submarines in Karachi, and strengthened its security ties
with various countries in SEA. 32 Once the Indian government realized the extent of China’s
threat to their regional dominance, New Delhi adopted more aggressive policy in the IOR.
The past decade saw two shifts in India’s maritime policy.

First, India boosted the

protection of its coastline following the Mumbai attacks of 2008, in which Pakistani terrorists
sailed to the coast of Mumbai.33 Second, and with greater implications for Chinese presence in
the IOR, New Delhi updated is naval strategy in 2015 with a shift from “using” its surrounding
seas to “securing” them.34 India hopes to transform itself from a passive beneficiary of its IOR
access to an active security provider in the Indian Ocean, in order to balance Chinese security
presence in the region. While China continues to construct ports and improve its access to the
Indian Ocean, current Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi has announced his commitment to
“consolidating India’s maritime ties and collaborating with Indian neighbors on maritime
security.” 35 In contrast with border disputes, New Delhi’s more active rhetoric and policy in the
Indian Ocean exposes the importance of regional balancing in the evening of their asymmetric
relationship.
New Delhi’s overall regional security architecture does not include single-power
domination over the Indian Ocean. 36

While not explicitly stating that it aspires for such

domination, Beijing has focused on a regional security environment in which mutual trust
guarantees stability and bridges policy differences “through dialogue on an equal footing.”37
Thus, the IOR region is potentially a space of both competition and cooperation between India
Page 13
! of !174
Published by Dartmouth Digital Commons, 2018

13

Dartmouth Undergraduate Journal of Politics, Economics and World Affairs, Vol. 1 [2018], Iss. 1, Art. 1

and China, as both share common interests in regional stability and securing access to global
markets.38 However, India’s response to Chinese aggression renders the Indian Ocean the first
potential forum that challenges Womack’s asymmetry theory.

ASEAN in Sino-Indian Regional Competition
Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, and Thailand founded the Association of Southeast
Asian Nations (ASEAN) on August 8, 1967, and its role in Sino-Indian relations has grown as
both powers attempt to expand their regional influence. 39 Originally envisioned to be a “riskavoiding organization,” these countries created ASEAN to minimize the threat of conflict either
within the region or with external actors.40 Since the boom in Chinese economic growth, SinoASEAN relations represent an easy application of Womack’s asymmetry theory, even more so
than that of India and China.

ASEAN includes relatively small states that do not pose a

challenge to China’s rise globally or regionally.

However, India’s Look East Policy (LEP),

which was originally proposed in 1991, interferes with the traditional asymmetric balance
between ASEAN and China.41 By interfering in the Sino-ASEAN relationship, New Delhi has
proven not only that it is a rising regional power but also that this rise corresponds with an
alteration in its own asymmetry with China.
The Look East Policy has two primary policy focuses: increased economic integration
with ASEAN and a strengthened security architecture between India and the region. Although
LEP originally sought to enhance India’s global position after the Cold War, the first formal
arrangements between India and ASEAN began in the early 2000s with the signing of various
free trade agreements.42 In 2009, total trade between India and ASEAN was 39.1 billion US
dollars, but this trade volume grew 41.8 percent in 2010, to 55.4 billion US dollars.43 This 2010
volume constitutes about 2.7 percent of total ASEAN trade.44 As comparison, Sino-ASEAN
trade totaled about 362.9 billion US dollars in 2011, which constituted an increase by nearly 24
percent compared to 2010.45

Although these numbers show China’s trade dominance with

Southeast Asia, the foundation of the ASEAN-Indian Free Trade Agreement (AIFTA) in 2010
was a “milestone” achievement of India’s Look East Policy.46 Furthermore, some scholars point
to the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) as another opportunity for Indian
Page 14
! of !174
https://digitalcommons.dartmouth.edu/dujpew/vol1/iss1/1

14

Editorial Board: Volume I | Issue I | 2018

integration into the Southeast-Asian trade network.47 India’s increased trade with its eastern
neighbors, along with agreements like RCEP and the AIFTA, are essential for New Delhi’s
attempt to balance China in the region. As the Indian economy continues to grow, its Look East
Policy will make cooperation with India even more appealing to the ASEAN nations.
The second and more recent tenant of LEP aims to improve security cooperation within
Southeast Asia.

In fact, under current Prime Minister Modi, the Look East Policy has

transitioned into an “Act East” policy, meaning that Indian actions in Southeast Asia have
intensified in both economic and strategic scope.48 While the original Look East Policy focused
primarily on the economic benefits of trade with ASEAN, this Act East policy stance responds to
China’s growing security presence in the region.49 New Delhi has endorsed an open, inclusive,
and “polycentric” security environment in Southeast Asia.50 In addition, the unofficial Act East
policy includes increased defense spending and political engagements with ASEAN, such as the
provision of patrol vessels and lines of credit to the region. 51 The increasingly active Indian
security cooperation with ASEAN nations, along with its economic integration, contrasts
significantly with Indian policy in bilateral relations. New Delhi will likely become a serious
regional player, and in the process, it may be able to force some deference from China in the
region. This reversal in asymmetry—or, more likely, evening of asymmetry—results in part
from the addition of actors in regional balancing.

Involvement with ASEAN nations will

determine the future of India and China’s ability to balance, and potentially cooperate, in
Southeast Asia.
Looking at China’s attitude towards the Look East Policy, a 2011 editorial in the official
newspaper of the Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA), PLA Daily, argued that New Delhi’s
new security posture was an attempt to contain China.52 While public discourse acknowledges
India’s growing regional influence, Beijing’s criticism of LEP often contains doubt that India
will become an active regional leader. 53 The asymmetric power balance theory, therefore, still
exists at the regional level at least to the extent that China has yet to see India as a challenger to
its own regional goals. Nonetheless, security and economic competition renders the regional
forum more promising for the equalization of Sino-Indian asymmetry than the bilateral forum.
As China and India compete for political, naval, and economic influence in the Indian Ocean and
Page 15
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Southeast Asia, the former may eventually defer to the growing power of the latter—thus defying
Womack’s theory.

Forum 3: Coexistence in a Multipolar World Order
The third and final forum of Sino-Indian relations is multilateralism. As discussed above,
domestic border disputes enforced Womack’s theory of asymmetric power politics, and changes
in regional balancing present nascent transformations in how the states cooperate and compete
with each other.

However, their participation in global policy forums like the BRICS and

Bretton Woods institutions marks a new evolution of how China and India see each other.54
These two emerging powers share an interest in multipolarity, and through both the expansion of
Indian soft power and the global restraints on Chinese actions, New Delhi can defy the
asymmetry defining their relationship today. In a truly multipolar global system, India will no
longer ask for recognized autonomy from China, and China will no longer be able to demand
deference from India.

Soft Power in BRICS Leadership
The BRICS nations—Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa—challenge the
traditional division between developing and developed countries. Two of these nations—India
and China—distinguish themselves from the other three members of this abbreviation, for their
population and economic growth have made them models for other developing countries. As
stated at the fourth BRICS summit in New Delhi in 2012, the member countries present a
platform “for dialogue and cooperation amongst countries that represent 43 percent of the
world’s population, for the promotion of peace, security and development in a multi-polar, interdependent and increasingly complex, globalizing world.”55 With the BRICS nations accounting
for about half of global economic growth today, cooperation between India and China will be
essential to bring global attention to developing-country interests.56 Strong leadership is required
for the BRICS to succeed, and it thus presents an opportunity for India to challenge Chinese
economic domination with normative appeals to other developing countries.
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Starting with Beijing’s approach to the BRICS, many Chinese scholars see the forum as a
pathway to challenge traditional United States (US) hegemony. Promising to never act as a
hegemony, Chinese foreign policy has historically centered on the autonomy of all nations.57 To
achieve autonomy and a multipolar system, Chinese scholars point to two key trends that must
occur: first, a high level of global economic and financial integration; and second, the multipolarization of global politics.58 The focus on economic integration explains China’s
collaboration with the other BRICS powers, whose simultaneous growth is essential to the
challenge of the current US-dominated world order. In contrast with China’s outwardly antiWestern attitude, India’s approach to the BRICS—along with the Group of 20 (G-20)—has
primarily addressed issues of economic and political global governance in general. 59

This

difference in approach to the BRICS marks a key opportunity for India to represent developing
nations in a way that China has failed to do so. Because the BRICS institutions represent a new
world order with greater power in the hands of developing nations, New Delhi should focus on
harnessing its soft power to advance its position among the BRICS.
Joseph Nye, who first established the theory of soft power in international relations,
defines it as the “attraction that makes others want what you want.”60 Soft power differs from
coercion, or what Nye calls “sticks,” and economic payment, or “carrots,” in that it rests on the
ability to shape the preferences of others to align with one’s own.61 Following to a certain extent
their overall visions of the BRICS, Indian and Chinese soft-power strategy will be a key
determinant in their leadership of other developing nations. For instance, China’s soft power
relies heavily on the appeal of its growing economy, which coincides with expanded Chinese
foreign investment and humanitarian aid in developing countries.62 On the other hand, being the
world’s largest democracy, Indian soft power derives from its image as a political model for
developing nations.63 Amit Kumar Gupta explains that India’s soft-power strategy has also
centered on capacity building among developing nations, whereas China primarily directs its
resources towards infrastructure building.64 If India continues to distinguish itself from China as
a democratic state that works to improve the political and economic capacity of its fellow
developing countries, it will strengthen both its soft power and its leadership presence among the
BRICS.65 Womack’s theory, which focuses on the physical or economic size of states, fails to
Page 17
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consider the role soft power plays in the relative global positions of states.

In some cases,

relative soft power can be more important to a state’s ability to cooperate multilaterally than pure
economic power, which is essential to India’s emerging leadership in the BRICS.

Bretton Woods, Multipolarity, and Mutual Interests
In addition to soft power in BRICS leadership, the Bretton Woods institutions reveal the
shared stakes China and India have in multipolarity. Because Chinese scholars see global
economic integration as a necessary element for multipolarity, Beijing’s critiques of the Bretton
Woods institutions provide insight into Chinese multilateral strategy. For instance, Beijing has
criticized the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank for their lack of
transparency and slow pace of voting-rights reform, which favor the US and other Western
powers based on their monetary contribution to the institution. 66

The Asian Infrastructure

Investment Bank (AIIB) and the BRICS New Development Bank (NDB) are direct responses to
the lack of reform of these Bretton Woods institutions, respectively.67 Finally, exposing the
tension between Beijing’s vision for international trade and that of Washington, D.C., China has
been involved in more anti-dumping and countervailing trade disputes in the World Trade
Organization (WTO) than expected at its entry.68 Overall, Beijing’s approach to challenging
these Bretton Woods institutions exposes its attempts to balance the US and Europe.
Arndt Michael calls India’s approach to multipolarity and global institutions “Panchsheel
Multilateralism,” which refers back to New Delhi’s emphasis on peaceful coexistence as outlined
in its 1954 agreement with China.69 Following the ideal of multipolar peaceful coexistence of all
states, Indian discourse in regards to the Bretton Woods institutions focuses on the
democratization of the decision-making process.70 In the IMF, India has criticized the slow pace
of voting rights reform similar to China, but it has also called for more general reform of the
governance structure, to improve equality among states parties.71 Next, New Delhi has demanded
that World Bank policy become friendlier to developing societies and economies.72

Finally,

India has faced anti-dumping and countervailing trade disputes in the WTO, but in contrast with
China, complaints have rarely come from the US and Europe.73 For India, the Bretton Woods
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institutions, thus, provide an opportunity to promote greater equality between the global North
and South.
Although Sino-Indian competition still exists at the global level, the root of their interests
in reform lies in one shared goal: multipolarity. Whether the world eventually follows India’s
norm-based, Panchsheel Multilateralism or China’s economic-based, anti-Western
multilateralism, both powers’ stakes in multipolarity create a policy forum for Sino-Indian
cooperation.74

Neither India nor China can reform institutions like those of Bretton Woods

without the other, so the intersection of multilateral interests defies Womack’s theory of
asymmetric power balancing. If we base Sino-Indian relations solely on each state’s size or
economic might, China would be Womack’s state A, or the large power. However, with the
addition of variables like soft power and shared interests, India becomes more important to
China’s long-term policy goals. As the difference in power between the two states diminishes on
the multilateral stage, China can no longer expect complete deference from India. Womack’s
asymmetry theory crumbles in this third forum, which explains why multilateralism is the ideal
forum for Sino-Indian relations. Not only does the division between Indian and Chinese power
diminish in global interactions, but the likelihood of conflict falls with multilateral cooperation
compared to borders disputes. With widening mutual interests, the multilateral forum increases
the costs of non-cooperation, therefore forcing both India and China to cooperate in ways
unlikely in their bilateral and regional relations.

Conclusion
Brantly Womack’s theory of asymmetric power relations predicts that when power
asymmetries exist, a larger power will demand deference and a smaller power will demand
autonomy.75 Applying Womack’s theory to Sino-Indian relations at the bilateral, regional, and
multilateral level, this paper found that an asymmetric power balance primarily exists in the first
of these three policy forums. Regional and multilateral competition mark a transition in the
balance between India and China, in which the costs of non-cooperation expand with the number
of external state actors and the overlapping of political interests. Consequently, the larger the cost
of non-cooperation, the less asymmetric both players become. New Delhi and Beijing may still
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see each other as competitors, but the future symmetry of Sino-Indian relations lies in their
ability to peacefully balance and collaborate multilaterally. Cooperation has already occurred,
and will likely continue, in this third forum of their complex relationship. As former Indian
Prime Minister Manmohan Singh emphasized in various speeches, the world does have enough
space for the growth ambitions of India and China, and this space begins with their participation
in multilateral institutions.76
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Abstract
Supporters of the nuclear non-proliferation regime seek to reduce the threat of nuclear
weapons faced by the international community. Although there is vast support for the elimination
of nuclear weapons, governments struggle to find common ground and promote progress.
Member countries of the European Union in particular, who supposedly share one Common
Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), fail to reach a consensus on the Treaty on the Prohibition of
Nuclear Weapons. This paper seeks to explain what has caused member countries of the
European Union (EU), which claim to speak with one collective voice, to deviate from the
apparent status quo.
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Introduction
Key Concepts
There are several key concepts in this research project. Proliferation is the spread of
nuclear weapons, nuclear weapons technology, materials, and information that could help a state
develop nuclear weapons. 1 As defined by the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear
Weapons (NPT), a Nuclear Weapons State (NWS) is “one which has manufactured and exploded
a nuclear weapon or other nuclear explosive device prior to 1 January 1967”.2 A Non-Nuclear
Weapons State (NNWS) is a state that has not detonated, developed, or acquired nuclear
weapons. A nuclear host state is a state that does not possess nuclear weapons of its own but
stores functional nuclear weapons on its territory. A Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone (NWFZ) is an
area that bans the use, development, or deployment of nuclear weapons.3 A nuclear umbrella
refers to the protection that a country allegedly gains through an alliance with a nuclear weapons
state. This project focuses on the new Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons, also known
as the Nuclear Ban Treaty (NBT), which opened for signing on September 20, 2017.

Hypothesis
The question that this paper seeks to answer is: What explains the positions of EU
countries concerning support for or opposition to the prohibition of nuclear weapons under the
Nuclear Ban Treaty? Based on an analysis of each country’s allegiance commitments, nuclear
arsenals, national security concerns, and interpretations of treaty language, this paper
hypothesizes that competing identities are the source of discrepancy in attitude towards the NBT.
Specifically, conflicting policies and expectations challenge EU members of the North Atlantic
Treaty Organization (NATO), which give them a unique role on the world stage. Through a
constructivist understanding, social constructs such as norms and discourse demonstrate
significant influence on the decision-making processes of EU countries.4 The timeline this paper
focuses on is post-Cold War, 1990 to present, as the end of the war marks a turning point in
international attitude towards nuclear weapons and proliferation. This period includes the
codification of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) and indefinite extension of the NPT,
two significant pieces of legislation geared towards non-proliferation. This time period is useful
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when evaluating the current situation, as the global community had appeared to find common
ground on the issue but has since shown divergence regarding the NBT.

Literature Review
Scholars such as Beatrice Heuser, Kristan Stoddart5, Dong-Joon Jo, and Erik Gartzke6 use
a realist approach to identify deterrence as a main variable of proliferation, a concept associated
with a country’s resources and capabilities. Other scholars such as Robert Keohane, Lisa Martin7,
and Neal G. Jesse8 use a more liberalist approach to identify cooperation, verification, and the
role of institutions as key variables. Markedly, these scholars overlook the paramount role of
identity and norms in the proliferation process. Jesse explores the components of a state’s
identity and the impact that those components have on foreign policy, which is relevant to this
analysis. This paper’s argument follows that of William C. Potter9 who analyzes the impact of
the humanitarian-initiative movement (HIM) on the disarmament process through a
constructivist lens, with a focus on the role of discourse. Constructivists seek to understand the
process of how international norms evolve and play a role in the behavior of states.10
Constructivism involves analyzing interactions between individuals and structures through
methods such as discourse analysis to see how states shape identities and interests.11 Potter found
that differing opinions on the issue had a significant impact on multilateral disarmament and
non-proliferation diplomacy, and are likely to remain a component of nuclear negotiations in the
future.

Research Design
This comparative case study encompasses analyses of government policy statements and
declassified documents, treaty documents, conference records, white papers, and public speeches
made by political leaders at United Nations conferences. Initially, this research sought to identify
patterns in orientation towards the NBT within the scope of EU members and NATO members.
These patterns were then compared with support or lack thereof for the NPT, the CTBT, a
potential Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty (FMCT), and NWFZs. Data collection presented four
notable outliers: Austria, Ireland, the Netherlands, and Poland, due to strong orientation towards
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the NBT and nuclear non-proliferation. The purpose of this research is to determine what
variables were most influential in constructing these particularly conspicuous positions.

Outliers
Austria and Ireland are two advocate outliers that have shown adamant support for the
treaty and non-proliferation regime as a whole. Austria and Ireland were among the few states
that voted in favor of the draft NBT, and while the majority of others abstained, the Netherlands
was the only country from any region to vote against the draft. A fourth outlier is Poland, not
because it has a dominant role in the implementation process, but because it has a unique history
and a correspondingly unique course of action regarding nuclear proliferation, which warrants
further analysis. These four countries are not the only EU states to have differing views on the
NBT, but they are the most prominent and practical for comparison. This paper will only briefly
mention the United Kingdom and France, as they are also outliers for obvious reasons, such as
their status as NWS.

Regional Anti-Proliferation Index
To gauge commitment to the non-proliferation agenda, the regional Anti-Proliferation
Index measures involvement in the legal regime based on military expenditures, nuclear weapon
arsenal size, support for the NPT, CTBT, Draft NBT, and official NBT, and presence at the
United Nations Conference to Negotiate a Legally-Binding Instrument to Prohibit Nuclear
Weapons, Leaning Towards their Total Elimination. A country will get one point (+1) if its
military expenditures have consistently decreased since 1990, no points (0) if the percentage
spent remains the same and lose points if it has increased overall (-1). A country will receive one
point (+1) for decreasing its nuclear arsenal size, receive no points (0) for maintaining the same
arsenal size, and lose one point for increasing its arsenal size (-1). If a country is a nuclear host
state, meaning that it stores the nuclear weapons of other NWS on its territory, it will lose 0.5
points (-0.5). Ratification of selected treaties receives one point (+1), followed by accessions and
successions (+0.75 points), signatories (+0.5), non-signatories (0), and withdrawals (-1).
Similarly, a vote for the NBT draft treaty receives one point (+1), abstentions receive no points
Page 29
! of !174
Published by Dartmouth Digital Commons, 2018

29

Dartmouth Undergraduate Journal of Politics, Economics and World Affairs, Vol. 1 [2018], Iss. 1, Art. 1

(0), and an opposition vote results in a loss of one point (-1). Regarding the 2017 United Nations
Conference to Negotiate a Legally Binding Instrument to Prohibit Nuclear Weapons, Leading
towards their Total Elimination, presence receives one point (+1) and absence receives no points
(0). A country will be awarded extra points if it makes a statement at the conference (+0.5), sends
more than the average number of representatives (+0.75), or holds a leadership position at the
conference (+1), because these factors further exemplify noteworthy engagement.
The country that has the highest number of points is the most active in non-proliferation
efforts based on the chosen variables. The following chart represents the point system:
Trajectory of Military Expenditure
1990-2016 (%GDP)*
Overall decrease in spending
+1
No change in spending overall 0
Overall increase in spending
-1
Nuclear Weapon Arsenal Size (1990-2017)
Decrease in size
+1
No change in size 0
Nuclear Host
-0.5
Increase in size
-1

Support for NPT, CTBT, NBT

*Counted separately for each treaty

Ratification +1
Accession/Succession
Signature
+0.5
No signature 0
Withdrawal -1

+0.75

Draft NBT Vote
Vote for
+1
Did not vote
0
Vote against -1

Presence and Involvement in 2017 Conference
Present
+1
Absent
0
BONUS POINTS:
Statement +0.5
More than average # of reps
+0.75
Leadership position +1
*Complete 2017 Military expenditure data is not yet available.

Data comes from the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, the World Bank Group, the United
Nations, and the United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs. The average number of
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representatives present per country at the 2017 NBT Conference is five, determined by dividing
the total number of representatives present at the conference by the total number of countries
present.
Anti-Proliferation Index (API): Europe
1990-2017
Country

Score
Expenditur Arsenal
e (MX)

NPT

CTBT

N B T NBT
Draft

Presence

Rank

Austria

+1

0

+1

+1

+1

+0.5

+2.75

7.25

1

Belgium

+1

-0.5

+1

+1

0

0

0

2.5

9*

Bulgaria

+1

0

+1

+1

0

0

0

3

7*

Croatia

+1

0

+0.75

+1

0

0

0

2.75

8*

Cyprus

+1

0

+0.75

+1

+1

0

+1

4.75

4

C z e c h +1
Republic

0

+0.75

+1

0

0

2.75

8*

Denmark

+1

0

+1

+1

0

0

0

3

7*

Estonia

-1

0

+0.75

+1

0

0

0

0.75

11*

Finland

0

0

+1

+1

0

0

0

2

10

France

+1

+1

+0.75

+1

0

0

0

3.75

5

Germany

+1

-0.5

+1

+1

0

0

0

2.5

9*

Greece

+1

0

+1

+1

0

0

0

3

7*

Hungary

+1

0

+1

+1

0

0

0

3

7*

Ireland

+1

0

+1

+1

+1

+0.5

+1.75

6.25

2*

Italy

+1

-0.5

+1

+1

0

0

0

3.5

6*

Latvia

-1

0

+0.75

+1

0

0

0

2.5

9*

Lithuania

-1

0

+0.75

+1

0

0

0

0.75

11*

Luxembour +1
g

0

+1

+1

0

0

0

3

7*

Malta

0

+1

+1

+1

0

+1

5

3

+1
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Netherland +1
s

-0.5

+1

+1

-1

0

+2.25

3.75

5

Poland

+1

0

+1

+1

0

0

0

3

7*

Portugal

+1

0

+0.75

+1

0

0

0

2.75

8*

Romania

+1

0

+1

+1

0

0

0

3

7*

Slovakia

+1

0

+0.75

+1

0

0

0

2.75

8*

Slovenia

+1

0

+0.75

+1

0

0

0

2.75

8*

Sweden

+1

0

+1

+1

+1

0

+2.25

6.25

2*

Spain

+1

0

+0.75

+1

0

0

0

2.75

8*

United
Kingdom**

+1

+0.5 +1
**

+1

0

0

0

3.5

6*

*Tie
**The United Kingdom received +0.5 for Nuclear Arsenal Size because although it has been
decreasing its stockpile, there was a period of inconsistency from 1998 to 2005, during which its
nuclear warhead supply increased.

The API for Europe shows Austria ranked first with the maximum number of points possible
(7.25). This means that Austria is the most active in terms of non-proliferation efforts. Following
closely behind are Ireland and Sweden, tied for second at 6.25 points. The Netherlands is ranked
exactly fifth, which means that it is relatively active since no ties exist before sixth place.
Poland’s activity is average, as it tied with seven other countries for seventh place. This index is
applicable to all regions of the world. 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20

Background
Ireland
Since 1958, Ireland has led the disarmament movement with its “Irish Resolutions”
proposal, also known as the foundation for the NPT.21 As the “first signatory and leading voice”
of the NPT, Ireland continues to present itself as a strong advocate for disarmament, having been
one of the few countries to sign the NBT document immediately on September 20, 2017.
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Ireland has a long history of British rule and now assumes an international position of
neutrality22. Its decision to become neutral came from its resistance to the asymmetrical power
between itself and Britain.23 Irish-British relations have improved post-colonization, but the Irish
government continues to work to establish and maintain an identity that is completely
independent of the United Kingdom. Ireland joined the EU in 1973 and is not a member of
NATO but participates in the Partnership for Peace (PfP) program, which allows it to work with
the alliance without having to become a member.24
Ireland does not possess any nuclear weapons, nor does it utilize nuclear energy, which is
largely due to government’s ability to afford the long-term financial commitment. The Irish
government is already struggling to meet its renewable energy requirement under the European
Union’s 2020 goals, but according to former Energy Minister Alex White, Ireland is unlikely to
utilize nuclear energy in the future.25 This is because the Radiological Protection Institute of
Ireland places firm regulations on the use of nuclear energy through the Radiological Protection
Act of 1991, and because the potential environmental and safety concerns of nuclear energy
worry the public.26 27
Ireland’s defense spending is the lowest in the region, which raises concern regarding
national security.28 Ireland is ill prepared to defend itself unless Irish leaders believe that the
CFSP as a formidable means of defense. It cannot even rely on deterrence because it lacks the
minimum capability necessary to have a credible defense system.29 A 2015 White Paper released
by the government stated that “maintaining military capabilities...is too expensive”.30 For such
reasons Ireland is particularly vulnerable to conventional attacks, invasions, or wars, let alone
nuclear incidents. Ireland’s overall vulnerability explains its aggressive nonproliferation stance.

Austria
Austria has also presented itself as a main force behind nuclear disarmament. Along with
Ireland, it was one of the five EU countries that voted in favor of the draft version of the NBT on
July 7, 2017 and signed the official document on September 23, 2017. Austria has been a
supporter of non-proliferation efforts since the implementation of the NPT, and according to
William C. Potter, was “the most critical voice in the Focus Group discussions” during the 2015
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NPT Review conference. As made possible by Article VII of the NPT, Austria has independently
declared itself a Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone.31 This makes it the only NWFZ in Europe.32 In
2014 at the Vienna Conference, Austria issued a Pledge that addresses the humanitarian
consequences of nuclear weapons, known as the Humanitarian (or Austrian) Pledge.33 The
purpose was to launch negotiations on a nuclear prohibition treaty and force nations to
acknowledge the need to bridge the ‘legal gap’ that refers to the several possible interpretations
of international law on nuclear weapons.34
Austria constructed its first nuclear energy plant in 1972 and planned to construct two
additional plants until the government began to experience backlash from the community. The
public had initially appeared to support the move to nuclear energy but protesting gradually
increased, which led to a referendum in 1978 in which the votes against nuclear power won by
slightly more than fifty percent.35 Notably, Austrians voted against nuclear power even before the
nuclear Chernobyl disaster of 1986, which effectively deterred many nations from using nuclear
energy. Following this, the Austrian Parliament passed a law called ‘Atomsperrgesetz’, which
translates to the “Atom banning law”, prohibiting the use of nuclear energy in Austria.36
Although Austria has the capability of using nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, it has opted
against doing so.
It seems as though Austria’s history of occupations and invasions has shaped its
nonproliferation perspective. Constant adversity stifled the ability of the country and its citizens
to create an identity until it regained sovereignty post-WWII. Austria joined the EU in 1995 and
has not become a member of NATO. Like Ireland, it collaborates with the alliance through the
PfP program. Austria identifies the PfP program as a necessary partnership for effective
involvement in military efforts within the CFSP, since there is a large overlap of member states.37
Austria recognizes the EU and NATO as partners but nonetheless assumes neutrality on an
international stage.
Austria’s defense system is minimal and efforts to maintain military preparedness have
decreased according to officials, but Parliament reassures that “the better Austria is integrated
into the international security architecture, the more efficiently will it be able to safeguard its
security interests and peace policy objectives”.38 Austria attaches its national security concerns to
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those of the EU, and emphasizes how defense strategies internationally have shifted from
deterrence to cooperation.39 Parliament explains that this shift occurred after the Cold War, which
triggered a transformation in European security policy, as the world order evolved to include
numerous global players as well as less transparency and predictability.40 Because of this, Austria
has begun to rely more on cooperation with other international actors as a defense strategy rather
than fortifying its own military.

Netherlands
At the United Nations Conference to Negotiate a Legally Binding Instrument to Prohibit
Nuclear Weapons, Leading Towards their Total Elimination, the Netherlands was the only
country from any region to vote against the draft of the NBT. The Netherlands did not sign the
Humanitarian Pledge, but it is a founder of the Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Initiative
(NPDI) and a member of the Conference on Disarmament (CD), along with Austria and Ireland.
The NPDI is a group of states that seek to strengthen the non-proliferation regime by achieving
goals such as increasing transparency within the nuclear regime and promoting key legal
instruments that safeguard nuclear activity.41 Poland and Germany are the only other EU-NPDI
members. Notably, the Netherlands is the chair of the Preparatory Committee for the 2020 NPT
Review Conference.42 The Netherlands has a strong national identity, exemplified by its role as a
founding member of both the European Union and NATO.
The Netherlands has one functioning nuclear reactor with at least one more unit proposed
for the future.43 Dutch interest in nuclear energy began to decay after substantial natural gas
reserves were discovered, and even more so after the Chernobyl nuclear disaster.44 Consequently,
Dutch parliament decided to phase out the Borssele reactor but reversed the decision in 2005 due
to “legal difficulties”, which refers to trouble implementing the decision.45 When the
environmental and economic benefits of nuclear energy became clear, sentiment began to favor
nuclear energy, and the government remains open to constructing new plants for the purpose of
cutting carbon dioxide emissions in accordance with the European sustainable energy goals.46
In 1970, the Netherlands became part of a joint nuclear fuel company with Germany and
the United Kingdom, which now also involves the United States.47 U.S.-Netherlands relations are
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long-standing through NATO and the stockpiling of American nuclear weapons on Dutch
territory. Much this stockpiling happened in the beginning of the 1960s and involved the United
Kingdom as well.48 Geographically, presence in the Netherlands has been advantageous for the
United States, especially with robust Dutch naval forces as a resource. American anti-submarine
warfare (ASW) units were also stored on UK territory for Dutch use, but the use of these
weapons has always been up to the leaders of the United States and the United Kingdom.49 The
American nuclear arsenal in the Netherlands has considerably decreased since the end of the
Cold War, but it still “currently deploys an estimated 10-20 nuclear B61 bombs in underground
vaults inside 11 aircraft carriers at Volkel Air Base”.50 On its own, the Netherlands has a
formidable military defense system, spending an average of 1.201 percent on defense in 2016.51
Military upkeep in the Netherlands is necessary as the country represents a crucial strategic
position for the United States. While the Netherlands may not have any enemies of its own, it
must be prepared to assist or cooperate with its American ally if necessary, especially if Dutch
leaders seek American protection.

Poland
Poland did not vote on the NBT draft treaty, voted against the convening of a 2017
Conference to Negotiate a Legally Binding Instrument to Prohibit Nuclear Weapons, Leading
towards their Total Elimination, and has not signed the Humanitarian Pledge.52 Its history has
been contentious, which is recognized by its political leaders, “Poland fought for and regained
independence between 1918 and 1921, only to lose it again in 1939-1945, and to once again
reclaim it in 1989-1991”.53 Poland joined NATO in 1999 and became an EU member in 2004.
Poland gets most of its energy from coal and gas. In order to coincide with the EU
climate policy, Polish leaders continue to search for a way to minimize reliance on harmful
consumption methods.54 Much of its gas supply comes from Russia, a country that the Polish
government seeks to rely less on in general.55 Consequently, Poland has looked to nuclear energy
as an effective and environmentally friendly substitution. Poland has 23 active reactors, 6 under
construction, and 9 planned.56 Since 2009, Poland has been cooperating with France on matters
of nuclear plant development, research, and construction.57
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The Polish government has also been working to establish cross-border energy
transmission systems. Already partially connected with Sweden through a subsea line, Poland
has formulated an agreement with Ukraine in 2015 regarding a future project as well.58 Polish
leaders have also devised a plan with Finland and Sweden to synchronize energy transmissions
by 2025 through the Baltic Energy Market Interconnector Plan (BEMIP) and are pursuing
another big project that will establish a link with Lithuania.59
Within its 2017-2021-policy framework, Poland seeks to enhance the credibility and
potential of its allies and bolster its own defense capabilities.60 The country is working towards
meeting the defense spending quota set by NATO. Poland regards the EU and NATO as “vital” to
its security and claims to have already become increasingly more secure because of these
alliances.61 While Poland does not host nuclear weapons on its territory, it has agreed to host a
United States missile defense system, much to Moscow’s disgruntlement. There has been
discussion between the United States and Poland regarding threats to Poland’s security and its
corresponding areas of weakness.62 The agreement is a clear strategic advantage to both sides:

The United States recognizes that this assistance will strengthen
Poland’s contributions to the NATO Alliance and facilitate strategic
cooperation between the United States and Poland. Poland
acknowledges and appreciates the important assistance provided by
the United States in the past to Polish military modernization efforts.
The United States intends to provide substantial assistance to support
Poland’s military modernization efforts in the future” (United States
Department of State 2008).

The Role of Language, Identity, and Norms
Language and the ‘Legal Gap’
The aftermath of implementation is one area of disagreement among advocates and
opponents of the NBT. Advocates view the NBT as a mechanism that will complement the NPT
and strengthen the non-proliferation regime, while opponents believe the opposite. Leaders from
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countries such as the United Kingdom, France, the Netherlands, and the United States argue that
the imperfections of the treaty will jeopardize the NPT and non-proliferation process. The nature
of the language used in the treaty and during negotiations has a big role in creating this
discrepancy.
Ireland stubbornly underscores the necessity of implementation.63 As early as 1957
Foreign Minister Frank Aiken regarded the need for nuclear disarmament as “urgent”.64 In March
2017, Irish Ambassador Patricia O’Brien stressed the need for everyone to “reject the premise
that they [nuclear weapons] can ever be used again under any circumstances” due to the
catastrophic affects.65 At the 72nd UNGA meeting in October 2017, Mr. George-Whilhelm
Gallhofer of Austria used similar language to that of Foreign Minister Aiken when he expressed
that disarmament and the implementation of the CTBT are both ‘urgent’, and again when he
highlighted the need for the “total elimination of nuclear weapons”.66 Gallhofer’s language was
extreme, especially when he stated that the international system appears to be “balancing at the
edge of an abyss”.67 Gallhofer and his Austrian counterparts are actively encouraging other
countries to sign the NBT and get it into force “as soon as possible”.68
Austria’s geographical location at a nuclear crossroad may be the underlying push behind
its intense discourse. Likewise, Ireland’s adjacency to the United Kingdom, a NWS, could
potentially make it feel like a target of other NWS states such as Russia. Contrarily, countries
like the Netherlands argue that there should be no rush in the process. The hurry or hesitancy that
leaders exhibit regarding implementation is a result of how individual leaders have interpreted
the grey area, or legal gap, that exists in international law on nuclear weapons.
Political leader Hans Dijkstal of the Netherlands and Patricia O’Brien commented on this
“legal gap”, which refers to the fact that international law does not specifically forbid the use of
nuclear weapons. The United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) sent an inquiry to the
International Court of Justice (ICJ) asking if the use of nuclear weapons was legal under
international law. Hans Dijkstal responded to this ICJ case, expressing his belief that the court
should refrain from giving an opinion. He explained that a decision deeming nuclear weapons
illegal would endanger the integrity of the NPT, as would a decision that deemed them legal.69
He describes the case as a “recipe for competition and fragmentation”.70
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If the court had decided that nuclear weapons were unlawful, then that would have
applied to all circumstances. 71 If the court had decided that they were lawful, the permitted
circumstances would have been unclear, a matter that the ICJ would have not been required to
explain further.72 Dijkstal presented several examples of ambiguity related to possession, side
effects, small nuclear weapons, humanitarian law, and victim suffering.73 He also argued that
outlawing nuclear weapons would lead to more instability by putting NWS and nuclear host
states in an awkward position, as they would suddenly possess large arsenals of illegal
weapons.74 Essentially either outcome of the case would have carried significant and potentially
disastrous weight in the process of disarmament.
Participants have noted the vulnerability in the language that can lead to different
responses. For example, the Dutch identified Article 1 of the NBT as incompatible with NATO
obligations, and submitted a temporality clause that adjusted the wording so that it could better
match the obligations of NATO member states. This effort did not succeed though, because it did
not align with the views of many other participants. Failure to find common ground in language
inevitably infringes on the ability of countries to reach a unified position, resulting in a blocked
consensus. The debate on language persisted during verbal negotiations, especially since the
NBT introduced new discourse that eliminated the prospect of interpretation, such as the
declaration that nuclear weapons are to “never be used again under any circumstances,” which
presented a problem for NATO and others who rely on nuclear weapons for security. The new
regulations posed by the NBT would be favorable for the political leaders who are ready to make
a considerable change, but for NATO countries particularly, the definitive language renders the
legislation incompatible with their views and results in a rejection of the treaty. Yet, the
opportunity for each state to have its own interpretation has led to many failed negotiation
attempts as well.
Wording and interpretation of discourse are thus responsible for part of the division
within the EU. Negotiation is inevitably difficult when implications are unclear. Agreement on
language is a key component of cohesion, as the difference between one word and another can be
the difference between a vote for or against the entire agreement. Those who have rejected the
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NBT are rejecting the language of the treaty, not the idea. This does not explain all oppositions,
but it explains one important point of contention among many countries involved in the process.

Identity and Decision-Making
National identity is at the core of decision-making. Irish and Austrian leaders identify
themselves as neutral on an international stage but must utilize their voices to push disarmament
because otherwise their land and their people are highly vulnerable to nuclear threats due to their
lack of arsenals, dangerously low military spending, and hypothetical absence of military allies.
These problems are products of their perception of neutrality.
The Austrian government has instead adopted a pro-humanitarian approach to the issue,
possibly to show sympathy to possible victims of nuclear warfare, because it can historically
relate to war-related violence. Out of respect for the integrity of its people’s identity, culture, and
traditions, the government is also careful to respect their voices, a concept validated by the
Humanitarian Pledge, and by the outlaw of all things nuclear following public outcry. Each
nation’s diverse past has led to the formation of diverse identities, and these two countries in
particular have committed to the fight against nuclear weapons based on the beliefs and
suspicions they have formed over time. The Nuclear Ban Treaty would provide the utmost
credible means of security for these ‘non-allied’ states.
With this, even those who are not neutral face adversity in this area. The NBT clearly
contradicts some of NATO’s fundamental principles, as NATO relies on nuclear deterrence and
collective defense. Thus, NATO leaders seek to persuade NNWS members to adhere to its beliefs
and act in accordance with the alliance: “We strongly encourage you [NATO members] to vote
‘no’ on any vote at the UN first committee on starting negotiations for a nuclear ban treaty”.75
Therefore, Poland’s vote against negotiations and the Netherlands’ vote against the NBT
are not surprising. The Netherlands identifies closely with NATO as an original member and is
acting in support of what the alliance wants. Although the Dutch government has expressed
support for non-proliferation and has taken on leadership roles within the movement as the chair
of the Preparatory Committee for the 2020 NPT Review Conference, member of the CD, and cofounder of the NPDI, it is nonetheless slowing down the disarmament process. Ultimately, all of
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these decisions are linked with NATO. The Dutch overtly expressed loyalty to NATO in their
explanation of vote on the NBT, which asserted that the Netherlands could not accept the NBT or
“any instrument that is incompatible with NATO obligations”.76
The Polish government appears to be constantly concerned with the nation’s sovereignty
and security. In Polish foreign policy documents, Polish leaders often point out the threat that
Russia poses. Especially after Russia’s 2014 annexation of Crimea, Poland’s history of
occupation and Russia’s proximity have reasonably intensified apprehension among Polish
leaders. The first sentence of Polish foreign policy strategy reads, “Poland’s security and
environment has deteriorated considerably as a result of Russia’s annexation of Crimea and the
Russian-provoked conflict in eastern Ukraine”.77 Long ago Polish leaders recognized the
vulnerability of the country’s geographic position and have now made a clear decision to be
proactive in acknowledging the threat. The government has called for the strengthening of
military forces in the EU’s Eastern flank to ensure the capabilities of NATO, because it fears
reliving its history of Russian occupation. This likewise means that the government is willing to
do whatever necessary to ensure the alliances reliability, even if that means storing U.S. missiles
on its land.78 Polish leaders have further expressed that American military involvement in Europe
is imperative for the security of the region and “is key to maintaining NATO’s collective defence
and deterrence capabilities”.79
Thus, inconsistencies between Polish claims and actions make sense. Polish officials are
advocates of non-proliferation for other NNWS, but out of fear for Poland’s national security,
leaders are attempting to balance advocacy paradoxically with increased defense cooperation
with the United States and NATO.80

The Evolution of Norms: Neutrality and Nuclear Weapons
Neutrality
The norm of neutrality is evolving and becoming increasingly difficult to uphold. A
country that deems itself neutral forfeits military assistance from other countries, which can be
daunting during a time of instability in the international community. This is why ‘neutral’
countries like Ireland and Austria inadvertently show partiality to one alliance or another, in this
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case towards the West through collaboration with NATO. The idea of being neutral seems
favorable until a government is fully responsible for defending its territory: “it is the role of the
government to be prepared to act alone in its own defense until the United Nations can secure
international peace and security”.81 In one way, this is beneficial to governments that fear
domination by the more powerful countries in an alliance, but on the other hand, it leaves a
nation vulnerable. Aside from whatever protection the CFSP claims to offer, Ireland and Austria
would be responsible for protecting themselves against nuclear weapons in the event of war,
against which they have no nuclear weapons or anything nearly as powerful with which to
retaliate. In a sense, non-NATO membership could serve as a defense strategy itself, but the
reliability of that strategy would depend on whether or not countries like Russia would target
NATO members directly or instead target less powerful, neighboring states. Therefore, it is
understandable that the leaders of these countries would seek alternative security in some
compromised form. Although neither the Irish government nor the Austrian government believe
that their countries will be involved in violence soon, neither wants to wait for something to
happen, especially if they lack a promised umbrella.82
As global relations pressure states that adhere to this norm, a shift in its meaning occurs.
Some scholars such as Neal G. Jesse refer to neutral states as ‘non-allied’ instead of neutral,
because the nature of the international system makes it incredibly difficult to abstain from
military alliances. Austria is essentially non-allied despite its attempt to remain neutral because
in reality, its United Nations membership makes it clear that complete neutrality is not possible
based on a legal view of UN obligations.83 So-called neutral states, like Ireland and Austria,
openly value their relationship with NATO and seek to maintain an amicable relationship with
the alliance to increase the likelihood of inclusion in its defense.84
Even just being an EU member poses challenges to the claim of neutrality, as Europe has
begun to create common defense policies of its own. Although the claim is that countries like
Ireland can benefit from the military assistance of the EU without having to change neutral
status, the slight orientation is still evident and worthy of suspicion. 85 The Amsterdam Treaty
states:
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The policy of the Union in accordance with this Article shall not
prejudice the specific character of the security and defence policy of
certain Member States and shall respect the obligations of certain
Member States, which see their common defence realized in the North
Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), under the North Atlantic Treaty
and be compatible with the common security and defence policy
established within that framework” (European Communities 1997).

Ultimately, the union recognizes the potential need for member states to compromise its
commitment due to its obligations to NATO but regards it as a chance for the two alliances to
work in unison. So, while EU member countries are not required to change their neutral status, it
does not mean that they do not utilize the support of the EU’s partners, one of which is clearly
NATO. Austrian Parliament recognizes this advantage and admits that security within the region
is dependent on EU and NATO relations, and that the success of the CSFP depends on this
partnership.86

Nuclear Weapons
Upon finalization of the NPT, the international nuclear ‘norm’ was that NNWS would
forfeit the opportunity to obtain nuclear weapons, if NWS would eventually decrease stockpiles
and dispose of nuclear weapons. Many are questioning this ‘norm’ in 2017. Norm pioneers like
Ireland and Austria are fighting incredibly hard to make a new universal ‘norm’: no nuclear
weapons, at all, ever. The desired shift here is from deterrence to cooperation. Many NNWS are
promoting this norm while NWS are resisting it. As an alliance that relies on deterrence as a
defense strategy, NATO continues to contest this norm and persuades all of its members to do the
same.
In this way, it is possible to address realist and liberalist claims. Should countries be
prioritizing deterrence, as realists would suggest, Ireland and Austria would not have cut military
spending to practically nothing. The Austrian Parliament at one point actually mentioned the
decreasing relevance of the deterrence principle, “There has been a paradigm shift in security
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policy in Europe. This process, which started with the end of the Cold War (1989), has initiated a
transition from thinking in terms of military balance and deterrence to an understanding of
comprehensive and co-operative security”.87 Furthermore, another Austrian official stated, “…it
is urgent that we finally move on from the Cold War concept of mutual assured destruction as the
illusionary warrant for the security of ourselves, our children and grandchildren”. 88
Yet deterrence remains a key component of NATO policy formations, “[NATO will]
maintain an appropriate mix of conventional, nuclear, and missile defense forces…to bolster
deterrence as a core element of our collective defense and contribute to the indivisible security of
the alliance”.89 However, it is not necessarily a determinant of the decisions made by EU
countries regarding the NBT. EU countries that do not express direct support for the NBT are
voting based primarily on how those countries identify with NATO, not its deterrence policy
specifically. The NBT conflicts with this deterrence principle, but explanations of opposing votes
frame the violation of NATO member obligations. While several non-NATO EU states covertly
rely on the alliance’s deterrence, such as Ireland and Austria, there is no barrier limiting their
ability to support a piece of legislation that clearly violates such rules because they are simply
not parties to the alliance.
The intimidation of a British nuclear umbrella could be reason behind Ireland’s rejection
of realist views. Ireland’s lack of military and lack of alliances leave it extremely vulnerable in
an intensifying international climate, “…lacking a credible defense, Ireland pursues diplomatic
relations as a way to assert itself”.90 This idea emphasizes cooperation to some extent, but the
framework of the debate would likely be on verification if cooperation were the main issue.
While the Netherlands addresses verification as an issue of the NBT in its explanation of vote,
Austria and Sweden also address this factor yet still voted in favor of implementing the NBT.
While the debate can incorporate problems of verification, one cannot give full credit to this
liberal ideal because the issue itself arises primarily due to the severity of the regulations in the
NBT that would necessitate the verification.
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Other Key Players
The United Kingdom and France
The United Kingdom and France are two more EU countries that did not vote on the NBT
draft. They support non-proliferation and have signed the NPT and CTBT and have shown
support for a potential Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty (FMCT) but rejected the ban because of
their status as NWS and corresponding reliance on nuclear weapons for security. They identify
the importance of the NPT and their commitment to eventual disarmament through that specific
piece of legislation, rather than the new ban treaty, which they believe would undermine
international peace and security.91 Furthermore, the United Kingdom and France released a joint
statement with the United States that firmly declares their unrelenting disapproval of the ban,
“We do not intend to sign, ratify, or ever become party to it [the NBT]”.92 The United Kingdom
and France are hugely important in the disarmament process and hold two of the strongest
positions within the EU, but their positions are not comparable to those of other EU members as
they are the only NWS in Europe.

Sweden
Sweden falls into the same category as Ireland and Austria. It has established itself as a
neutral territory, voted in favor of the NBT, has upheld significant presence at conferences and
negotiations, and participates in the PfP program. Sweden has significantly cut defense spending
since 1990 from 2.39% of GDP to 1.042% and assumes a similar position on defense and nonproliferation as Ireland.93 Its leaders provided a statement in response to the draft NBT that
parallels the beliefs and language of those of Ireland and Austria. In its explanation of its
affirmative vote, the speaker noted that the ban treaty did not meet its expectations but it
nonetheless decided to support it due to the “unprecedentedly limited time at our disposal”. 94 The
Swedish government assumes the position of a norm pioneer as it firmly believes that the “new
norm against the use and possession of nuclear weapons will be strengthened by this treaty”.95 It
has expressed some disappointment with the treaty, though, because the NPT is not clearly
recognized as the cornerstone for disarmament, there are concerns regarding verification, and
because there are issues with the language such as in Article 18, which suggests that obligations
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of the NPT and CTBT could potentially appear to be reduced under the NBT.96 William C. Potter
further refers to Sweden’s participation in 2015 NPT Rev Con and how it emerged as one of the
“most ardent advocates…for strong language on the humanitarian impact [of nuclear
weapons]”.97

Germany
Germany is a member of NATO, a member of the NPDI, and has been involved in FMCT
negotiations. Following WWII, the opportunity to develop nuclear weapons was limited in
Germany, and consequently it does not have any of its own. 98 Like the Netherlands, and like
many other EU-NATO members, the German government shows support for non-proliferation
but also shows commitment to its NATO allies. German leaders have previously pledged to
never use nuclear weapons, yet it hosts at least 10-20 known U.S. tactical bombs and “is
expected to extend the service life of its nuclear-capable PA-200 tornado through the 2020s”.99
The German government does not participate adamantly in negotiations probably because of its
conflicting perspectives: that of the government, which is inclined to comply with NATO, and
that of the people, which demand acceptance of the NBT. 100 The German government ignored
this demand in its decision to abstain from negotiations.101

Findings
The cases of Ireland, Austria, and Sweden are applicable to other EU countries that
identify as neutral. Because of the identity that these countries have formed, they are more
inclined to push for a ban on nuclear weapons than are those who identify with NATO. Along
with Ireland, Austria, and Sweden, Cyprus and Malta voted in favor of the NBT. These five
countries were the only five out of the entire European Union to vote in favor of the treaty.
Including Finland, these countries are also the only EU members that are not members of NATO.
Aside from these five affirmative votes and the one negative vote from the Netherlands, all other
EU countries abstained from voting on the treaty. Finland did not vote on the draft because it
regards United States nuclear weapons as vital to its security, assuming its close collaboration
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with the EU on defense. 102 However, Finland remains hesitant to join NATO partially due to its
geographic location, as it shares a border with Russia. 103
The Dutch have a tremendously close relationship with NATO and a long history of
international leadership. These two aspects of the country’s identity almost oblige it to form a
strong position against the NBT, unless it wants to forfeit one of its central characteristics.
Essentially the Dutch government is trying to balance internal pressure from its citizens, who are
increasingly showing opposition to the idea of nuclear weapons, with its NATO commitments.104
These internal and external pressures are forcing the government to seek a solution. This case is
nonetheless applicable to other EU NATO members, especially those who store nuclear weapons
on their territory. This includes Belgium, Germany, and Italy, which are in the same position as
the Netherlands, but do not have the same motivation to be deep-seated in the debate. These
countries support nuclear disarmament but are unlikely to vote in favor of the proposed NBT not
only due to their identities as NATO members but furthermore because of their status as nuclear
hosts. Poland’s ability to advocate for nuclear non-proliferation is slightly more flexible than
these states since it hosts U.S. missiles instead of nuclear weapons. The case of Poland is more
comparable to the remainder of other EU countries that do not have unique status as nuclear
hosts but hold questionable positions on the NBT, as seen in the RPI.
The leaders of the Netherlands are negotiating on behalf of EU-NATO members, and
trying to sell the idea that the international community is working towards disarmament, despite
lack of support for the NBT. The Dutch are trying to reinforce that the means by which the
international community can best achieve disarmament does not include the process proposed in
the Nuclear Ban Treaty. A popular argument made by most opponents of the NBT is that the
treaty will infringe on the progress that has occurred through agreements such as the NPT, and
the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) between the United States and Russia. During a
brief on the NBT, the German delegation also raised the point that Ireland and Austria are on the
border of pushing negotiations too hard and argued that the momentum could antagonize
important disarmament players and cause them to disengage from the initiative.105
Ultimately, EU-NATO members are rejecting the proposed norm that will come with the
NBT while non-NATO EU members attempt to persuade acceptance of the new norm through
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acceptance of the treaty. Many countries recognize the necessity of NWS compliance in order for
the new law to be successful, but it remains increasingly difficult to find common ground
between supporters and oppositionists as many are in different situations that result in different
fears and motivations. Consequently, the inclination of non-NATO EU countries to be preventive
is so strong that they are unlikely to easily surrender to the demands of NATO.106

Conclusion
The habits and inclinations that countries develop over time are extremely powerful
determinants of decision-making. The diverse histories of EU member countries have played a
central role in the development of each country’s individual identity and corresponding policies.
EU member states who are promoting the new norm are pushing for change guided by their past
experiences, while those resisting norm evolutions are also doing so because of how they view
their role in the world. Lack of EU cohesion is not concentrated on support or opposition for
non-proliferation and disarmament, but rather on the approach to the issue. EU member states
have not been able to reach consensus on the ban treaty primarily because the definitive language
used in the legislation, that signifies the creation of a new nuclear norm, does not satisfy the
different viewpoints that countries have based on their identities. Without the influence of
determining factors such as language, norms, and identity, EU countries would likely have very
similar outlooks on the issue. The presence of such factors is what makes agreement,
cooperation, and coherence complicated.
These findings suggest that disagreement over the NBT as it stands is inevitable. Key
NWS have already decided that they will never sign the treaty, despite the strong efforts of others
to implement it. Until international actors can find common ground regarding the NBT, which is
unlikely to happen soon, the international community needs to refocus its disarmament efforts in
order to continue making progress towards a nuclear-weapons-free world. Advocates and
opponents of the NBT alike need to shift their attention back to the NPT as a fundamental
building block for disarmament, push for the implementation of the CTBT, and continue
negotiations on a possible FMCT, before any implementation of a nuclear ban can be further
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considered. Stern advocates for elimination may not be fond of this prolonged process, but it
may be the only way for disarmament to progress amidst disagreement.
Austria and Ireland should shift their intense advocacy towards the implementation of the
CTBT, which is less controversial and remains outstanding since it opened for signing in 1996.
In order for the CTBT to enter into force, all remaining “Annex 2” states must sign and ratify the
treaty, which amounts to only eight other states. 107 Additionally, Austria and Ireland can push for
more negotiations on a FMCT, which would aid disarmament efforts significantly if enacted.
This would allow both advocates to continue making progress towards non-proliferation without
unintentionally dismantling the entire process. With that, both countries should try to ease the
pressure they are putting on other states to accept the NBT, at least temporarily, in order to avoid
aggravating NWS and jeopardizing overall success.
The Netherlands and Poland should likewise push for the CTBT and a potential FMCT if
they wish to keep the disarmament process going as well. However, these countries, especially
the Netherlands, should initiate negotiations with supporters of the NBT in order to review the
treaty and adjust the language. This should be a priority for these countries if they truly wish for
the nuclear ban to someday succeed. The Netherlands in particular needs to act as a mediator
between advocates and opponents, and work closely with the United Kingdom and France to
gain an understanding of what needs to happen in order for these countries to accept a ban treaty.
Poland is right to remain wary of potential aggressors such as Russia, but Polish leaders should
not retreat from non-proliferation efforts. Polish leaders can similarly push for the CTBT and
FMCT yet still refrain from provoking its enemies or frustrating its allies. It is important, though,
that while the fate of the NBT is unclear, Poland avoids bolstering its defense and external
assistance to an extent that perturbs its NWS neighbor and former occupant.
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Abstract
Hundreds of thousands of Rohingya Muslims, described by Amnesty International as
“one of the most prosecuted minorities in the world” have been forced to flee from their homes
in Myanmar. By virtue of it’s location in the Subcontinent, India has emerged as a natural
destination for many Rohingya refugees. In exploring the possibility of another, more systematic
avenue for the Rohingya crisis in the form of two-sided matching, this paper critically examines
certain matching markets and the challenges in implementing them in the world’s largest
democracy. With international refugee matching having been theorized in the western world, a
country like India presents a set of varying design challenges that are evaluated from the
perspective of optimizing design metrics for the novel refugee resettlement market, within the
ambit of policy constraints. Alternatives in the form of one- sided matching are also presented.
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Introduction to the Rohingya Crisis
Often called a textbook example of ‘ethnic cleansing’, the Rohingya Crisis has emerged
as a result of thousands of Rohingya Muslims being forced to flee from their homes in Myanmar.
More than one million people from this mainly-Muslim minority group lived in Myanmar at the
start of 2017, with the majority in Rakhine State.1 The government of Myanmar, a predominately
Buddhist country, has for long claimed that Rohingya people are illegal immigrants from
neighboring Bangladesh and has denied them citizenship, leaving them stateless. By virtue of
their locations in the Subcontinent, India and Bangladesh have emerged as natural destinations
for many Rohingya refugees. Around 60,000 ethnic Rohingya have already found themselves in
India after crossing the border, whereas in Bangladesh the number is as high as a million (with
over 500,000 having crossed at the height of the crisis between August and October 2017).

Refugee Resettlement Policy in India
India is not a signatory to any international convention on refugee resettlement. Even still,
India has always maintained a sort of open door policy to refugees, as a result of which there are
Tibetan, Afghani, and even Burmese refugees well-settled within their borders. Even though
India has been home to a large number and variety of refugees throughout the past, it has dealt
with refugee issues on a bilateral basis. It has observed a refugee regime which generally
conforms to the international instruments on the subject without, however, giving a formal shape
to the practices adopted by it in the form of a separate statute. 2 Refugees in India are legally
foreigners. They are dealt with under existing Indian law, both general and special, which are
otherwise applicable to all foreigners. For the same reason, applications for refugee status are
considered on a case-by- case basis. UNHCR has often played a complementary role to the
efforts of the government, particularly with regards to verification about the individuals’
background and the general circumstances prevailing in the country of origin.
In the face of an escalating crisis and the absence of any soundly designed resettlement
program, the Central Government of India decided in August 2017 that ethnic Rohingya should
be deported and others should not be allowed to enter. It was claimed by the Home Ministry to be
a “national security threat”. 3 Given all of this, the U.N’s refugee agency, the UNHCR has not had
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much say in convincing the government to accept these refugees for permanent resettlement.

Matching as a Solution in India
For the vast number of Rohingya refugees who have already made way to India and
Bangladesh, their assimilation into various communities lies largely in the hands of a
bureaucratic machinery working with limited or no information to assign a refugee to a particular
location. In fact, in 2015, the government of Bangladesh proposed a relocation plan for the
Rohingya refugees in Bangladesh to the remote island of Thengar Char in the Bay of Bengal.4
The plan was pushed back following criticism by human rights activists and the UNHCR. India
proposed several such relocation plans but again they were hinged on the idea of establishing a
single base for all refugees.
That where refugees end up long-term is hugely consequential on lifetime outcomes is
almost never a part of the long-drawn and inefficient bureaucratic process for assigning
resettlement. Economists Emma Stewart and Gareth Mulvey demonstrate the imperfections of
extant integration policies in the United Kingdom, many of which spring from the difficulties a
government faces in taking particular individualized needs and aspirations into account. The same
outcome has been unfolding with the 14,000 Rohingya already being relocated in some way by the
Indian government.5 Drawing from noteworthy ideas in matching theory and modifying them to
suit the priorities and bandwidth of India specifically, I will examine the feasibility of two-sided
matching as well as propose new mechanisms for the government to consider when
implementing relocation schemes for Rohingya refugees. As an aside, I have chosen to focus on
India not because it is the only destination for Rohingya refugees (I have already shown how
pivotal Bangladesh is), but because it is a relatively smaller destination (in terms of number of
Rohingya expected) and makes for more optimal testing grounds for initial hypothesizing. With
international refugee matching having been theorized in the western world, a country like India
presents a different set of design challenges. While Jones and Teytelboym proposed a centralized
matching system for refugees, similar to what is used in many places for school choice - I will also
reevaluate the notion of similarity to school choice since it is a matching market that barely exists
in India, in the process of building onto refugee resettlement.6
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Motivations, Comparisons, and Status Quo of Matching
Before diving into conceptualizing refugee resettlement and its associated design for the
Rohingya in India, it’s useful to consider the matching algorithms and techniques currently in
limited use in the Indian market. India is not a nation where matching theory has been put into
practice too often. Population size and high levels of illiteracy, as well as historical and cultural
factors render the implementation of market design techniques for overall gains inefficient. In
this section, I will evaluate existing algorithms but also aim to solidify a thus far vague
understanding of where they fall short in an Indian context. To begin with, consider the following
matching markets and their shortcomings.
In the National Resident Matching Program, an algorithm to optimize how resident
medical interns get their positions at hospitals is used. In the absence of a formal application
process that could facilitate some form of the NRMP, a vast majority of Indian medical students
end up doing their residencies abroad, popularly in the US, UK, and Canada. For those who
choose to stay in India, the process of getting a residency typically involves reaching out directly
to a hospital and hoping for a vacancy.7 Though formal application processes exist as a part of
procedure for various medical divisions (especially in private hospitals), any proposed resident
matching market would almost have to go back in time and undo the murky state of affairs in
intern placement.
A centralized matching market for schools does not exist, except for in higher level
engineering programs.8 India is home to a multi-tier school system that includes exorbitant
private schools (usually attended by upper and upper-middle class students) complemented by
much more affordable government run schools. These government run schools are subsidized for
students from the lowest socioeconomic backgrounds. Any matching market would first have to
distinguish between these distinctive systems of schooling. Furthermore, private school
attendance is not decided by virtue of location/proximity. Parents enroll their children at virtually
any private school within an acceptable radius. Once admitted at the beginning of their schooling
career, the student is more likely than not to stay in the same school till attending college. Most
private schools in India are K-12. An added source of inefficiency in the private schooling system
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is the inadequate number of schools available even to cater to the top 20%. This leads to the
creation of widespread false admissions cycles in schools during unexpected times in the
academic year. Government school attendance, on the other hand, is rife with different problems.
Since these schools are more heavily attended by students living within their tehsils (a local
administrative district), a matching market hinged on locational preferences has been thought of
as more conceivable for government schools. However, here again, educational infrastructure has
not evolved in tandem with population growth. Citizens record commute times of over 3 hours to
government schools closest to their districts in remotest areas of the country. Moreover, given
that agriculture still remains a source of income for more than half the country, children in rural
areas are pressured into working on the fields or in other unskilled low-wage pursuits from an
early age. According to the latest Census in India, 1 in 4 children of school-going age is out of
school.9
Let us now look at a market in India that is in practice a matching one but faces gross
inadequacies. Engineering school admissions in India function through a centralized matching
market in which students with differently privileged backgrounds, such as different castes, are
treated with different admission criteria. Students have different preferences over which
admissions criteria they are admitted under. Therefore, students may prefer not to reveal their
caste and tribe information while applying. Besides this strategic burden on students, the current
system suffers from a crucial market failure: the centralized assignment mechanism fails to
transfer some unfilled seats reserved for under-privileged castes and tribes to the use of
remaining students. Hence, it is vastly wasteful and Pareto inefficient.
It is not surprising that India is often referred to as the world’s biggest organ market.
Though there has been a substantial crackdown on illegal exchange markets, a new kidney
exchange scam is exposed frequently. There are far too many hurdles to kidney donation even in
terms of a legal exchange.10 Police clearance from patients’ respective districts and submission of
an affidavit before the tehsildar (principal administrator of tehsil) are almost cardinal.
Furthermore, donors and recipients have to often appear in front of a panel of doctors to solidify
their case for a transplant. The entire exercise takes months. At this rate, over 50 percent of
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people with renal failure are unlikely to survive over a period of 5 years. Before 2009, one could
not receive an organ from a non-family member regardless of match in blood group and tissue
type. Since 2009, the Paired Kidney Exchange (PKE) has been legalized under the amended
Human Organ Transplant Act of India. Ever since, there have been attempts to use technology,
mainly mobile apps, to introduce swapping/matching facilities.
A popular model/platform gaining traction in India is one where relatives of a kidney
patient can find a right match and get the kidneys swapped with one of another family’s members.
However, in the face of inefficient registration processes and illegally paid donors, the market for
kidney exchange in India is still as undeveloped and problematic as it was in 2009 post legislative
changes.
The aforementioned list is merely a subset of matching markets that have not thrived in
India as a result of social, cultural, historical and demographic factors that are far too deeply
ingrained in society. In all cases, we see that the size of such a potential market matching is so
huge that the problems it entails are equally formidable to design a centralized system for. But in
the case of Rohingya refugee resettlement, we narrow down to a potential market where we would
have to reverse fewer trends/policies from the past and design a system for fewer agents
(40,000-50,000). Moreover, since these 40,000 refugees constitute the first wave of Rohingya
Muslims seeking asylum in India, a sound centralized matching market, if implemented can set a
viable precedent for future refugee crises. Unlike in the other cases outlined above, designing a
two-sided matching can well be our starting point for finding optimal matches.

Refugee Resettlement
There is clear evidence that India needs both a successful matching market and an
innovative approach to it’s relocation policy. Without international conventions on refugee
resettlement, a centralized market for refugees to match them to localities or communities does
not compromise existing policy, at least from a UNHCR perspective. In fact, UNHCR already
often acts as a matchmaker similar to the public school board by processing applications and

Page 61
! of !174
Published by Dartmouth Digital Commons, 2018

61

Dartmouth Undergraduate Journal of Politics, Economics and World Affairs, Vol. 1 [2018], Iss. 1, Art. 1

suggesting refugees for resettlement in countries that have agreed to take the refugees.11 The
current matching process, however, is not systematically designed to achieve desirable properties
of two-sided matching. While the UNHCR acts as a conduit for the vast majority of resettlement
applications, it does not take into account the preferences of refugees and the priorities of
countries in any systematic way. UNHCR typically suggests a family for resettlement in a
particular country and the country processes the application it receives. Given that India has little
institutional experience with matching processes, implementing the UNHCR match without
considering any further properties may not be ideal.

Why Matching?
The UNHCR and other activist groups contend that a country of 1.2 billion people should
be able to provide ample opportunity to another 40,000, especially since the the central
government issued an order to all state governments to identify and deport illegal immigrants,
including Rohingya on August 8, 2017.12 This is likely to mean that more and more Rohingya
will be diverted to Bangladesh; but that the 40,000-60,000 believed to have entered India over the
last two years and already in some process of acquiring identification can legally be integrated
through some policy instrument.
Government reports suggest that about 14,000 Rohingya in India have been recognized as
refugees by the office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees.13 This
recognition has allowed refugees to procure long term visas, and helped them gain access to
education, healthcare, and housing. One of the main challenges in assigning these facilities,
nevertheless, is that refugees do not naturally seek areas with more jobs and housing, but instead
prioritize living close to their fellow Rohingya since the community is so closely-knit as a
minority group. For immediate and sentimental reasons, this homogeneity of experience makes
sense but it is bound to harm long term outcomes. Consider Sweden’s experiment in 1990 of
deliberately placing refugees randomly around the country, in the hope for better integration. The
research done at Uppsala University based on this experiment decisively shows that initial
placement of refugees into less prosperous communities lowers their job prospects, health,
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income levels, and education.14 Now, according to data from the United Nations Development
Programme (UNDP), Sweden is around 82 spots better than India on the world inequality index
determined by various metrics. This implies the amplified inequity of a similar attempt for
Rohingya in India.15 By random allocation, they would be subject to communities that are
detrimental to any form of upward mobility. The goal for India, on a humanitarian level, is to
avoid creating conditions (at the behest of complete randomization) such that the existing
Rohingya refugees voluntarily choose to head back to Myanmar.

The Proposed Market
Before discussing the necessary components for applying matching theory in this situation,
certain theoretical definitions need to be considered.
Even beyond the idea of economic and market-driven processes, a variety of situations in
society require pairing/matching one agent to another. The agent can take the form of an
individual or any other entity that offers something that can be incorporated as a form of
exchange. The first foray into such work was in 1962 was by D.Gale and L.S. Shapley who
focused on college admissions (matching colleges to students) and marriage (matching men to
women and vice-versa) as a class of processes that would classify as two-sided matching
models.16 A matching is two-sided if:
1. There are two sets of agents
2. If an agent from one side of the market can be matched only with an agent from the other
side
3. Both sets of agents must agree to duly match for a match to be made
4. A centralized application process, as does not exist for many potential Indian matching
markets, exists in the system
5. There is no unit of comparison in that agents have preference orderings over the other
set of agents instead of values
Furthermore, the preferences, ≻x , of agent x for set P of p agents on one side of the market and
set Q of q agents on the other side are strict total orders over:
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• P ∪ {q} for agent q
• Q ∪ {p} for agent p
Ever since Gale and Shapley’s marriage model, several goals of a fair and optimal allocation (or
successful matching) have been identified. The notions of fairness and optimality are captured in:
1. Pareto Efficiency: No one should improve in the allocation without harming others.
There is no potential trade made between two agents being matched that would make
anyone better off without making anyone else worse off. The better and worse off can be
corresponded simply to happier and unhappier.
2. Stability/No Justifiable envy: The process of justifiable envy is as follows: If p envies
q’s match, then q’s match prefers q to p. Should this be removed, Rohingya refugees
would not end up satisfied with their matches and would pursue under the table rematching. This could prevent our designed matching intervention from breaking down.
3.Algorithmic: The algorithm to find suitable matching should be solvable in
polynomial time.
4. Strategy-Proof (for the agent being matched): This design outcome implies that
reporting true preferences maximizes the rank of final match. Again, in line with our
approach this would mean refugees should not have any incentive to lie about their
preferences over localities/communities hoping for better assimilation within India.
With these considerations of theory and achievable outcomes, I shall now proceed to how
matching can well be a turning point in the Rohingya refugee resettlement process within India’s
borders.

Matching for the Rohingya
On one side of the proposed matching system are Rohingya refugees. Does this mean each
refugee enters the market as one agent on one side? It does not take much analysis to confirm
that these refugees are already going through grave amounts of trauma. Splitting families up
would only amplify the ordeal. Hence, one agent on the refugee side would correspond to an
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entire family. A crucial element of the resettlement process is that refugee status is decided by the
UNHCR and government agencies. For the purposes of matching, it will be taken as given.
The other set of agents comprises localities/communities, which in India are identified
by as tehsils. The Rohingya have been found to create self-organized social safety nets, through
literacy programs and other such campaigns. However, Delhi and other parts of urban India are
often the preferred destinations for refugee groups that fall within the UNHCRs mandate.17 In the
capital, these groups have the possibility to get refugee certificates and access to certain support
services, such as education, health, livelihoods, and legal counseling. It is for this reason that the
Rohingya lawyers and the central government of India are in the midst of a legal battle at the
Supreme Court where the government contends that offering the best of urban settings to these
refugees poses a security threat to the state. Matching is also capable of softening the terms of this
legal battle if it is recognized that a more equitable and fair allocation of refugees to areas (not
necessarily all urban) poses both less of a security threat and less burden on the tehsils that will
accept Rohingya.

Matching Market Structure
Once regulatory authorities can definitively ascertain that a certain number of Rohingya
have to be resettled, and that tehsil administrations can confirm that they can host a certain
fraction of this number, we should be ready to implement the match. With the highly decentralized structure of government, the way this would work is that the central government would
earmark certain areas deemed fit for accommodating refugees (based on the latest Census and
proximity to Myanmar border).
For information to be processed before any allocation is made, a centralized clearinghouse
would have to exist. Both sets of agents - refugees and tehsils - will submit a ranking to this
centralized clearinghouse: refugees (as family units) would submit their preferences over where
they wish to go, and communities their priorities as to which categories of refugees they feel
equipped to help. To be clear, Tehsils would not rank Rohingya families individually - they would
rank categories of refugees that their available resources can accommodate. Not only is there no
way for administrators to know specific characteristics of incoming refugees that make them
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attractive for acceptance, but ranking individually would send the system into an ethical spiral.
Even 70 years after independence and partition between India and Pakistan, India is divided into
Hindu-majority and Muslim-majority regions. Individual family names, can hence be used to
identify ethnicity and may adversely affect stability of outcome, whereby a tehsil administration
may prefer a different refugee status but ends up lying due to ethnic favoritism.
Instead of ranking families individually, tehsil representatives and administrators would
rank priority categories based on capacity, which is expected to be a function of resources
available for the district to provide new livelihoods. Each district will have what is called a
‘priority structure’, which is the complete ranking made by one agent on any side of the market.
More specifically speaking, the priority categories could arise from say, a district with more
entry-level jobs available or more hospitals/medical facilities available having highest priority
for refugee categories seeking entry-level jobs or more urgent medical assistance.
In an Indian context, other priority categories I would recommend are: family size for
necessary housing accommodations, or number of children in Rohingya family versus private/
government schooling infrastructure and presence of NGOs for refugee support. The prerogative
of which categories to include in the matching market is necessarily that of the central authority
for reasons of uniformity. As a caveat, a precursor step should be to finalize which priority
categories leave no room open for ranking based on immoral intentions by existing residents of
the district. The UNHCR and other resettlement agencies have substantial data on vulnerability
and particular need of the 40,000-60,000 refugees already in India.18 For the Rohingya refugee
match, the Indian government could simply make the possible priority categories correspond to
categories based on this vulnerability and need-based data.
We will find that it is mandatory to assign a two-fold priority system to tehsils, one that
highlights total capacity in size units and another that highlights the true priority aspect. One
must recognize that some of these services, though well-offered, may not be able to cater to
every possible capacity of incoming refugees. This two-fold system would also avoid overfilling
quotas in any category. Bestowing the power of deciding a priority structure on the tehsils also
eliminates a cumbersome bureaucratic process from the capital New Delhi. Yet another reason for
discretion is that tehsils or localities are bound to have non-uniform priorities. Therefore, it is
Page 66
! of !174
https://digitalcommons.dartmouth.edu/dujpew/vol1/iss1/1

66

Editorial Board: Volume I | Issue I | 2018

wise to allow some degree of discretion over priority structure. For example, one district might
want to prioritize rare medical conditions over family connections, whilst another might have a
very different ranking. The Rohingya refugee match duly allows both refugees and tehsils to
decide for themselves what is most important to them.

Matching Logistics
Before describing what the algorithm would look like, it is imperative to impose some
requirements without which the process would bear no fruit. In order for the preference orders to
be meaningful in any way, the central government must ensure that refugees receive accurate and
comprehensive information about districts in order to help them make a decision. Partnering with
support groups and NGO’s is my suggested best way to go about it, based on the deeper grass
roots connection these groups tend to possess in a hugely populous country like India. Many a
time, this will include presenting information in a valid format, i.e. translation to Rohingya
language which happens to be closely related to Bengali (one of India’s most widely spoken
languages).
Though not formalized through a known refugee resettlement program, the Indian
government is bound to resettle at least 14,000 Rohingya refugees, just based on UNHCR
recognition (the others making up the previously stated 40,000-60,000 have not gained
recognition/status yet). It is likely these 14,000 refugees were a part of the first wave of
Rohingya redirected from Bangladesh around August of 2016. Should our Rohingya refugee
match find allocations satisfying certain properties, India’s plans to deport other Rohingya may
change in some shape or form. It is largely because of the absence of any sound matching
system that the government is reluctant to adequately resettle these refugees (along with security
issues as mentioned earlier).
Voluntary participation should ideally not be an option, simply because of a possible
sentiment of aversion towards these refugees. The government will have to earmark certain
districts and force participation, and raise financial support available at the state level in tandem.
This is expected to hold because the initial matching system will be tried with the assumption
that the government can commit to hosting only 14,000 Rohingya with guaranteed status from
Page 67
! of !174
Published by Dartmouth Digital Commons, 2018

67

Dartmouth Undergraduate Journal of Politics, Economics and World Affairs, Vol. 1 [2018], Iss. 1, Art. 1

UNHCR. It should also be clearly delineated by government representatives that tehsil
administrations have an incentive to participate in the scheme especially when they believe that
few other tehsil administrations are participating. When the system is less competitive from their
perspective, they are likely to get particularly apt matches given their priority structures. Other
incentives for tehsils include increasing financial support from the centre per refugee, more
infrastructure projects as reward for entering the match and a better utilization of existing
infrastructure - all captured within the theme of growth prospects for the particular region.
Since we have decided the matching system will run on 14,000 Rohingya (split into
families), we are entering what is called the Refugee Number Target system, where payments are
determined by a convex function (see figure 1).19 After the government has set a number of
refugees, the system determines the cheapest allocation of that number. Tehsils will announce a
minimum number they would be willing to accept and should be willing to accept further
refugees up to their actual total capacity. As opposed to a Spending Target system where the
government would decide an overall amount it is willing to spend, a smaller number of tehsils or
districts are likely to host large numbers of refugees in this Refugee Number Target system.
Fig. 1. Refugee Number Target System
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One cannot emphasize enough how crucial it is to ensure that refugees do not get lost in a
pool of information and in turn, lose the ability to make sound decisions about their rankings. In
a way, presenting them with two-sided matching is already stressful enough. The idea is to relieve
that stress wherever possible. The government would need to approach this on both sides of the
market: on one hand, pre-select a reasonable number of tehsils that are found to be functional for
certain services and on the other ask refugee families to rank only a subset of the tehsils. These
steps can hugely simplify the process. They can also bridge the gap between this overwhelming
matching market and the intrinsic personalities and needs of Rohingya.
Refugees are in dire need of relocation assistance. Running the match on say, yearly
intervals, would be counter-productive. The goal will be to reduce intervals to ensure immediate
protection but not to the point that matching is done so frequently that refugees who are deemed
to have higher priority at an earlier clearing round end up with lower priority than a set of
refugees entering the system later. If the system matches too frequently, Rohingya refugees may
end up damaging their own interests and that of other refugees in the Rohingya Refugee Match.
This leads to the question: Will refugees be able to game the system by entering a later round?
We will avoid this problem by asking the Indian government to allow refugees to submit
preferences with ample amount of time to think about their decisions, but to not inform them
which batch they will enter.
We have already seen the desirable characteristics of two-sided matching outcomes. However, no two-sided matching market has so far been found to satisfy all outcomes.20 As a result,
we will aim to build a sense of the subset of desirable properties we deem more important. Some
evaluation would lead us to feasibility, strategy-proofness and Pareto efficiency as the most
important properties for our purposes.
• Whilst efficiency and feasibility are clearly desirable to avoid political controversy and
disarray, they will also be necessary to present for the Government to be willing to act as
clearinghouse.
will be needed because refugees naturally have unequal levels of
•
• Strategy-proofness
access to information about different districts and, if the system is gameable, more
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informed refugees may have an undue advantage.
• Stability should not be too important because under the table re-matching should
anyway be legally prohibited or made exceptionally costly to deter refugees/districts from
indulging in it. However, giving up stability would mean losing the power to do much
about an unstable/unfair outcome - one where refugees can see that there are more desirable
districts in which they would have had a higher priority.
Following the above considerations, it must be made clear to refugees that they cannot make
themselves better off by being untruthful about their preferences of tehsils. This ensures a level
playing field. We will be hoping for diverse preferences. Despite the previously described
homogeneity of religious areas in India, diversity at the lower level (districts which we would
ask refugees to rank) is still large. Given the set up of this matching market, the more diverse
preferences are, the more we stand to gain by using a two-sided matching process. Another way
to think about this is: Regardless of which algorithm we use, if all districts have similar priority
structures, then the system is likely to let refugees decide their own fates.

Algorithms
With the theoretical and practical considerations behind us, we must now consider how
the centralized clearinghouse would run this matching. I will outline sample matches using the
following algorithms:
Gale-Shapley Algorithm (Tehsil/District-Proposing): Assume there are there are three Rohingya
families, referred to as R1, R2, R3 and three tehsils, referred to as T1, T2, T3. For purposes of this
example, let each district accommodate at most one refugee family. Furthermore, assume that
preferences of the Rohingya families are as follows:

R1 : T1 ≻ T3 ≻ T2

(1)

R2 : T2 ≻ T1 ≻T3

(2)

R3 : T2 ≻ T1 ≻ T3

(3)
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where ≻ means ’strictly prefers.’ Now, consider the indirect preferences of the three tehsils
(keeping resources and matching family needs in mind):
T1 : R2 ≻ R1 ≻ R3

(4)

T2 : R1 ≻ R2 ≻ R3

(5)

T3 : R1 ≻ R2 ≻ R3

(6)

With these preferences in mind, this is how the District-Proposing version would work:
1. T1 proposes to R2, T2 to R1 and T3 to R1.
2. Tentative acceptances are made based on preferences of Rohingya families, and rejected
districts keep proposing in sync with their specified priority structures.
3. No families are rejected - all tentative acceptances are made final.
This leaves us with the stable outcome (T1 − R1, T2 − R2, T3 − R3). However, we have clarified
earlier that stability is not the most important property to satisfy. Furthermore, the stable outcome
is not efficient since T1 and T2 would want to swap the refugee families currently assigned to
them. Let us pivot to an algorithm that can move us towards one of the other properties we would
favor.
Top-Trading Cycles Algorithm: In every round, every Rohingya family points at its favorite
district, and every district points at its highest-priority family.
Running the TTC, we have the following cycle: T1 → R2 → T2 → R1 → T1. We follow the
strategy of assigning families in the cycle to the tehsils they immediately point at. So, T1 gets R2
and T2 gets R1. This leaves the assignment of T3 to R3.
This gives us the outcome (T2 − R1, T1 − R2, T3 − R3). Notice that this outcome is not stable since
R1 and R2 can coordinate an under the table deal and swap districts to make each better off. If
previous suggestions on making such deals legally prohibited/costly are followed, this deal should
be virtually impossible to conduct. But the outcome is efficient, no refugee family can get
assigned relocation in a more suited district without rendering some other refugee family worse
off in the process.
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One-sided Rohingya matching - Irvin’s Algorithm: Though the focus of this paper has been on
two-sided matching theory, it is important to leave alternatives open. Suppose the government is
reluctant to implement a proposal that requires tehsils to enter a matching market, and instead
chooses to pre-specify districts where it would want to place Rohingya refugees. Taking this as
given, I propose we can still use matching theory to keep refugees satisfied. Here, there will be a
matching between refugee families as opposed to between families and districts. Irvings
algorithm for the stable roommate problem from 1985 can be thought of as a motivator for this
one-sided refugee matching.21 For the sake of comparison, refugee families can be thought of as
roommates and tehsils can be equated to room/accommodation. The problem can be described as
follows: A set of n potential families, each with ranked preferences over all the other potential
families, are to be matched to tehsils, x families per tehsil.
The process would be formulated slightly differently. It would be made clear to refugees
that the districts to which they will be assigned are pre-decided and not open to choice. Instead,
they can choose which other families they want to live with by entering this single-sided market
and ranking each other. The ‘x’ is attained by continuously running the match on family pairings
and treating them as a single unit at each subsequent round. For instance, X and Y are found to
be stable co-residents in one matching. Then X and Y will join forces in the next round and act as
a singular family unit hoping to find a stable assignment in another pair acting as a single family,
say P and Q (where P and Q was a stable assignment from the previous round).
A matching is stable if there is no Rohingya family, R1, that would rather be matched to
some other co-resident family, D2, than to their current co-resident, R2, where the other family, D2,
would rather be matched to R1 than to their current co-resident family, D1.The algorithm takes
place in two phases.
In phase 1, potential co-resident families take turns sequentially proposing to the other
families. Each family who is proposed to can accept or reject the proposal. A family accepts if it
currently has made no better proposal which was accepted to another family. If a family has
accepted a proposal, and then receives a better proposal, it rejects the old proposal and substitutes
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in the new proposal. In phase 2, we begin by eliminating all potential family co-resident matches
which are worse than the current proposals held. Once a match is made after a number of rounds,
refugee families can be assigned to pre-decided districts keeping in mind the family pairings
from the one-sided Irving like algorithm. The above algorithms have been described as though
there is active proposing, rejecting and accepting. In reality, we will have computer software
implement the matching system, much like in the one-sided matching case. What should be even
more striking is that different algorithms can lead us to different properties, some more attractive
than others. With the theory laid out, it will be up to the pertinent government organization to
decide whether to take a matching theory approach to expand on the aforementioned ideas. The
presence of families may require some difficult trade-offs to be made. For example, it is unclear
whether a single individual satisfying priority categories X and Y should be matched ahead of a
two-person family with one member in priority category X and one member in Y. It can be left up
to the regulating authority’s discretion once a presentation is made. More such final
considerations are highlighted in the next section.

Conclusion
As this paper shows, designing and implementing matching systems in emerging markets
with weak institutions poses a substantial challenge. In exploring the status quo of matching in
India before outlining the Rohingya refugee match, my effort has been to take a step in that
untapped direction. It would be too far-fetched to claim that matching is the ideal solution for the
Rohingya refugee crisis in India. The reason I emphasized legal measures earlier on is to be able
to conclude by reiterating that no amount of market design can triumph a simple lack of desire
by society or government to accept refugees. Moreover, it cannot be applied to all contexts. If, for
some reason, the government decides to let refugees seek aid in India through local sponsors, it is
much less likely that a matching system can then act as a viable intervention.
At the same time, however, the matching system is a more efficient and humane way of
dealing with a crisis like that which the Rohingya face. The tehsils that families are matched to
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are more likely to get them started on a path of integration and upward mobility. As a result, the
overall quality of life a district can offer is expected to be higher in most cases. The system in
itself is an incentive for further participation, especially for the districts. Seeing favorable results
and neighboring regions flourish is bound to get more local administrations excited about
entering a matching system to accept Rohingya. Better integrated and more content refugee
populations are expected to foster communities within districts that are more confident about
their ability to host refugees in future. Yet another benefit is the immediacy of the outcome with
matching. In the current system, the government is making little or no progress even in
relocating Rohingya refugees with guaranteed status. For a matching market, an allocation is
immediately decided once the priority structures on both sides are aggregated by a centralized
clearinghouse. The intervals at which to facilitate this matching are also up to our discretion.
Last but not least, this system is almost unprecedented in how humanizing it is. It would
give a historically neglected and now displaced community more control over its own fate. This
system would be even more direct than systems that purportedly take the best interests of
refugees into account in helping them find a suitable region to resettle - like the existent system
of bureaucratic machinery reviewing a dearth of refugee family information to make arbitrary
decisions. We expect a fundamental right to choice across all walks of life within the constraints
of what is available. The government of India must realize that Rohingya Muslims too, at the very
least, have that right to choice.
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Abstract
We study the relationship between unemployment insurance and unemployment rates
during the post-Great Recession employment recovery using county-level data on unemployment
and state-level data on aggregate benefits. A typical fixed effects estimation approach may be
inconsistent in this setting, for even after county and time fixed effects are removed with a
“within” transformation, county-level shocks may still be correlated with state policy. To address
this endogeneity, we combine a “within” transformation with a first difference across
neighboring counties in different states, exploiting the fact that neighboring counties likely
experience comparable shocks while their unemployment policies, being set at the state level,
may differ. Using this approach, we find that the usual fixed effects estimator indeed
overestimates the extent to which unemployment benefits raise unemployment. Our results also
suggest that it may be possible to improve unemployment outcomes by raising the level of
benefits while lowering their maximum duration.
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Introduction
The relationship between unemployment insurance (hereafter, UI) and the unemployment
rate is of both theoretical and practical interest. Labor economists must concern themselves with
this relationship in developing models of labor markets, while policymakers are interested in
how public unemployment benefits affect the aggregate labor force.
Traditional economic reasoning suggests a simple relationship: the greater the UI (either
in terms of length of benefit, average weekly payout, or both), the more utility agents derive
from being unemployed, and the less incentive they have to find employment (holding the wage
distribution constant). Higher UI then increases the number of workers who choose to be
unemployed at a given time, increasing the steady-state unemployment level. Section 2.1
presents a formal discussion of this theoretical intuition.
As Section 2.2 shows, however, economists have encountered difficulty and dispute in
empirically measuring this supposed relationship between UI and unemployment. The question
presents a difficult endogeneity problem, in that unemployment-prone regions may be expected
to offer more generous UI. Moreover, political debate on the social welfare consequences of UI
has made the question of this relationship highly contentious. These considerations warrant
further research into the relationship.
Additionally, some gaps exist in the UI literature. While many have recently studied the
effects of UI on unemployment during the Great Recession, few have considered the effects of
UI in the subsequent economic recovery, during which overall unemployment has decreased
substantially to pre-Recession levels. Moreover, most recent studies of UI have considered only
the maximum duration of available benefits, and not the level of weekly benefits paid. Our main
contribution to the literature is to apply the method used by Hagedorn, Karahan, Manovskii, and
Mitman, which compares adjacent counties in different states, to study the effects of both
duration and level of UI benefits on unemployment in the post-Recession U.S.1
In this paper, we begin by summarizing some of the important theoretical and empirical
developments made toward understanding the relationship of UI and unemployment in the past
50 years. we then propose a simple model to study the predicted relationship of UI and
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unemployment. Next, we detail available recent data and outline an empirical procedure to assess
the model. We conclude with some preliminary results and a discussion of their implications.

Literature Review
We now survey some relevant theoretical and empirical work on the relationship between UI and
unemployment.

2.1 Theoretical Work
McCall’s job-search model provides an early theoretical grounding for the informal
argument presented in Section 1. In McCall’s model, an unemployed worker may in each period
pay c to draw a random wage offer x from a distribution Φ. The worker accepts the offer if the
lifetime utility it will bring her exceeds the expected utility of waiting another period and again
paying c to draw a new wage offer. The reservation wage is defined as the wage offer that
renders the agent indifferent between accepting and rejecting employment. It is easily verified
that, all else begin equal, increasing the search cost c decreases the reservation wage, leading
agents to more readily and quickly accept job offers, and resulting in lower aggregate
unemployment. If the individual also receives some public UI benefit b in each unemployed
period, the benefit functions as a negative search cost, and a larger b thus results in higher
unemployment.2
McCall’s model identifies a moral hazard problem, arguing that unemployment benefits
lower unemployment by decreasing the relative cost of remaining unemployed. Chetty has
developed a model in which UI raises unemployment primarily through an income effect, by
providing greater liquidity to unemployed low-income households.3
Albrecht and Axell expand on McCall’s search model by including firm behavior in the
economy, endogenizing the wage distribution. The authors find that an increase in the
unemployment benefit b raises the steady-state general equilibrium level of unemployment,
although this effect can be offset by a shift in the wage distribution. Interestingly, the authors also
determine that a selective increase in the unemployment benefit, extended only to agents who
derive little utility from leisure, can in fact lower steady-state unemployment.4
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Davidson and Woodbury offer a different extension to the classical job-search model by
considering UI benefits offered only for a finite number T of periods, rather than indefinitely.
The authors find that the average duration of unemployment spells is increasing in both the
benefit b and the maximum benefit length T. Further, the authors demonstrate that the welfaremaximizing level of b decreases in T, reaching a level equal to the weekly wage when T=32.5
Still more extensions in the literature include models with partial UI coverage, wage
bargaining and union-financed UI, and experience rating.678 In general, the intuitive prediction
that more generous UI increases unemployment is supported in a wide class of theoretical
models.

2.2 Empirical Work
Despite broad agreement in the theoretical literature that UI should increase
unemployment, the exact quantitative relationship has proven difficult to measure conclusively.
This difficulty may be due to the substantial endogeneity in models relating unemployment to
UI. Various instruments have been used in attempt to isolate the causal effects, on both the
microeconomic and macroeconomic levels.
Solon exploits a 1979 U.S. policy shift that made UI benefits taxable on sufficiently high
tax returns. Solon compares 1978 and 1979 data collected by the Continuous Wage and Benefit
History (CWBH) program, which surveyed UI claimants in Georgia. The author proposes a
hazard-rate model of individual unemployment duration using a Weibull distribution, the
parameters of which are estimated by maximum likelihood. By comparing unemployment
durations of high-income claimants in the 1978 and 1979 samples, Solon concludes that the tax
on UI—which amounts to a decrease in weekly benefit—resulted in a decrease of expected
unemployment length from 9.6 to 8.4 weeks.9
McCall studies the effect of benefit levels on receipt of UI using a logit dichotomous
choice model, in which the available benefit level affects the probability of an agent taking up
benefits. The author uses micro-data from the Current Population Survey’s Displaced Worker
Supplements (CPS DWS) for 1984-1992. Exploiting differences in UI policy across states and
over time, the author uses UI claimants’ state and year of filing as an instrument for exogenous
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variation in available benefit level. He estimates that a 1% increase in the replacement rate (the
ratio of the weekly unemployment benefit to the previous weekly wage) corresponds to a
0.1-0.3% increase in the probability of taking up UI benefits. 10
Recently, much literature has analyzed the effects of extensions in the maximum length
of UI benefits during the Great Recession, which reached as high as 99 weeks in some states
between 2009 and 2012. Farber and Valletta consider the micro effects of these extended benefits
by comparing UI-eligible and UI-ineligible individuals in the Current Population Survey data.
They find that the extensions had a small negative impact on the individual unemployment exit
rate. The authors estimate that the unprecedented extensions accounted for only 0.4 percentage
points of the 9% national unemployment rate seen in 2010.11
Chodorow-Reich and Karabarbounis offer a macroeconomic analysis of these benefit
extensions. To overcome endogeneity, the authors note that UI benefit extensions were based on
real-time reports of state unemployment, which suffer from substantial measurement error. By
comparing the real-time reports to later revised data, the authors isolate inter-state differences in
UI benefit extensions induced by measurement error rather than differences in economic
fundamentals. These measurement errors provide exogenous variation in UI benefit extension,
allowing the authors to identify causal effects. They conclude that the extensions had an almost
negligible impact on macroeconomic outcomes, estimating that extension of benefits from 26 to
99 weeks could increase aggregate unemployment by at most 0.3 percentage points.12
Hagedorn, Karahan, Manovskii, and Mitman explore the macro effects of Great
Recession-era benefit extensions with a different procedure: comparing bordering counties in
different states, to isolate the exogenous state UI policy from the counties’ endogenous labor
market fundamentals. Their results are much larger than those elsewhere in the literature,
estimating that 2.5 percentage points of unemployment in 2011 were induced by benefit
extensions.13

Model
Unfortunately, the models discussed in Section 2.1 do not easily produce simple closedform equations relating the steady-state unemployment rate to the available UI benefit level and
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maximum benefit duration. Moreover, it is beyond the scope of this paper to construct a full
theoretical model for deriving such equations. For these reasons, I look to evidence from
simulated models and prior empirical work to propose a regression equation.
Sargent and Stachurski combine a version of the McCall model with a “lake” unemployment
model to analyze the effect of UI benefits on steady-state aggregate unemployment. They use a
CRRA utility function and a lognormal wage distribution, and calibrate birth, death, and
separation rates to match those of the U.S. The authors then numerically simulate the steady-state
unemployment rate for various levels of infinite duration (T=∞) UI benefits. Their results, shown
in Figure 1, suggest a highly linear relationship between the unemployment rate and the benefit
level.14
Figure 1: Steady-state unemployment as a function of per-period UI benefit level c. From
Sargent and Stachurski (2015)

To understand the relationship of the maximal weeks of UI benefits on steady-state
unemployment, we turn to Davidson and Woodbury. Their model demonstrates that changing the
benefit b while holding T constant produces essentially the same effects as holding b constant
while changing T, suggesting that T should enter into the regression equation in the same
functional form as b. However, their model notes that simultaneous changes in b and T can have
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different effects than changing each individually, suggesting that an interaction term b×T should
also be included in the regression.15
Moreover, it seems reasonable that each county and time period contribute some fixed effect
to the unemployment rate, based on permanent local business conditions and the national
economic environment. We thus arrive at the fixed effects regression equation
! ikt = β0 + β1bit + β2Tit + β3bit Tit + γ ′xit + aik + vt + uikt + εikt
Y
where Y is the steady-state unemployment rate, b the weekly UI benefit, T the maximum length
of the benefit, x a vector of controls (discussed in Section 4), a a county fixed effect, v a time
fixed effect, u a county-specific time fixed effect, and ε the remaining random error, which is
constructed to be uncorrelated with all other covariates and fixed effects. The subscript i
indicates the state, k the county in the state, and t the time period. Note that the b and T terms
do not receive a k subscript because UI policy is set at the state level.
We suspect that the two fixed effects aik and vt may be correlated with the state policy terms
bit and Tit’, as UI policy is designed to extend greater benefits to consistently distressed states and
to all states during prolonged periods of economic downturn. The above regression equation
therefore has endogeneity.
To combat this endogeneity problem, we use the standard “within” transformation to demean
out the county and time fixed effects. We obtain
~
~
~
~
! ikt = β1bit + β2Tit + β3(bT )it + γ ′~
Y
uikt + ~ε ikt,
x it + ~

(1)

where the terms are similarly defined.
This model may still have endogeneity, as the demeaned county-specific time fixed effect ~
!uikt
still impacts the demeaned unemployment rate, and therefore may be positively correlated with
the demeaned UI policy terms.
To overcome this further endogeneity, suppose counties (i,k) and (j,l) are adjacent. Due to
their adjacency, their demeaned county-specific time fixed effects are likely quite similar, so that

ujlt = 0. Subtracting their equations thus yields
we assume ~
!uikt − ~
~
~
~
~
~
~
~
~
x it − ~x jt )
!Yikt − Yjlt = β1(bit − bjt ) + β2(Tit − Tjt ) + β3((bT )it − (bT )jt ) + γ ′(~
+(
ε ikt − ~ε jlt ). (2)
! ~
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This equation should not have endogeneity, as the only remaining error term, ~
ε! ikt − ~ε jlt , is a
~ ~
~
~
linear function of the ε’s, and therefore uncorrelated with the policy terms !bit − bjt, T
! it − Tjt, and
~
~
!
(bT
)it − (bT )jt, themselves linear functions of the original covariates. Note, however, that we

ujlt for (i,k) and (j,l) adjacent to reach this conclusion. The
need the strong assumption that ~
!uikt = ~
validity of this assumption is discussed in Section 6.

Data
To estimate our specifications in equations (1) and (2), county-level unemployment data
for April 2016-March 2017 was obtained from the Bureau of Labor Statistics’ Local Area
Unemployment Statistics (BLS LAUS). The U.S. Census County Adjacency File was used to
construct 1,305 unique pairs of adjacent counties in different states. These pairs are shown in
Figure 2.
Data on average weekly UI benefit paid in each month for each of the state and the
District of Columbia was taken from U.S. Department of Labor Monthly Program and Financial
Data. Data on the maximum length of UI benefits in each state and D.C. per month was obtained
from the Center on Budget and Policy Priorities (CBPP) and the Congressional Research Service
(CRS).
Figure 2: Pairs of adjacent U.S. counties in different states, highlighted in blue

!
Some variables should be controlled for in our regressions. To control for broad
economic welfare, we include annualized state quarterly per capita income in our regression,
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using data from the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA). Further, to account for the generosity
of different UI programs, we include a “compensation ratio” term in the regression, which is
calculated as the ratio of weeks of UI claimed to weeks of UI paid for each month and state. This
ratio is calculated using the U.S. Department of Labor Monthly Program and Financial Data.
It would also be valuable to control for other factors, such as business conditions, race,
and age in different areas. Unfortunately, measurements of such variables on the state and county
levels are not available on time scales smaller than one year. The effects of these factors would
therefore be indistinguishable from county fixed effects in our model, so we are unable to
include them.Summary statistics for the panel of counties is shown in Table 1.
Table 1: Summary statistics for county panel data.

Variable

Mean

St. Dev.

Min

Max

Unemployment rate

5.266%

2.054%

1.345%

27.339%

Average weekly benefit

$325.83

$67.67

$200.68

$541.74

Maximum weeks of benefit

23.445

4.815

12

30

Compensation ratio

85.237% 15.459% 56.833% 222.265%

Income per capita

$46,824

$6,006

$35,639

$76,524

Results
To confirm that the fixed effect specification presented in section 3 is appropriate, we
first ran a Hausman test on the null hypothesis that the equivalent random effects estimator is
consistent. The test returned a chi-squared statistic value of 285.8 on 5 degrees of freedom. This
result gives strong evidence that the random effects estimator in inconsistent for the present
purpose, and that the fixed effects estimator is to be preferred.
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Following this test, we calculated the fixed effect estimator, first using equation (1) and a
panel of 3,141 counties, and then using equation (2) and a panel of 1,305 unique pairs of adjacent
counties in different states. The results are shown in Table 2.
All estimates shown are significant at the 1% level, except for the coefficient on the
maximum weeks of benefit T in specification (2), which is not even significant at the 10% level.
Table 2: Fixed effects estimates using equations (1) and (2).

Specification

Weekly benefit b

Maximum weeks of benefit T

Interaction bT

Compensation ratio

Income per capita

(1)

(2)

−0.019

−0.025

(0.005)

(0.005)

0.194

0.067

(0.059)

(0.074)

0.001

0.001

(0.0002)

(0.0002)

0.004

0.005

(0.0004)

(0.0004)

−0.0002

0.0001

(0.00004)

(0.00004)

Notes: Column (1) calculated from panel of 3,141 counties over 12 months, column (2)
calculated from panel of 1,305 border county pairs over 12 months. Unemployment rate and
compensation ratio measured in percentage points. Weekly benefit measured in dollars per
week, income per capita measured in dollars per quarter. Panel-corrected clustered standard
errors shown in parentheses, with clustering done at
the county or border county pair level.
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One of the most interesting results is that the coefficient on the weekly benefit b is
negative under both specifications, suggesting that, all else held constant, providing an average
of $50 more per week would decrease the unemployment rate by about 1 percentage point.
However, notice that the coefficient on the interaction term bT is a positive 0.001. It is
straightforward to calculate that in a state providing around 20 weeks at most of UI, this
interaction would cancel out the negative effect of the weekly benefit b, and in states providing
more than 20 weeks, increasing the weekly benefit would raise the unemployment rate.
It is also interesting to note the differences between the results of the county specification
(1) and the border county pair specification (2). The estimated coefficient on the weekly benefit
b in specification (2) is more negative than corresponding estimate in specification (1),
suggesting that the fixed effects model ran on specification (1) underestimates the negative effect
of an increased weekly benefit on the unemployment rate. Looking at the magnitudes of the
different estimates, and noting that both specifications estimate the coefficient on the interaction
term to be 0.001, we see that the estimates in specification (1) suggest that increasing the weekly
benefit will decrease unemployment in states where the maximum duration of benefit is at most
19 weeks, while the estimates in specification (2) suggest that increasing the weekly benefit will
decrease unemployment in states where the maximum duration of benefit is as high as 25 weeks.
This result has direct implications for policymaking.
The estimated coefficient on the maximum weeks of benefit T also differs greatly
between the two specifications. The estimate in specification (1) is quite large, suggesting that
increasing the maximum duration of benefits by just 5 weeks would increase unemployment by 1
percentage point. The estimate in specification (2) is not significantly different from 0, but the
point estimate suggests that it would take an increase of 15 weeks in the maximum duration of
benefits to raise unemployment by 1 percentage point. We suspect, however, that both estimates
may be unreliable, as the data has little variation in the maximum length of benefits, both across
states and and over time. Nevertheless, the direction of difference between the two specifications
suggests that the border county pair differencing indeed addresses some of the endogeneity in
specification (1).
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Some caveats to these results must be noted. First, by design, specification (2) accounts
only for counties on a state border, and it is possible that this subset of counties possesses
different economic conditions than the set of all counties. It may be, for example, that such
counties benefit greatly from interstate trade, or are more likely to lie near important rivers. That
said, any fixed effect shared by all border counties would be differenced out by specification (2).
It is also possible that the regression specification (2) overweights counties which share several
borders with counties in other states. This concern is indeed relevant, and should be studied
further in the future, for it may have implications for our calculation of standard errors. At
present, we merely note that of the counties which share a border with a county in a different
state, about 75% border between two and four counties in other states, and 99.7% border six or
fewer counties in other states.

Conclusions
The results in section 5 suggest that simply using a fixed effects estimator on a panel of
counties to assess the relationship of UI and unemployment rate tends to overstate the extent to
which UI can raise unemployment, likely due to the endogeneity problem that U.S. policies
extend greater UI benefits to high-unemployment areas. Fixed effects estimation on pairs of
adjacent counties in different states suggests a smaller positive relationship between maximum
weeks of benefits and the unemployment rate, and a stronger negative relationship between
weekly benefit and the unemployment rate. Estimation on border county pairs seems to correct
for some of the endogeneity in equation (1), giving estimates that may be closer to the true causal
relationships.
Corroborating the results of other recent literature, we find that increasing the maximum
duration of UI benefits can indeed substantially increase the unemployment rate. Our point
estimate of this effect is even higher than that found by Hagedorn, Karahan, Manovskii, and
Mitman, who estimate that an increase of one week in maximum duration of benefits causes
about a 0.03 percentage point increase in the unemployment rate.16 We note, however, that our
estimate of this effect has too a large standard error to be taken as a precise measurement, and
may be unreliable due to a lack of variation in maximum duration of benefit in our data.
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Our results also have significant implications for UI policy. By simultaneously analyzing
the effects of average weekly benefit and maximum duration of benefits on the unemployment
rate, we estimate that increasing average weekly benefit can actually decrease the unemployment
rate in states where the maximum duration of benefits is under 25 weeks. We would thus advise
policymakers that lower duration, higher benefit UI policies may result in lower unemployment
than higher duration, lower benefit policies. The intuition behind such advice is that lower
duration, higher benefit policies may allow and encourage unemployed individuals to search
more intensely for new work, and provide them with enough financial liquidity to do so. In
contrast, higher duration, lower benefit policies may leave the unemployed with little financial
liquidity to support an intense search, and encourage complacency with longer spells of
unemployment.
Importantly, the validity of our econometric approach depends upon the assumption in
section 3 that adjacent counties have similar county- and time-specific fixed effects, and this
assumption should be rigorously assessed in future research. One way to assess this assumption
would be to gather panel data of county demographics and local business conditions over time,
and measure whether adjacent counties are indeed comparable over time. Obtaining county-level
data on per-capita income, hiring, and other government benefit programs over time would also
be useful for adding more controls to our specifications, to better isolate cross-border variation
and measure the causal effects of UI.

Page 90
! of !174
https://digitalcommons.dartmouth.edu/dujpew/vol1/iss1/1

90

Editorial Board: Volume I | Issue I | 2018

Notes
1

Hagedorn, Marcus, Fatih Karahan, Iourii Manovskii, and Kurt Mitman. “Unemployment Benefits and
Unemployment in the Great Recession: The Role of Macro Effects.” 2015. Federal Reserve Bank of New York Staff
Reports, no. 646.
2 McCall, J. J. “Economics of Information and Job Search.” 1970. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 84 (1):
113-126.
3 Chetty, Raj. “Moral Hazard versus Liquidity and Optimal Unemployment Insurance.” 2008. Journal of Political
Economy, 116 (2): 173-234.
4 Albrecht, James W. and Bo Axell. “An Equilibrium Model of Search Unemployment.” 1984. Journal of Political
Economy, 92 (5): 824-840.
5 Davidson, Carl and Stephen A. Woodbury. “Optimal unemployment insurance.” 1997. Journal of Public
Economics, 64: 359-387.
6 Regev, Tali. “Unemployment compensation under partial program coverage.” 2012. Labour Economics, 19:
888-897.
7 Holmlund, Bertil and Per Lundborg. “Wage bargaining, union membership, and the organization of unemployment
insurance.” 1999. Labour Economics, 6: 397-415.
8 Mortensen, Dale. “Reducing Supply-Side Disincentives to Job Creation.” 1994. In Reducing Unemployment:
Current Issues and Policy Options, Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City, 189-219.
9 Solon, Gary. “Work Incentive Effects of Taxing Unemployment Benefits.” 1985. Econometrica, 53 (2): 397-415.
10 McCall, Brian P. “The Impact of Unemployment Insurance Benefit Levels on Recipiency.” 1995. Journal of
Business & Economic Statistics, 13 (2): 189-198.
11 Farber, Henry S. and Robert G. Valletta. “Do Extended Unemployment Benefits Lengthen Unemployment Spells?
Evidence from Recent Cycles in the U.S. Labor Market.” 2015. The Journal of Human Resources, 50 (4): 873-909.
12 Chodorow-Reich, Gabriel and Loukas Karabarbounis. “The Limited Macroeconomic Effects of Unemployment
Benefit Extensions.” 2016. Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis Working Paper.
13 Hagedorn, Marcus, Fatih Karahan, Iourii Manovskii, and Kurt Mitman. “Unemployment Benefits and
Unemployment in the Great Recession: The Role of Macro Effects.” 2015. Federal Reserve Bank of New York Staff
Reports, no. 646.
14 Sargent, Thomas and John Stachurski. “A Lake Model of Employment and Unemployment.” 2015. In
Quantitative Economics with Python.
15 Ibid.
16 Ibid.

Page 91
! of !174
Published by Dartmouth Digital Commons, 2018

91

Dartmouth Undergraduate Journal of Politics, Economics and World Affairs, Vol. 1 [2018], Iss. 1, Art. 1

Cheonggyecheon Restoration Project: The Politics and Implications of Globalization and
Gentrification

Yasmin Yoon

Page 92
! of !174
https://digitalcommons.dartmouth.edu/dujpew/vol1/iss1/1

92

Editorial Board: Volume I | Issue I | 2018

Abstract
This paper examines the process of gentrification by analyzing the actors implicated in
gentrification, the global and domestic discourses surrounding redevelopment, and the political
motivations undergirding such projects in the context of the Cheonggyecheon Restoration
Project. It takes a critical stance towards the South Korean government’s pursuit of
redevelopment projects with the goal of generating “world-class” spaces favoring the interests of
large corporate entities, with which it has established economic ties constituting a conflict of
interest. Consequences of these gentrifying practices include the displacement of local
merchants, communities, and cultural spaces, which further stratify already disparate levels of
privilege within the country’s political economy.
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Introduction
Foul pollution, traffic hell, back-breaking housing prices, brutal
rivalry and unruly streets—this is the Seoul we think of today.
Now close your eyes and envision the future of Seoul. Citizens are
relaxing by a stream; happy crowds mingle as music plays all night
long, and young couples wish for love as they toss coins into the
water. This no longer will be merely an imagination but will come
to reality starting this year. A city of romance and festivals will be
born out of the previous pollution and traffic—all thanks to the Lee
Myung-Bak Projects!1

This article, written five months before the initiation of the Cheonggyecheon
reconstruction project, reflects a common sentiment in South Korea. The project received an
overwhelming 79. 1 percent approval rating amongst the residents of Seoul. The quick execution
of the plan earned Mayor Lee Myung-bak further praise once the project was over, and
eventually he was able to leverage this result to earn the South Korean presidency in 2008.2 The
project received international attention as an example of successful urban regeneration. The New
York Times described Cheonggyecheon as a “gathering place…[that] taps into a growing
national emphasis on quality of life and immediately makes the mayor a top presidential
contender.”3 Times magazine ranked the Cheonggyecheon Stream as number seven in places to
visit in Korea. 4 The Landscape Architecture Foundation wrote that the project led an “important
paradigm shift, changing from an auto-centric development-oriented urban landscape to one that
values the quality of life of its people and the importance of functioning ecosystems.”5
The Cheonggyecheon restoration project was undeniably crucial to the economic
revitalization and changing image of downtown Seoul. However, such reviews often lack a
comprehensive analysis of outcomes, actors, and methods that paint a more complicated picture
than the narrative of a newly born “clean and attractive global Seoul.”6 Although the mainstream
media may portray the project as a boon for the general population of Seoul, a more in-depth
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study reveals the gentrifying processes in which the Seoul city government drives the
Cheonggyecheon project. This project of gentrification manifests the motivations of a country
executing a late and rapid entrance into industrialization and the global sphere, and willing to go
to long measures to fulfill its goals, including suppressing labor and perpetuating exclusionary
political and social relations.
Previous literature has primarily used the framework of urban regeneration to understand
the Cheonggyecheon restoration project. Urban regeneration and gentrification are similar terms
in that they conceptualize the same phenomenon. They both study the process in which residents
are displaced to create spaces that serve and attract wealthier subjects. However, the two terms
differ as frameworks of analysis, in that gentrification examines the socio-political relations
between the displaced and displacer, while urban regeneration solely focuses on the displacer.
Urban regeneration is becoming more common now that open spaces are presumed to
appeal to a “creative class” that is essential to urban maturation in developing economies.7 In the
past, the main dispossessors during gentrification have been households reacting to market
incentives, or the “rent-gap.”8 However, according to Hackworth, larger, corporate interests are
entering real estate and, as a consequence, displacing “lower” commercial activities and lower
income households.9 Not only does Hackworth contend that gentrification is no longer only a
market-induced phenomenon, but that government intervention has also joined in gentrifying
efforts in order to combat deindustrialization.
The Cheonggyecheon restoration project is useful when discussing the evolution of urban
regeneration because, in this case, the state intervenes in order to prioritize the interests of the
free market. This paper will analyze who the actors involved in gentrification are, how this
process is facilitated and justified, and how different social groups experience gentrification. In
doing so, this paper will take a critical stance on development-induced urban projects and argue
that the Cheonggyecheon project is emblematic of a world-wide phenomenon in which the poor
are displaced in the name of development.
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Industrialization, Development Discourse, and Political Motivations
In order to understand what the previous inhabitants of Cheonggyecheon have exactly
been dispossessed of, a study of this project through the lens of gentrification must understand
what the Cheonggyecheon stream was like before its regeneration. Cheonggyecheon used to be
an 11-km stream that ran through downtown Seoul until the rapid industrialization during the
1950s, when the entire stream was covered with a road and the elevated Cheonggye Expressway
to foster the growth of industrial and residential areas in Eastern Seoul. Gradually, wholesale
markets, small stores, street restaurants, vendors, and bars settled down along the expressway
and into the slim alleys of close neighborhoods.10 By the 1980s, this particular scene did not
settle right with the metropolitan government. Downtown Seoul was the only area in the city
with a declining population, and bulyang jutaeks, or substandard housing types, (mostly rentals
or squatters) composed 35 percent of downtown housing, a proportion that was 2.5 times the
average of Seoul. Most of the people leaving were in their 20s or 30s, and the number of
businesses and enterprises in the downtown area had declined by 24.1 percent from 1991 to
2000.11 In simpler terms, downtown Seoul was not “developed” enough, especially compared to
the rest of the city, and the metropolitan government was determined to revitalize the area.
Thus, the Cheonggyecheon restoration project certainly was not the first to introduce
‘development’ as the ideal. The metropolitan government had been making small scale
regeneration efforts prior to the Cheonggyecheon restoration project—improving rundown
houses, expanding roads and refining infrastructure in small dilapidated neighborhoods with poor
traffic conditions. Yet such minute operations were not enough to transform Seoul into a central
business district as long as the 18-lane elevated highway was still present.12 It was not until Lee
Myung-bak, with ambitious career goals and a detailed plan on how to reach them in mind,
arrived with the Cheonggyecheon restoration project when downtown Seoul underwent drastic
change.
By liquidating the unsightly legacy from Korea’s developmental
period and restoring the city’s natural environment, Seoul can be
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ready to emerge as a cultural metropolis where tradition and
modernity are harmoniously blended with each other.
- Lee Myung-bak13

Ever since South Korea became its own country in 1948, efforts toward ‘development’
have largely gone uncontested. This allowed for the development of infrastructure, numerous
mega-conglomerates, called chaebol, to thrive, national GDP to soar; the country had even
hosted what is arguably the biggest international event to ever exist, the Olympics, in 1988.
‘Development’ is not only a constant theme in South Korean history but is also a rhetorical
device deployed to justify gentrification projects worldwide. After all, a common synonym for
urban regeneration projects is urban redevelopment projects. But what exactly is development,
and what does it look like? And how has the image of development changed in South Korea
since the days of rapid economic growth led by military dictators in the 1970s and 80s?
Before delving into how the project was carried out, one must recognize the specific
vision of development Lee Myung-bak had in mind. First, he distances the new and refurbished
Seoul from that of the “unsightly” developmental period by “liquidating” its “legacy.” Hence, the
city must hold a certain aesthetic that is more advanced than that of crude industrialization. He
focuses on “modernity,” a term that refers to an ambiguous global standard, but is also concerned
with “tradition,” which indicates a nationalistic appeal to the Korean ethnicity. With the phrase
“cultural metropolis,” he paints the picture of a city full of vibrancy with a healthy economy.
This is only one dimension of the city, however, since it must also contain a “natural
environment,” an ecological appeal, as well. Under the pretext that this new scene will help
“national growth,” the Seoul city government meticulously advertised a very curated image of
Seoul to the global stage.
Execution of the Project
Once Lee Myung-bak won the 2002 Seoul mayoral election with 52.28 percent of the
votes, the Cheonggyecheon projects commenced less than a month later on July 1, 2002 and
lasted until 2006. Lee Myung-bak formed three groups—the Cheonggyecheon restoration
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headquarters, Cheonggyecheon research group, Cheonggyecheon citizens’ committee—to
manage research proceedings regarding the restoration, generate plans, and organize structural
processes. Each group consisted of government officials, experts, and citizens. This triangular
structure was specifically designed to simultaneously launch implementation whilst building
public relations. Efficiency was especially considered an important component of the process and
the three departments congregated every Saturday for a meeting in which they made decisions in
a “speedy and determined manner.” A development plan concerning strategy for downtown
development, revival of downtown industries, and the Cheonggyecheon neighborhood were
announced in June 2003. A year later, the Cheonggyecheon restoration headquarters presented a
master plan that specified how to revitalize Cheonggyecheon’s natural environment in order to
design a more “human-oriented public space” and how to return the stream, acquire water
resources, manage sewage, traffic and historical assets.14
The process was incredibly fast-paced. In fact, much of the planning and construction
stages overlapped. The manufacturing of the Cheonggyecheon stream did not happen in an
orderly, linear fashion. Construction began only six months after the government had started
working on the “Cheonggyecheon Restoration Master Plan” even though it was not until a year
later when the plan was finalized. To give a point of reference, the Big Dig city regeneration
project in Boston, Massachusetts that covered 12 km took 25 years. The High Line project in
New York City, which covered 1.6 km, took 9 years. The Cheonggyecheon project, which
covered 5.8 km, was completed in just 27 months. The construction process was hurried in order
to minimize business disruption and financial loss for the merchants and property owners in
Cheonggyecheon, but Lee Myung-bak was also eager to complete the project before his term as
the Seoul mayor was over.15
The metropolitan government wanted Cheonggyecheon to be recognized as a public
project, thus it accumulated $84.13 million from what was supposed to be the Cheonggye
elevated highway renovation, another $84.47 million pulled from other city programs, and the
rest from tax money to secure a total government budget of $323 million.16 The financing of the
Cheonggyecheon restoration project depended on the “ripple effect” as well. 17 Once the public
sector was able to build a “better” urban environment, the private sector was presumed to follow
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in regeneration efforts. The private and public sector then would work in partnership to continue
“urban regeneration.” With an elevated highway, an “eco-friendly” waterfront, and the stream,
Cheonggyecheon first opened to the public in September 2005.18
Under the developmental state, Korea derived its zeal for urban reconstruction from the
“great works of nation building and social transformation.”19 The use of urban renewal and city
marketing to enhance economic competitiveness and international attraction in Seoul had always
been a topic of interest for the metropolitan government since industrialization. The goal was to
develop Seoul into a “sustainable, livable, and global city” through strategic management and
marketing of its resources for eventual economic growth and urbanization. Cheonggyecheon was
pivotal for Seoul’s envisioned future as a “world-class city.”20
A key feature of a model city in the minds of the metropolitan government today is one
that can compete at a global level. Indeed, Lee Myung-bak stated that Seoul must “stand out as a
center of foreign investment...as an attractive center of business along with Shanghai, Tokyo, and
Beijing.”21 According to Kriznik, global pressures mounted especially high on Seoul, who was
late to urbanization and was, for a long time, a “wannabe world city” eager to prove itself.22 It
had “most to gain—in status, power, and wealth—from its worldview.”23 With the advent of
globalization, cultures and politics across nations became increasingly intertwined and cities rose
as centers of global flows of culture, capital, and goods. Yet Kriznik argues that cities were not
just spaces for globalization to unfold, but “engines of the global economy and reproduced the
global order as much as they were affected by it.”24 In other words, globalization is about
increased local control as well. The Cheonggyecheon project epitomizes a new phase of
developmentalism, one that is intensified by policies reminiscent of Kim Young Sam’s
Segwehwa, where globalization meets ethnic nationalism and a very specific image of Seoul is
marketed to the world. In the context of globalization, the ability to attract foreign investment
became critical for economic growth and urban development. This phenomenon incentivizes
governments to invest substantial financial resources and enact administrative initiatives in their
urban policies in order to create social change. In response to these trends, in 1995, the Seoul
metropolitan government took a central role in local economic growth and urban development. It
also increased the marketing budget by 750% in 2008.25
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The hope that the global status of Seoul could be altered by the determined management
and marketing of its resources often overshadows the negative outcomes of urban development,
such as uneven capital accumulation and social segregation. For example, sustainability is
considered one of the “normative principles in urban design, assuring attractiveness in the city
government.”26 However, while green urbanism has been advocating the ethics of zero-emissions
and zero-waste, a precise definition for sustainable urban design has not been reached. In fact,
Scheutze et al. states that over 200 different definitions for sustainable urban development exists,
which makes it difficult to comprehend urban sustainability beyond energy efficiency and
aesthetics. Thus, city governments have not paid adequate attention to how to apply urban
sustainability across various societal groups and invest in the “social responsibility and
economical aspects on different levels of urban scales.” Especially in the case of the
Cheonggyecheon project, which took an alarmingly short period of time to construct, one can
only imagine how much attention was devoted to social and ecological responsibility.
In spite of the arbitrary nature of the standards used to judge cities, a space had already
formed in which governments challenged established relations amongst cities through the
“worlding practice,” or making their cities more “world-class.”27 In 2005, OECD described the
restoration as one that “can serve as a flagship project showing to the international community
Seoul’s dedication in building a lively urban landscape. If the project is closely connected to a
cultural booming, it could become a major touristic asset for Seoul’s international image.”28
Furthermore, the foreign media commended the project for successfully transforming previous
international perception of Seoul as an “urban concrete jungle.”29 These sources legitimized the
city government’s undertaking of urban regeneration, furthering emboldening their efforts to
achieve importance within the global competitive order.

Politics of Redevelopment, Corruption, and Public Reception
Despite the constant rhetoric about “national growth,” and the betterment of Seoul, Lee
Myung-bak had much to gain privately from this project. Enabled by the top-down structure of
the Cheonggyecheon project, Lee Myung bak was able to aggressively push the project through
and skillfully advertise his project in a way to further his professional career. When Lee MyungPage 101
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bak pledged during his 2002 Seoul mayoral election campaign that he would reconstruct the
Cheonggyecheon stream, it immediately became the central question of the election, thus,
allowing the project to have salient connections to the election and politics. The opposing
mayoral candidate called for protecting neighboring merchants and commercial property owners
from business interruptions. They argued that the project not only did not have a feasible
infrastructure plan but would cause further traffic congestion and cost the city an additional $446
million, and that funds be spent on more pressing issues, such as education. On the other hand,
Lee Myung-bak argued that the highway was run-down and unstable, that the project would help
resuscitate the downtown economy, and transform Seoul’s image to that of a dynamic and
emerging global metropolis.30
In spite of Lee Myung-bak’s rhetorical emphasis of this being a public project for the
general betterment of Seoul’s citizens, hints of cronyism, corruption and personal advancement
were apparent in the Cheonggyecheon reconstruction project. Once Lee Myung-bak was elected
and initiated the project, he hired contractors who had been active in the bidding process in favor
of the project. Cheonggyecheon was divided into sections in which various private developers,
including Daelim Industrial Corporation, LG Engineering and Construction Corporation,
Hyundai Engineering, and Construction Corporation, undertook responsibility for
development.31 It is notable that the direct beneficiaries of this $300 million project were
massive conglomerates. Namely, Hyundai Engineering and Construction Corporation, which was
responsible for one of the main sections of Cheonggyecheon, was the same company that Lee
Myung-bak himself had worked for, and eventually became CEO of, from 1967-1992.32 It is not
a coincidence that these particular conglomerates were delegated parts of the reconstruction
project. Yet again in South Korea, a project set up in the name of development,
disproportionately benefited conglomerates over the local markets and vendors that had existed
there originally. Lee Myung-bak’s own previous position as the CEO of Hyundai Engineering
and Construction Corporation, and subsequent economic opportunities he gifted to the company
as mayor, do not suggest the usual corporate-state link, but that, in South Korea, the line has truly
blurred between the two entities. Perhaps the reason why the reconstruction project was able to
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be carried out so quickly, and all dissenting opinions suppressed so easily, was that corporations
and the government were able to literally act together, as one and the same.
A particularly controversial case of cronyism arose when Vice-Mayor Yang Yoon-jae,
who was once a professor at Seoul National University’s Graduate School of Environmental
Studies and director of the project from 2002 to 2004, was arrested for accepting over $100,000
worth of bribes from a developer to relax height restrictions on the Cheonggyecheon
Expressway. Although he was found guilty and sentenced to five years in prison, Lee Myungbak, his former boss and who had been elected President by this time, not only pardoned him but
also designated him as Presidential Commission on Architecture Policy.33
One of the biggest reasons the Cheonggyecheon project was able to happen so smoothly
was that much of the project budget was devoted to marketing. One cannot help but wonder what
Lee Myung-bak cared about more: the project or people’s opinion of the project. It was important
for Lee Myung-bak that the project served its purpose: to publicize the project and his own
competency and kick-start his own campaign for presidency. In order to make known the success
of the project, Lee Myung-bak devoted 1 billion won (approximately 959,000 US dollars) on
numerous public relations programs related to the stream. With these finances, Lee Myung-bak
instituted the Cheonggyecheon Revival Academy in the early 2000s to “inform public opinion”
regarding the project, in an attempt to build, or at least feign, social consensus on the project. Lee
Myung-bak did not stop with the South Korean media but made his debut into the global scene
as well. On May 2004, Lee Myung-bak offered 390,000,000 won (approximately 374,000 US
dollars) to the US documentary channel, “Discovery,” to produce an episode on
Cheonggyecheon, including an extensive interview with Lee Myung-bak. He has also expended
600,000,000 won (approximately 575,400 US dollars) on a project called “Cheonggyecheon
Video White Paper” using Seoul citizens’ tax money and hosted a symposium in which he
invited infrastructure and environmental experts to speak about the Cheonggyecheon restoration
project.34
Thus, with the support of government officials, government research institutions, and
civic engineers, Mayor Lee pushed for swift reconstruction with wide political support and
positive media coverage. The rapid and relentless fashion in which the restoration process was
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conducted was supposed to reflect his “management competence” and strong political stance.35
However, multiple civic, academic, environmental, and cultural organizations have questioned
the “ecological and historical authenticity” of the stream and voiced protest on what they viewed
as an undemocratic operation.36 For example, an important aspect of Cheonggyecheon’s appeal is
its environmental friendliness. However, because the city government had chosen a nearby
water-treatment facility for water supply instead of a long-term gradual restoration of natural
water inflow, an increasingly serious algae problem had developed in the stream. Moreover, the
bottom of the stream, which is made of concrete, renders it almost impossible to conduct
purification purposes, and maintenance expenses have been climbing by 30 percent annually.37
Despite Mayor Lee’s claim to have built a modernized Seoul that is still in touch with its unique
cultural heritage, not only has the project itself destroyed numerous historical and cultural sites,
but his previous company, Hyundai Engineering and Construction Corporation, was also
responsible for much of the environmental degradation during the period of rapid
industrialization in 1960s and 1970s.38
Gentrification
The case of the Cheonggyecheon restoration project offers two important facts
concerning gentrification: that displacement is ongoing, and that the displaced does not just
include lower income households, but lower industrial uses as well.
Despite Lee Myung-bak’s determined PR efforts to gain approval for the restoration
project, the restoration plan was extended from the initial 10 months to 2 years due to trouble
building social consensus amongst all civil groups.39 Vehement and active protests, albeit
ultimately drowned out in an authoritarian fashion, are evidence that the gentrifying practices
prompted by the Cheonggyecheon restoration project were, in fact, exclusionary. Perhaps the
protests against the Cheonggyecheon project were not met with the dramatic and violent
silencing tactics from the 70s and 80s, when the police could openly beat demonstrators to death
in the streets, but the government under Lee Myung-bak was oppressive nonetheless. Any dissent
was ignored when the project was being pushed through, and when the land prices became too
high for the previous residents, they were forced to relocate. Impacts and outcomes of the project
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indicate that certain social classes were prevented from enjoying the benefits of the newly
constructed stream, solidifying a widening gap in power relations between the dispossessor and
the dispossessed.
Prior to the restoration project, Cheonggyecheon constituted a very vibrant community,
with social and political complexities. Pollution and noise from the elevated Cheonggye
expressway formed an amicable setting for small firms and trophy, metalworking and printing
industry clusters to develop in surrounding areas. Small plots and lower buildings conserved the
narrow alleys and historical sites, while lower-income workers, merchants, customers and illegal
vendors populated the downtown area every day and built their livelihoods around it. 40 The area
had, after four decades, nourished local cultures and businesses, and “woven into the fabric of
the city.”41
Thus, merchants lead the opposition against the project. City officials and merchants held
approximately 4,200 meetings, yet the merchants still emerged from the process as a deeply
disadvantaged party. The government gave no direct compensation for business interruptions or
relocation, and moved street vendors to the Dongdaemun stadium close by with the promise of
renovating the flea market area.42 However, not only did this promise fail to deliver and business
wane, but the stadium itself was also demolished in the name of “urban regeneration” a year later
under the next Seoul mayor, Oh Se-hoon. The street vendors were moved once again, this time to
a folk market in sinseoldong.43 As opposed to recognizing that the Cheonggyecheon
reconstruction project has disempowered certain groups, the project has only incited more
excitement about urban regeneration projects, and about development. Compared to the success
story of a renovated city and a tenacious man, and the glowing international reception the project
received, the story that the previous residents of downtown Seoul have to tell is harsh and
unpromising.
The purported goals of the Cheonggyecheon reconstruction project were the following:
decrease the disparity between northern and downtown Seoul by improving environmental and
living conditions in the latter, reclaiming natural and cultural heritage that had been destroyed
during rapid urbanization, form new public spaces, and increase traffic safety. In some ways, the
Cheonggyecheon project was a success. The Cheonggyecheon stream has hosted 259 cultural
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events from 2005 to 2007, and in a 2014 public survey, 59.6 percent of the respondents described
it as a pleasant place to relax. 44Hence the Cheonggyecheon is generally perceived to have
enhanced accessibility to conveniences, yet this does not apply for everyone.
Through the project, the Seoul Metropolitan Government hoped to expand business
services and commercial cluster in the area. Such transformations entailed increase land rents
and property values. In fact, on account of the reconstruction, land prices increased from 35 to 80
percent depending on the proximity to the stream, and office rents increased by 20 percent.45
Consequently, neighborhoods like Sinseoul, Hwanghak and Wangsimni became districts of land
speculation. High-rise office buildings and residential projects grew along Cheonggyecheon in
replacement of small workshops and businesses.46 19 percent of the economy used to consist of
manufacturing, while another 32 percent was wholesale, retail, and transportation business.47
However, the project drove out traditional industrial sectors in order to give rise to financial and
professional services. By 2011, 98% of the land use changes along the reconstruction districts
constituted hotel, commercial, office or educational institutes.48 Almost half of all 168 land uses
changes were commercial, including cafes, restaurants, bars, and retail, while approximately
quarter of them were for office utilities and only 8 cases, or 4.7 percent, were industrial.49 Before
the project, there were about 60,000 shops that employed a total of 800,000 workers and illegal
street vendors. The Cheonggyecheon flea market, along with the Hwanghak market, essentially
vanished after the reconstruction, and only 700 street vendors were left in the Seoul folk flea
market by 2011. 50 In other words, reproduction of local economy and day-to-day life perished to
be replaced by structures of private urban development. In fact, Lim et al. argues that
entrepreneurial cities purposefully escalated property tax revenues to compensate for the lack of
state funding.51 Under commercial gentrification, government intervention in refurbishing
neighborhoods had become “conscious, active, intentional, and even a source of pride.”52
The structural changes the project enacted in the economy demonstrate the importance of
spatial capital. A survey in Wangsimni, a low-income neighborhood nearby Cheonggyecheon,
was conducted in 2008 about the stream. 69 percent of the respondents reported that they often
spent their free time in the neighborhood, but 33 percent of the respondents said that they never
or seldom visited the stream and complained that the neighborhood lacked available public
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space. When asked why, they explained that they did not consider Cheonggyecheon as “their
place.” In fact, reports show that Cheonggyecheon is mostly enjoyed by foreign visitors and
visitors from other parts of Seoul.53 The “privileged consumption practices” of other visitors is
an act of “social power over the everyday use and meaning of space.”54 The creation of the
Cheonggyecheon stream has “created a new sense of order for some local residents,” effectively
spreading a sense of alienation amongst those who were left behind in the process. Moreover,
only 6% of the respondents stated that the reconstruction boosted economic development in the
neighborhood, suggesting that a very small proportion of the local population, if any, had access
to the economic benefits of reconstruction in their own living environment.55 The inequitable
outcomes of the Cheonggyecheon stream imply that this is a case of authoritative social and
political actors enforcing their arbitrary understandings of urban renewal, whether or not it is
meaningful to the already existing societies.
Based on the reception Cheonggyecheon has received, swift redevelopment for the
“higher uses” is considered a successful instance of urban regeneration. Such general perception
suggests which stakeholders are more valued not only by the city government, but by civil
society. As displacement continues, a civil society that increasingly caters to bourgeoisie middleclass interests has emerged. As a result, the urban poor, who are most in need of incomegenerating opportunities, are pushed away from “central sources of income,” and from “civic life
and urban culture, and were seen as impediment to progress and betterment of society.”56
Conclusion
Continually chased by the workings of the global free market, and its agent, the state, the
urban poor are transformed into nomads, or “transients in a perpetual state of relocation.”57 The
Cheonggyecheon restoration project not only sparked long languishing redevelopment projects,
but also incited new ones. While no redevelopment projects were issued permits from 1990 to
2005, within two years of the stream’s public opening, eight redevelopment projects that had
been inactive since the mid 1970s were issued permits. Hence developmentalism is still present,
possibly even strengthened, under the world’s current political-economic climate. Despite the
narratives of Seoul as a cultural, environmental, and “international hub of world capitalist
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production and exchange,”58 this paper argues that such top-down “scientific social planning”
simply does not work. Communities are not designed to be dislodged and transported. Urban
regeneration does not give rise to nation-wide growth, but instead further creates “spatial
barriers, residential privileges, zoning, and other planning mechanisms where income, position,
and clout determined access” to wealth.59 Furthermore, the Cheonggyecheon restoration project
sheds insight into the hypocrisy and contradictions of Korean politics. The personal benefits Lee
Myung-bak reaped from the Cheonggyecheon reconstruction project indicate that urban
regeneration efforts strategically legitimize the elite political and corporate groups’ particular
interpretations of urban renewal. Neglect of the demolition of traditional markets and local
places, dislocation of lower-income neighborhoods, and isolation amongst local residents erases
the memory of city exploitation, and perpetuates gentrification as embodying the new “global
urban strategy.”60
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Abstract
Global levels of displacement are higher today than they’ve ever been. Australia, called
on by the international community to take in refugees, is entrenched in an ethnocentric
nationalism adverse to increased immigration and the rise of multiculturalism. While the
government professes humanitarian motivation, the reality of policy and detainment is a gross
violation of human rights and concerted efforts to decrease the number of refugees and asylum
seekers. Refugees are villainized and strategically silenced by Australian government and media
as a means to justify their actions and minimize publicity of humanitarian atrocities.

John

Howard’s famous statement, “we will decide who comes to this country and the circumstances in
which they come,” professes the government's endeavors to control who composes the Australian
nation.
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Introduction: Living in a Detention Center

It is 10 years this week since Woomera detention center was closed.
I still remember how isolated our lives were in the middle of the
desert. Incidents of self-harm such as ingesting shampoo or cutting
with razor wire were things I’d see every day. Some nights we’d get
together and speak about our families and I would notice our group
getting smaller. My memories are full of riots, people being beaten
and tear-gassed, and friends being taken into isolation for weeks…
Have we moved on from these distraught experiences?1

Ramesh Fernandez fled Sri Lanka in 2001 and sought asylum in Australia. He was
detained in Cocos Island, Christmas Island, Perth, and Woomera, before being transferred to
Baxter, Victoria, and finally granted asylum in 2004. Woomera detention center, built on a
defense site in the middle of the South Australian desert, opened in 1999 in response to
increasing arrivals of asylum seekers.

2

The Department of Immigration and Multicultural and

Indigenous Affairs contracted the Australasian Correctional Management (ACM) to operate the
center, delegating the government’s responsibilities towards asylum seekers and refugee to a
company with a background in running prisons. This is outlined in the 1951 United Nations
(U.N.) Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol, to which Australia is
a signatory. 3 Originally intended for 400 people, in the early 2000s Woomera detention center
held close to 1,500. Strict rules and harsh punishments dictated detainees’ lives. Although
temperatures in the area regularly reach 45 degrees centigrade, the facility had no airconditioning. Three washing machines and five toilets were meant to accommodate all 1,500
people.4 Riots in 2000 – instigated both by asylum seekers detained at Woomera and external
protesters denouncing the Australian government – drew national as well as international
attention to the facility.5 Having become infamous for such human rights abuses, overcrowding,
and brutal conditions, the center was shut down in 2003.
Harsh and sometimes inhumane treatment of refugees and asylum seekers did not end
Page 114
!
of !174
https://digitalcommons.dartmouth.edu/dujpew/vol1/iss1/1

114

Editorial Board: Volume I | Issue I | 2018

with Woomera. As of April 30, 2017, 1,392 people were confined to immigration detention
facilities in Australia and 1,194 asylum seekers were detained in Australian-funded “Offshore
Processing Centers.”6 Men, women, and children in such centers live in constant uncertainty;
they do not know if they will be granted refugee status, and they have no voice in, nor influence
on, the outcome of their detention. While some Australians praise the government’s policy,
others accuse politicians and immigration officials of violating asylum seekers’ human rights.
Despite this dissent, offshore detention and processing policies in the last two decades have
received bipartisan support; evidently a large number of Australians wish to restrict the arrival of
asylum seekers on Australian shores and of refugees into Australian society. Many of these
asylum seekers are of African, Middle Eastern, and South Asian origins, and the rhetoric used to
justify restrictive immigration policies seems, at least at times, to be racially motivated.
As Australia asserted itself as a new nation on the 20th century world stage, Australians
sought to establish a national identity for themselves. This identity grew from quintessentially
“Australian” Bush, Pioneer, and Anzac legends but it also clung to a predominantly white and
British heritage, which helps explain the development of the White Australia policy. This policy
– an amalgam of laws enacted over multiple years – effectively barred non-whites from
immigrating to Australia for the first half of the 20th century and maintained an Anglo-centric
cultural homogeneity within the nation. The laws emerged amidst a fear of “invasion” by Asian
migrants. Even after World War II, when policy shifted to a more open stance towards nonBritish migrants, anxiety about Australia’s economic reliance on Asia fueled racist sentiments
and prompted support for restrictive immigration measures. A new principle – “multiculturalism”
– replaced White Australia, yet the legacies of the former policy and the discriminatory
undercurrents that gave rise to it continue to influence Australian society and policy today.
Refugees and asylum seekers form a particularly vulnerable group of people because they
lack the protection of their national government. To address this vulnerability various members
of the United Nations committed themselves to protecting refugee and asylum seeker rights by
crafting and signing the Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees in 1951. This Convention
defined the term “refugee,” and outlined the rights of the displaced, as well as the legal
obligations of states towards refugees and asylum seekers. Since 1951, 145 State parties have
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ratified the Convention, which now serves as the primary international legal document relating to
refugee protection.7 Because the original Convention restricted refugee status to those whose
displacement had occurred “as a result of events occurring before 1 January 1951” and was
intended to encompass only refugees of World War Two within Europe, member nations
amended it in 1967 by instituting a Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, which removed
temporal and geographic restrictions from the Convention.8 The norms established in these
conventions should, theoretically, guarantee refugees and asylum seekers international protection
and basic human rights. Too often, however, countries – including signatories to both the original
Convention and its Protocol – fail to guarantee these rights or flagrantly violate them.
In light of Australia’s immigration history, it is evident that a white ethnocentric
Australian national identity enabled the formation and continuation of exclusionist refugee
policies that violate human rights as well as international laws. Through these policies, Australia
is shirking its responsibilities as a signatory to the 1951 Refugee Convention and its 1967
Protocol and setting a dangerous precedent in the region with regards to the treatment and
protection of displaced persons. Asylum seekers today undergo the same hardships Fernandez
experienced in Woomera in 2002. He describes how monotony and uncertainty bred desperation
among detainees:

The breakout during the Easter of 2002 was something I’ll never
forget. Protesters arrived at the detention center and broke fences.
Some asylum seekers managed to escape. Some tried to jump over
the razor wire and got stuck. They were cut so badly they fainted
due to blood loss. Others were crying, asking protesters to “please
take me too!” and some were jammed in the middle because there
were so many people rushing to escape. As people gathered closer to
the fences the guards became aggressive. After a while police and
the guards surrounded us and there was no escape. All went back to
the sad reality once again.9

Page 116
!
of !174
https://digitalcommons.dartmouth.edu/dujpew/vol1/iss1/1

116

Editorial Board: Volume I | Issue I | 2018

Section I: Boat Arrivals and Offshore Detention Centers
Insular political parties and anti-refugee rhetoric have gained ground in Australia over the
past twenty years, and the creation of offshore detention centers exposes a widespread inclination
to exclude refugees from the nation. Both the Liberal-National Coalition and the Labor Party
preach the humanitarian necessity of intercepting boats carrying asylum seekers and detaining
those aboard to deter people from undertaking the dangerous journey. However, analyses of the
policies that stipulate these actions suggest that the government’s actions and motives are not
humanitarian.
In October 2013 the government instructed administrative staff to start referring to
asylum seekers arriving by boat as “illegal maritime arrivals” rather than “irregular maritime
arrivals”10 – in spite of the fact that entering a country without authorization for the purpose of
seeking asylum is not illegal.11 Further criminalizing refugees, the government then implemented
a policy involving military vessels patrolling Australian and international waters for the purpose
of intercepting migrant boats. Rather than rescue the people in these boats, Australian defense
forces tow them to their point of origin and sometimes even send asylum seekers back in
inflatable dinghies or “unsinkable” lifeboats, subjecting them to the same journey they claim to
discourage.12 These measures not only violate the rights of asylum seekers, they also are a form
of refoulement, given that the refugee status of these individuals has not yet been determined.
In October 2012, the government started conducting “enhanced screening” of asylum
seekers. Under this policy, officers from the Department of Immigration interviewed asylum
seekers arriving by boat from certain countries. If the interview raised concerns that indicated a
need for protection, people were “screened in” so their claims could be officially processed. If it
did not raise such concerns, however, asylum seekers were “screened out” and returned to their
country of origin. As the Refugee Council of Australia explains, this system failed to protect the
rights of asylum seekers by depriving them of the opportunity to formally lodge a claim for
asylum in a safe environment:

In July 2014, a group of 41 Sri Lankan asylum seekers who had
attempted to enter Australia by boat were intercepted by Australian
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authorities and screened at sea before being returned to Sri Lanka.
Some subsequently fled to Nepal where they were found to be
refugees by UNHCR. Another group of 12 Sri Lankan asylum
seekers whose boat was intercepted by the Australian authorities
near Cocos Island in May 2016 were also screened at sea before
being flown to Sri Lanka. They were reportedly arrested on arrival at
the Colombo airport. In March and July 2015, two boats carrying
Vietnamese asylum seekers were intercepted by the Australian navy
and their passengers underwent enhanced screening before being
returned to Vietnam. Asylum seekers on the first boat were held at
sea for nearly a month. It has been reported that some of the people
on board the first boat were subsequently tried and sentenced to two
to three years in prison.13

Despite such episodes, the government continues to claim that boat interceptions and
offshore processing are necessary to deter people from risking their life in boat journeys.
Journalist Thomas Albrecht, writing for The Guardian, highlights the paradox of Australia’s
policy of offshore processing. “I understand why those who originally supported offshore
processing were moved by the tragic drownings of men, women and children who were trying
desperately to reach Australia’s shores, to embrace policies and practices seeking to end the
boats.” Allegedly designed to protect people, offshore processing subjects them to physical and
psychological harm from “open-ended mandatory detention, inadequate conditions and indefinite
limbo.”14 According to Albrecht,

there is a false and disingenuous logic in saving people at sea, only
to then mistreat them on land. When faced with overwhelming
evidence of harm and neglect, we must acknowledge that good
intentions cannot justify the status quo. The current policy has been
an abject failure. A proper approach by Australia must include, at a
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minimum, solutions for all refugees and asylum seekers sent to
Papua New Guinea and Nauru, and an end to offshore processing.
This is the time to share, not shirk, responsibility.15

Rather than fulfill the principle of international protection, these policies transgress
international law. “There is nothing illegal about seeking sanctuary from war and persecution,”
explains Albrecht, “the right to seek asylum is enshrined in the Declaration of Human Rights…
Australia’s obligation to people fleeing persecution, just as with any country in the world, is the
same whether they arrive by air or by sea.”16
While it is true that boat journeys are dangerous and that people smugglers take
advantage of asylum seekers, the reality is that most people in these situations – who abandon
their possessions, their family, and their home, pay thousands of dollars to climb onto a boat, and
leave all that they know for an unknown destination – will always attempt to flee conflict,
oppression, and persecution and will always try to reach countries, like Australia, that supposedly
protect human rights. Moreover, evidence suggests that Australia’s policies have not reduced
deaths at sea.17 Given these facts, the idea of deterring asylum seekers is inherently flawed.
While the government insists that their policies have restored the integrity of Australian borders,
an analysis of the situation suggests these measures, rather than the asylum seekers’ actions are
illegal.18

Section II: Setting a Dangerous Precedent
In 2016, all 193 Member States of the United Nations unanimously adopted the New
York Declaration for Refugees and Migrants, proffering “profound solidarity with, and support
for, the millions of people in different parts of the world who, for reasons beyond their control,
are forced to uproot themselves and their families from their homes.”19 Today however, low or
middle-income countries host more than eight in ten of the world’s refugees. 20 Given this statistic
Albrecht (among others) calls on Australia and other “prosperous, successful immigrant
countries with respect for the rule of law and a fair go for all” to uphold their end of the
international asylum system.21 “The example Australia sets at home is one that is watched
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closely by countries in the region and around the world. Closing borders and outsourcing
obligations will not prevent people from seeking safety, nor will it provide protection to the men,
women and children who need it. It will only be a destructive and dangerous precedent.”22
Over the past two decades, all three major parties in Australia have implemented and
agreed to offshore processing, but Australia’s immigration policies haven’t always been this
harsh. In 1973, the same year in which Australia signed the 1967 Protocol Relating to the Status
of Refugees, the Whitlam government legally abolished the White Australia policy. Two years
later, Australia accepted thousands of refugees from the Vietnam War. As more and more asylum
seekers fled to Australia, the Government refined and systematized its humanitarian immigration
program; in 1978, the governing Liberal Party implemented a procedure for processing onshore
applications for refugee status in accordance with Australia’s obligations under the Refugee
Convention.23 The same year, in language strikingly different to that used in political discourse
today, Immigration Minister Michael MacKellar affirmed that “boat people” were not “illegal
immigrants” and that “refugees arriving by boat [should] no longer [be] considered queue
jumpers.”24 However, attitudes began to shift again as the principle of multiculturalism took
effect in earnest in the late 20th century and increasing numbers of ethnically diverse migrants
and refugees entered Australia; backlash became apparent as people invoked nationalism, border
security, and economic arguments in demanding more restrictive immigration policies.
In 1989, reacting to the influx of asylum seekers arriving in Australia following the
Tiananmen Square massacre and the collapse of the Soviet Union, the Hawke Government
introduced the Migration Legislation Amendment Act to deter “illegal entrants” by implementing
new regulations that introduced mandatory detention and required asylum seekers to pay back
the cost of their ‘protection’ (i.e. detention), which, for some, amounted to hundreds of thousands
of dollars25. Building on these increasingly severe measures against asylum seekers, the
outsourcing of management of immigration detention centers to private companies began in
199726 and served as one of the most important turning points in Australian immigration policy,
since it enabled government officials to evade responsibility for abuses committed against
asylum seekers.
Most Australians at the time rejected the extreme attitudes of anti-refugee advocates. In
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1998, when Pauline Hanson (leader of the right-wing populist One Nation party) suggested
Temporary Protection Visas (TPVs), Phillip Ruddock, the Minister for Immigration, responded
by saying, “Can you imagine what temporary entry would mean for them? It would mean that
people would never know whether they were able to stay here … I regard the approach as being
highly unconscionable in a way that most thinking people would clearly reject.”27 TPVs are
issued to persons who have been recognized as refugees, but who continue to live in uncertainty
because three years after being granted a TPV, they are required to reapply for a visa (in case
conditions have changed in their homeland). Moreover, refugees under TPVs have no family
reunion rights and are prohibited from reentering Australia if they leave.28 Yet, only a year after
Ruddock’s statement the Liberal-National Coalition headed by John Howard, implemented TPV
legislation, claiming it was necessary to prevent misuse of the asylum process by unauthorized
arrivals.29
Once again, this legislation contained a fallacy; asylum seekers and refugees, by
definition, should not be considered “unauthorized.” Article 31 of the Refugee Convention

prohibits States from imposing penalties on refugees who, when
coming directly from a territory where their life or freedom was
threatened, enter… their territory without authorization… [T]his
includes both refugees coming straight from their country of origin
and refugees coming from any other territory where their protection,
safety and security cannot be assured. This Article recognizes that
refugees have a lawful right to enter a country for the purposes of
seeking asylum, regardless of how they arrive or whether they hold
valid travel or identity documents. As such, what would otherwise
be considered illegal or unlawful actions (e.g. entering a country
without a visa) should not be treated as such if a person is seeking
asylum.30

Yet, TPVs still exist in Australia today. In 2008, Kevin Rudd’s Labor Government abolished
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TPVs only to have Tony Abbott’s Liberal-National Government begin the process of reinstating
the policy in 2013, despite Immigration Minister Chris Evans’ affirmation that “the Temporary
Protection visa was one of the worst aspects of the Howard government’s punitive treatment of
refugees, many of whom had suffered enormously before fleeing to Australia. There is clear
evidence that the TPV arrangements did nothing to prevent unauthorized boat arrivals.”31 In
claiming to protect asylum seekers, Australian leaders have misrepresented policies that are in
breach of international law. As the State Library of New South Wales explains,

Article 31 means that Australia should not impose any penalty
against an Afghan asylum seeker who travels from Afghanistan to
Pakistan, to Malaysia using false documents, on to Indonesia and
then to Australia by boat without a visa or passport. There is no
country between Australia and Afghanistan that is a signatory to the
Refugee Convention… Australia places this person into indefinite
detention at an excised location and has created a system of
processing that differs from the system used for someone who
arrived by plane with a tourist visa and then applied for protection…
Article 31 also prohibits State parties from restricting the freedom of
movement of refugees who arrive without authorization… [But]
Australia’s Temporary Protection Visas (TPVs) deny people the
right to re-enter Australia if they leave.32

Although a signatory to the Refugee Convention, Australia has managed to evade its
stipulations through TPVs, turning boats back, and through multiple other means. During the
Tampa Crisis of 2001 a Norwegian ship rescued 439 Afghan asylum seekers from international
waters near Australia and was then refused entry into Australian waters. This event marked the
beginning of the “Pacific Solution,” the first formalized policy of detaining asylum seekers on
island nations in the Pacific in order to prevent them from setting foot on the Australian
mainland.33 In response to the Tampa affair, the Howard government introduced the Border
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Protection Bill in August of 2001.34 The Bill gave the government the power to remove any ship
in the territorial waters of Australia, use reasonable force to do so, and forcibly return any person
to the ship.35 The Migration Amendment (Excision from Migration Zone) Act (2001) excised
certain territories from the Australian migration zone and stipulated that a non-citizen who first
enters Australia at an excised offshore place without legal authorization has fewer rights than a
person who reaches Australian mainland to seek asylum. The Migration Amendment further
strengthened The Pacific Solution.36 “The legal fiction underlying the policy is that because the
asylum seekers never set foot on Australian soil, Australia can shirk the responsibilities it would
otherwise have toward them under the U.N. Refugee Convention,” explains foreign policy expert
Rebecca Hamilton.37 All the policy does, however, is wrongfully force people into indefinite
detention as their refugee claims are processed and resettlement or repatriation is arranged.
Despite extensive research, interviews, and harrowing personal accounts showing the deleterious
psychological effects of indefinite detention, the Australian government persists with offshore
processing.38

Section III: Deciding Who Comes to Australia and How
Not only are the arguments advanced for offshore processing “legal fiction,” Australian
politicians and leaders have not always been truthful in statements meant to garner support for
immigration policies or to conceal the effects of these policies. In 2001 the government released
photo evidence of asylum seekers on SIEV 4 throwing their children overboard to prompt rescue
and passage to Australian territory. The event became known as the Children Overboard Affair
when subsequent evidence revealed the photos were actually taken during the rescue of
passengers as the SIEV 4 was sinking.39 In October of 2002, the Senate Select Committee
released a report of their inquiry into the Children Overboard Affair and the Tampa Affair, stating
that “along with genuine miscommunication or misunderstanding,” “deliberate deception
motivated by political expedience” factored into “the making and sustaining of the report that
children had been thrown overboard from SIEV 4.” 40 Later that month, the U.N. working group
on Arbitrary Detention published a report on Australia’s detention centers asserting that “one
could reasonably assume that if public opinion were fully and specifically informed about the
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conditions to which human beings are being subjected… public opinion would change.”41
While government officials lie or suppress information to maintain support for policies,
immigration officials painstakingly review the claims of asylum seekers, often making them
relive traumatic experiences, because they must provide proof of their persecution to be granted
refugee status. Yet, no one has systematically reviewed the government’s unnecessarily harsh
policies. When SIEV X sank between Indonesia and Christmas Island in October of 2001,
leading to the death of an estimated 146 children, 142 women, and 65 men, the Senate expressed
concerned over a potential link between this tragedy and Australia’s intensive anti peoplesmuggling program at the time.42 A product of a policy that prevented these men from sponsoring
the resettlement of their families, “many of the women and children who died were attempting to
reunite with husbands and fathers in Australia who were on TPVs.”43 The Senate passed three
resolutions calling for an independent judicial inquiry, but the inquiry never took place. Instead,
only seven days after the sinking of SIEV X, in his campaign for re-election, John Howard made
his famous statement: “We will decide who comes to this country and the circumstances in which
they come.”44
Howard and other government officials focused on the “circumstances in which they
come,” justifying their measures as necessary to save the lives of asylum seekers by deterring
them from hazarding boat journeys. However, rhetoric used by both politicians and policy
decisions suggest the government’s intentions in implementing policies such as the Pacific
Solution were – at least in part – racially motivated. By “decid[ing] who comes,” officials could
deliberately exclude people of certain ethnicities from the possibility immigrating. In a 2007
speech, Prime Minister Howard made his views on immigration – views that had always
influenced his policy-making – painfully evident, stating “this idea of Australia being a multicultural community has served only to dilute our sovereignty and our national identity… as
Australians, we have our own culture, our own society, our own language and our own
lifestyle.”45 This is a clear expression of nationalized ethnocentrism pervasive in Australia’s
refugee policy. For example, in early 2002, the government froze about 2,000 refugee
applications, all from Afghani asylum seekers. 46 This clear targeting of a particular group
sparked riots and protests; people in detention centers went on hunger strikes and sewed their
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lips together in an attempt to symbolize their lack of voice and of choice. 47
In February of 2002, Ruud Lubbers, the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees,
expressed worry about the vilification of asylum seekers in Australia and urged politicians to
circulate accurate information about asylum seekers.48 However the government has consistently
concealed information about the experiences of asylum seekers in detention centers and with
popular support has perpetuated its policies of boat interception and offshore processing for over
a decade. In July of 2002, a U.N. Report on Mandatory Detention contended that Australian
immigration policy “contravened the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, which
outlaws arbitrary detention and the denial of access to legal review of incarceration, and the UN
Convention on the Rights of the Child, which prohibits detention of children except as a last
resort.”49 Publicized allegations of rights violations and reports from journalists and human
rights activists guarantee that Australian officials understand the current state of detention
centers; yet, abusive immigration policies persist.
Refugees, under the U.N. Refugee Convention (and under any universal human rights
treaty) have the same rights as citizens in relation to “freedom of religion, intellectual property,
access to courts and legal assistance, rationing, public relief, access to elementary education,
labour rights and social security” and should receive “treatment which is… at least as favorable
as that accorded to foreign nationals, in relation to the acquisition of property, self-employment,
practicing as a professional, access to housing and access to secondary and tertiary education”
and “with respect to freedom of association, wage-earning employment and freedom of
movement.”50 People in Australian-funded offshore processing centers are granted few, if any, of
these rights.

Section IV: Protests and Depictions of Asylum Seekers
Lacking access to judicial review and often hidden from the media, asylum seekers in
offshore detention centers have tried to make their voices heard. Rather than listen, the
government has used asylum seekers’ protests as justification for stricter policies. In March of
2011, peaceful protests at the North West Point processing facility on Christmas Island turned
into unrest, to which the Australian Federal Police responded by taking control of the center
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using tear gas and rubber bullets.51 Over the next month, protests and hunger strikes spread to
detention centers across Australia, prompting the Immigration Minister to propose amendments
to the Migration Act that would deny, on character grounds, a detainee convicted of any crime
from receiving permanent protection. “Any crime” can include damage to commonwealth
property at a detention center, which might occur during even a peaceful protest. In refusing to
hear their grievances, the Australian government has sometimes pushed asylum seekers to
extreme actions. On April 2, 2001 Shahraz Kayani, a recognized refugee, self-immolated outside
the Parliament House in Canberra to protest immigration policy; for five years, Kayani had been
attempting to reunite with his family.52 To succeed, he needed to raise AUD$75,000 to pay for
the care of his middle daughter, who suffered from cerebral palsy. Given the lack of opportunity
as well as prejudice he was subject to as a newly settled refugee, he had been unable to raise such
a sum. Within three months, he died of infection caused by his burns; his symbolic plea
accomplished nothing.
For close to two decades, men, women, and children in Australian detention centers have
endured the same trauma. Their grievances have been largely ignored or smothered. Ramesh
Fernandez remembers his time at the Woomera center in 2000:

Each day in Woomera was a nightmare. Sometimes I’d go… and
hold on to the burning hot fence thinking I was the only one. But
when I turned right and left I saw many others doing the same thing.
I would look straight ahead and the infinite desert would stare back
at me… If I walked into the mess where lunch was served, I would
see an empty space filled with flies and untouched food. Most
people felt depressed, sleeping all day and with nothing to do. In
2002 there was a big hunger strike and people sewed their lips
together… [S]ome started drinking shampoo and attempted suicide.
After no response from the government, frustration grew daily, and
people started rioting. One person needed hospital treatment after
jumping off the roof.53
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More than fifteen years later, asylum seekers continue to tell the same story. This year, twentyfive-year-old Sundanese refugee, Abdul Aziz Muhamat, told Sydney Morning Herald
photographer Alex Ellinghausen that life on Manus Island is more difficult than in the country he
fled: “Back there, when people torture you, they torture you and put a bullet in your head and it’s
over. Here it’s like systematic torture, mental torture that doesn’t end.”54
Ellinghausen and his colleague Michael Gordon had to overcome multiple barriers to
speak to Muhamat – getting a visa to access the Port Moresby processing center, which is in a
remote province of Papua New Guinea, dealing with officials reluctant to provide information
and admission, and interviewing detainees unwilling to tell their story for fear of retribution.
Muhamat was held on Manus for three and half years before being moved in preparation for the
center’s closure. Not only does his story shed light on the struggle of living in a detention center,
it highlights the futility of recent gestures the Australian government has made to assuage
accusations of human rights abuses in its offshore processing centers. For instance, Malcom
Turnbull’s administration, reacting to domestic and international pressure, closed the Manus
Island detention facility; yet, asylum seekers were merely moved to an equivalent center on a
different island and most remain uncertain about their future.55
While some Australians speak up against the government’s violations of asylum rights
and of international law, many continue to support Australia’s refugee policy. A combination of
factors has led to this continued support: Australia’s history of restrictive immigration policies
and its persisting white, British-influenced national identity; aversion to change and fear of
economic and cultural invasion by migrants; disingenuous information circulated by the
government; and worldwide trends towards isolationist forms of nationalism. Moreover,
Australia’s policy of intercepting boats and detaining asylum seekers has become ingrained in
national politics, benefiting from bipartisan support, and the system of offshore processing
centers is now almost impossible to dismantle. Closing centers requires alternatives for the
people living in them, but the government has not yet come up with any. Instead, asylum seekers
and refugees continue to be vilified as a means to justify brutal containment conditions. An
immigration journalist, writing anonymously about her husband’s immigration experience, calls
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attentions to the fallacies in Australia’s current refugee policy:

I am not advocating people smuggling, but it is the smugglers and
corrupt officials in the countries from which they depart who must be
targeted. Border security is important, but it is organized crime and
drug smugglers who pose the real risk… [U]nder the law, asylum
seekers are not illegal. The real illegals are those who overstay tourist
visas… or people who lie and come in on the wrong visa class to
evade government regulation…We have no problem accepting British
families who migrate here “for the weather”… But a boatload of
desperate people who just want safety, democracy, first world
freedoms, education and a chance at a better life are demonized.56

She and Ramesh Fernandez urge us to question and pressure the Australian government.
The journalist laments “the vitriol and anger” directed at asylum seekers. “Putting their lives at
risk to come here on a boat does not make them lazy, dishonest, welfare cheats or criminals,” she
says, “it makes them desperate. Surely hatred is not the right response to desperation?”57 Beyond
the change in attitudes she calls for, Fernandez stresses the importance of ending the current
vicious cycle that is Australian refugee policy, as the government closes one center just to open
another and abolishes one restrictive law just to enact another. “Do we want to keep repeating the
cycle and supporting the creation of another Woomera generation?” asks Fernandez. “I urge all
Australians to take action to stop this cruel treatment of refugees.”58

Conclusion: No Human Being is Illegal
Officials face a difficult task as they attempt to manage the influx of asylum seekers who
hope to make Australia home. Various stakeholders, with different perspectives and interests,
influence the process of making immigration legislation. In addition, the government, for
security and equality reasons, must systematically review the claims of asylum seekers.
However, Australia can make changes to its policies to better respect and protect the rights of
Page 128
!
of !174
https://digitalcommons.dartmouth.edu/dujpew/vol1/iss1/1

128

Editorial Board: Volume I | Issue I | 2018

thousands of men, women, and children whose only “crime” is to seek a life devoid of violence
and persecution. The government could improve conditions in processing centers by enforcing a
cap on detention time; allowing asylum seekers access to judicial review; providing them with
the human (lawyers, mental health professionals, culturally-conscious interpreters) and material
resources they need to make claims for refugee status without forcing them to relive traumatic
experiences over and over again; increasing access to comprehensive medical (including
psychological) care; running the centers as communities rather than as prisons; allowing asylum
seekers to speak up and actually listening to their grievances; allowing reporters and members of
organizations such as the U.N. and Amnesty International to visit centers and publicize
conditions; and updating asylum seekers on the status of their claims to mitigate the harmful
effects of indefinite detention.
Australia should also end its policy of offshore processing and allow asylum seekers who
arrive by boat to apply for visas in Australia; rather than spend its resources on intercepting boats
and detaining people, the government can focus on building effective resettlement schemes and
creating frameworks for refugees to start their lives over and integrate into society. Instead of
attempting to “deter” refugees in ways that are dangerous and abusive, Australia can work on
agreements with and provide support to nations, such as Indonesia, that house large numbers of
asylum seekers to ensure that those asylum seekers have access to a fair and comprehensive
review of their asylum claims, to safe living conditions that safeguard their basic rights, and to
resettlement options. Finally, Australian politicians should stop referring to asylum seekers as
“illegal.” Rather than promote divisive ideologies that pit asylum seekers as criminal and, thus,
potentially destructive to society, the government should acknowledge that the large majority of
admitted refugees contribute productively to society, both in economic terms and by enriching
and diversifying communities intellectually and culturally. Although some people dismiss the
claims of asylum seekers as invalid – citing cash-incentives-for-repatriation, for example – the
reality is that few asylum seekers are accepting these incentives (and, thus, the assumption that
claims are invalid cannot be generalized to the group as a whole) and that many of those who do
accept the incentives are most probably doing anything in their power to escape the
psychological and sometimes physical trauma of indefinite detention. Australia’s current system
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renders hopeless detainees by not providing them with the resources they need to make claims
for asylum.
The world has never experienced levels of displacement as high as they are today; 59 65.6
million people around the world have been forced from their home, 35% of whom are refugees.
To put these statistics into perspective, in our modern world, nearly twenty people are forcibly
displaced every minute as a result of conflict and persecution.60 And, ten million stateless people
continue to live bereft of their basic rights to education, healthcare, employment, and freedom of
movement.61 Yet, in 2016, only 1.1% of refugees worldwide were resettled, and Australia
received less than 1% of the global share of new asylum seekers.62 In total, 854,390 refugees
have been settled in Australia between 1901 and June 2014, which means that in over 110 years,
Australia has received less than 2% of the number of displaced persons in our world today.63
According to a UNHCR report, Australia ranks 46th for hosting refugees, 59th per capita, and
94th relative to total national Gross Domestic Product.64 To complicate this displacement crisis,
globalization seems to have polarizing effects; some people react adversely to multiculturalism,
and this backlash promotes tension and division, from which Australia’s exclusionist refugee
policies have grown. Rather than perpetuate this division, Australia must acknowledge people’s
shared humanity and embrace unity by upholding the basic, human rights of asylum seekers and
refugees and by providing them with protection they are due as displaced persons and as human
beings.

Page 130
!
of !174
https://digitalcommons.dartmouth.edu/dujpew/vol1/iss1/1

130

Editorial Board: Volume I | Issue I | 2018

Appendix: Definitions

Asylum seeker: A person seeking international protection but whose claim for refugee status has
not yet been confirmed. Every refugee is initially an asylum seeker; however, not every asylum
seeker will be recognized as a refugee. Countries with procedures for reviewing asylum claims,
such as Australia, which ratified the Refugee Convention in 1954, use the Convention definition
of a refugee to determine whether an asylum seeker qualifies as a refugee. 65

Refugee: A person recognized, under the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, as
a refugee. The Convention defines a refugee as “[a]ny person who owing to a well-founded fear
of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social
group or political opinion, is outside the country of his/her nationality and is unable, or owing to
such fear, is unwilling to avail himself/herself of the protection of that country.” Australia is
obliged under international law to provide protection to asylum seekers who are found to be
refugees and to respect their rights as refugees.66

Non-refoulement: Principle asserting that a refugee should not be returned to a country where
he or she faces significant threats to his/her life or freedom. Non-refoulement is now considered
a rule of customary international law that is binding for all States, even those that have not
ratified the Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees.67

Resettlement: The transfer of refugees from the country in which they have sought refuge and
found to be refugees to another state that has agreed to admit them. Refugees who are resettled
are usually granted asylum or some form of long-term resident rights and have the opportunity to
become citizens. However, resettlement figures are low, and States have not increased
resettlement offers in the face of drastic increases in the number of asylum seekers and refugees
worldwide.68

Page 131
!
of !174
Published by Dartmouth Digital Commons, 2018

131

Dartmouth Undergraduate Journal of Politics, Economics and World Affairs, Vol. 1 [2018], Iss. 1, Art. 1

Human rights: Accepted international standards that recognize and safeguard the dignity,
integrity, and equality of all individuals. These rights are part of customary international law and
are articulated in the legislations of most countries. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights,
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, and the International Covenant on
Economic and Social Rights are documents that seek to protect and preserve these rights.69

International Protection: Protection of an individual’s rights in accordance with international
humanitarian law. “Protection involves creating an environment conducive to respect for human
beings, preventing and/or alleviating the immediate effects of a specific pattern of abuse, and
restoring dignified conditions of life through reparation, restitution and rehabilitation.”70

Offshore processing: Australia’s unique practice of sending people seeking asylum in Australia
by boat to Nauru or Manus Island in Papua New Guinea, where they are held in Australianfunded offshore detention (or “processing”) centers while their refugee claims are assessed.71

United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR): U.N. program to support and
safeguard the rights of refugees at the behest of a government or of the U.N. itself. The UNHCR
Office assists with voluntary repatriation, local integration, and resettlement. Some see the
UNHCR as the “guardian” of the 1951 Convention and its 1967 Protocol. States are expected to
cooperate with this agency. The UNHCR’s mandate stipulates that the agency provide
international protection and seek permanent solutions for refugees. The 1961 Convention on the
Reduction of Statelessness gave the UNHCR an additional mandate with regards to issues of
statelessness; according to the mandate, the agency should help prevent statelessness by
providing States with technical and advisory services on nationality legislation and practice.72

Stateless person: A person who, under national laws, does not have a legal affiliation of
nationality with any State. The 1954 Convention Relating to the Status of Stateless Persons
defines the term and outlines the rights of Stateless people. 73
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Abstract
I study the effect of a two-percentage point corporate tax reduction on female
employment and wages across small and medium-sized firms in Vietnam. Using a nationally
representative survey of Vietnamese firms, I employ a difference-in-differences strategy and find
that firms eligible for this two-percentage point reduction do not significantly change their share
of female workers or the total number of female workers. However, I do find that at the
employee level, the presence of a tax reduction allows eligible firms to increase wages for the
female workers by 69 percent relative to male workers and women at ineligible firms. Intuitively,
this suggests that a corporate tax reduction might not increase female labor demand, but it could
increase welfare for current female workers via higher compensation.
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Introduction
Given the lowered worldwide average corporate tax rate, the economic literature has been
overwhelmed by theoretical and empirical evidence of its expansionary effect on total economic
output and its positive impact on firms’ various investment channels. Little attention, however,
has been given to studying the impact of such a tax change on the labor market, and even less
attention has been devoted to understanding its role in developing economies. To inform future
studies and discussions, this study asks whether a corporate tax reduction for small and mediumsized firms increases or decreases the labor demand, particularly for female workers, and wage
rates. This population is of particular interest because of its sizable share in the Vietnamese labor
market and its important economic implications.1 The findings in this paper can provide insights
on future research or policy actions that can support the female Vietnamese labor force.
To identify a causal relationship between corporate tax reduction and employment and
wages, I rely on a unique tax reduction provided to firms meeting an eligibility requirement on
revenue and labor size. This paper examines Vietnam’s corporate income tax (CIT) between
2014 and 2016. The standard CIT was 22% for most firms during this period; however, a 20%
CIT rate applied to small- and medium-sized firms with less than 200 full-time employees and
annual revenue not exceeding VND 20 billion (or approximately US$900,000 at current
exchange rate). This difference in tax rates could adjust the resources of a firm, which can in turn
affect hiring practices. I exploit this difference to examine whether an effective tax reduction
causes any variation in firms’ female labor demand.
However, two concerns arise from using tax policies as an exogenous factor. First, there
are many variables contributing to the variation in both tax changes and employment levels. For
instance, a tax cut might be triggered to stimulate investment and employment. Then, low levels
of investment are likely associated with low employment and a higher probability of reduced
taxes, which introduced bias to the coefficient estimates. Second, causality might occur in
reverse. Low levels of employment and output at the state-level or country-level might
incentivize the government to adjust tax rates, which could further attenuate coefficient
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estimates. As a result, an effective model must account for issues of omitted variable bias and
reverse causality due to the endogenous nature of tax changes.
I use the Vietnam Small and Medium Enterprises survey (Vietnam SME), which is
available via the publicly accessible database at the United Nations University (UNU-WIDER). I
follow Pham and Ljungqvist & Smolyansky and use a difference-in-differences identification
strategy to identify the causal effect of corporate tax reduction on female labor demand.23 The
control group consists of firms marginally above the eligibility threshold for the unique
reduction, and the treatment group consists of firms marginally meeting the requirement. To
reduce the risk of omitted variable bias, I include provincial fixed effect and controls at the firmlevel, which accounts for any time-invariant characteristics common among firms in a province.
I also construct a triple-difference estimate for female workers at an eligible firm (where male
workers at an ineligible firm are the counterfactual) to observe any effects on worker’s welfare,
such as wage rate.
The channel through which corporate taxation can affect female labor demand and wages
can be subtle and ambiguous in theory. For example, a decrease in corporate tax rate increases a
firm’s retained earnings via higher net profits. With the additional cash flow, a firm can engage in
a variety of expenditures or investment activities, some of which can influence its female labor
demand. If a firm is simply interested in increasing its output level, it can do so by directly
increasing its labor inputs; the only trade-off is that marginal output diminishes with every
additional unit of labor. This applies an upward pressure on labor demand, and if female labor
supply is already low, it will likely increase. If a firm decides to increase total factor productivity,
e.g. by adopting new technology or investing in human capital, then labor inputs can respond
directly or inversely depending on the complementarity or substitutability of labor inputs and
technology advancement. However, a reduced corporate tax might not affect labor demand at all,
if firms choose to spend the additional cash elsewhere, such as reducing outstanding debt.45 In
terms of wages, increased cash flow, if allocated to additional research and development, could
be either labor-augmenting (increase labor demand) and increase wages, or labor-saving
(decrease labor demand) and decrease wages. In short, the relationship between corporate tax
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versus female labor demand and wages is theoretically ambiguous, and quantifying this
relationship is an empirical question.
While literature specifically addressing female labor demand in developing countries in
response to tax changes is sparse, there is literature addressing these aspects separately. In terms
of the impacts of taxes on labor demand, empirical evidence has not found consensus regarding
direction and magnitude. Pham studies the effect of a temporary corporate tax cut in Vietnam
following the Great Recession and finds that for domestic firms, there are no changes in capital,
labor and profits.6 Ljungqvist and Smolyansky exploit variation in corporate tax rates between
counties straddling across a U.S. state border and find that a reduction in corporate tax rate does
not boost employment and wages. However, they establish that the effect of tax changes is not
linear throughout, since an increase in corporate taxation discourages employment and lowers
wages.7 Da Rin et al. use panel data of European firms to study how labor inputs, relatively to
capital inputs, increase for every unit of reduction in the effective corporate tax rate, but this
effect is ambiguous in absolute terms.8 However, when Shuai & Chmura study employment
growth in the U.S., rather than employment levels, they find that a corporate tax cut is
significantly associated with faster job creation.9
Other related literature includes Bishop & Montgomery (1993) and Faulk (2002). Both
papers study the impact of an employment tax credit on labor demand. Bishop & Montgomery
focus on the Targeted Job Tax Credit (TJTC) and find that the subsidy incentivizes employers to
hire younger workers. However, most claims for the tax credits are for workers who would have
been hired in absence of the program.10 Faulk examines the Georgia’s Jobs Tax Credit program
and discovers that firms participating the program create 25 percent more jobs than eligible firms
that do not participate.11
Finally, this paper also speaks to literature studying changes in female labor supply in
response to tax adjustments. For example, Bosch & van der Klaauw study the 2001 Dutch tax
reform and how it lowers the fixed cost of working for married women with high-income
partners. As a result, the reform has a positive, significant impact on female labor force
participation.12
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My own contribution with this paper primarily comes from the combined analysis of
three elements: corporate tax reduction and female labor demand in a developing economy.
There are also some minor differences. For example, while my paper shares Pham’s examination
of Vietnamese firms, it differs in terms of methodology: I exploit a permanent change in
corporate tax rate, rather than a temporary adjustment. This paper also differs from Bishop &
Montgomery and Faulk in that it studies a general corporate tax reduction, instead of a specific
type of tax credit.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the data and
methodology, including a detailed description of the endogeneity concern and identifying
assumptions. Section 3 discusses the main regression results and secondary findings. Section 4
addresses some robustness checks. Section 5 concludes with some policy implications.

Data and Methodology
Datasets
This paper uses the Vietnam Small and Medium Enterprises surveys (Vietnam SME),
collected biennially between June and August by the Central Institute for Economic Management
(CIEM), the Institute of Labour Science and Social Affairs (ILSSA), the Development
Economics Research Group (DERG) at the University of Copenhagen, and the United Nations
University (UNU-WIDER). Data are available for 2011, 2013 and 2015. The surveys report a
representative sample of firms across 18 sectors in ten provinces of the country: Hanoi, Ha Tay,
Hai Phong, Ho Chi Minh City, Phu Tho, Nghe An, Quang Nam, Khanh Hoa, Lam Dong, and
Long An. Stratified sampling allows for a balanced sample of firms in each province of different
ownership forms.
For each year’s survey, there are three modules: enterprise, economic, and employee. The
enterprise module reports on firm’s performance, history, employment, business environment,
and demographic information about the owner. The employee module collects information on
educational background, work experiences, union membership, and household characteristics of
a representative sample of employees. Finally, the economic module lists revenues, expenses,
asset, liability, and capital accounts of firms.
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Control and Treatment Groups
Based on Decree No. 32/2013/QH13, the unique CIT rate of 20% only applies to firms
whose total number of full-time employees is below 200 and annual revenue not exceeding VND
20 billion. Then, the treatment group consists of firms whose labor size and nominal revenue are
below the mentioned threshold. Firms not meeting either requirements make up the control
group.
Without any restriction, the control and treatment groups are extremely unbalanced.
Particularly, only 9 percent of the observations in 2013 and 2015 belongs to the control group,
and 91 percent belongs to the treatment group. To re-balance the samples, I restrict the sample to
only firms with at least 50 employees and at most 500 employees. This returns a sample of 346
observations for years 2013 and 2015, with 60 percent of the sample are control firms and 40
percent are treatment firms. 13

Identification Strategy for Enterprise Regression
I pursue a difference-in-differences identification strategy. The first difference compares
firms that were not eligible for a differential tax treatment (control group) and firms eligible for
the differential tax treatment (treatment group). The second difference compares firms before and
after the tax change; the timing of the Vietnam SME surveys allows me to use 2013 as pretreatment and 2015 as post-treatment. The difference-in-difference estimate of the effect of a CIT
reduction (!β1) is estimated by the following regression:

(1)
yidc = β0 + β1Postidc × T reatidc + β2 Postidc + β3T reatidc + β4 Xidc + δc + εidc
!
where y! idc is the outcome variable of interest, corresponding to a firm i! in district d
! in province c! ;
!Postidc is an indicator for being in 2015; T
! reatidc is an indicator for being in the treatment
group (i.e. eligible for the differential tax treatment); X! idc is a set of controls for firm’s
characteristics; δ! c is a fixed-effect at the provincial level, to account for any time-invariant
differences common among firms in each of the ten provinces. Standard errors are robust to
heteroscedasticity and clustered at the district-level.
By estimating any causal relationship at the enterprise-level, my main assumption
requires that policymakers make decisions independently of a single firm’s female employment
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levels. If the difference-in-differences regression is estimated at any level greater than the firmlevel, such as district-level or province-level, then it might run the risk of reverse causality. For
example, if two largest provinces of the country like Hanoi and HCMC have low level of female
employment, then policymakers might be encouraged to adjust current laws to boost
employment. This would bias our coefficient estimate downward.
The use of fixed effect at the provincial level and other controls at the firm-level
minimizes omitted variable bias. Suppose a firm in Hanoi is more likely to hire female workers
than a firm in Ha Tay because of some inherent differences between the two provinces, e.g.
urban versus rural. If urban firms are also more affected by tax changes than rural firms, then the
coefficient estimate is biased upward. The inclusion of province fixed-effect corrects for this
bias. Suppose certain characteristics at the firm-level are also correlated with female employment
and tax changes, then the inclusion of firm-level controls corrects for this bias as well.

Table 1–Descriptive Statistics, Enterprise-level Data: 2011 and 2013
Control Firms
N

VARIABLES

Mean

Treatment Firms
SD

N

Mean

SD

Panel A: Outcome Variables
Share of Female Workers

87

0.437

0.216

75

0.515

0.255

Total Female Workers

87

53.10

45.63

75

46.87

37.23

Panel B: Explanatory Variables
Total Labor Force

87

117.0

69.41

75

86.95

39.47

Share of Union Workers

68

0.782

0.226

46

0.802

0.230

Firm Investment (million VND)

87

6,713

11,543

75

2,104

3,588

Access to Road

87

0.943

0.234

75

0.947

0.226

Net Profit per Worker +1 (log)

75

3.384

1.301

68

1.913

1.074

Asset per Worker + 1 (log)

87

5.241

0.970

75

4.349

1.119
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Debt per Worker + 1 (log)

68

3.425

1.512

51

2.432

1.364

Tax Payment per Worker + 1 (log)

87

1.897

1.115

75

1.469

0.997

Notes: Data have been restricted to include only observations closely positioned around the threshold of 200. The
remaining observations included firms whose sizes range from 50 employees to 500 employees; the choice of
bounds was arbitrary and only reflected a more balanced sample for control and treatment firms.

To better understand the characteristics of the control and treatment firms before the
policy, I provide summary statistics of control and treatment firms in Table 1. The outcome
variables of interest in this regression are share of female workers and total female workers.
Control firms appear to have a lower share of female workers, but higher total number of female
workers than treatment firms. However, these differences are not statistically significant. With
my definition of treatment group, the control firms clearly have a large labor size on average. As
a result, the output potential for control firms is larger, as seen in their higher investment, net
profit, asset, debt, and tax payment.

Average Share of Female Labor

Figure 1. Parallel Trends, Average Share of Female Labor
CIT Change
2014

0.55

0.4

2011

2013

2015

Year

!

Control Firms

Treatment Firms
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Figure 2. Parallel Trends, Average Female Workers
CIT Change
2014

Average Female Workers

70.0
61.3
52.5
43.8
35.0

2011

2013

2015

Year
Control Firms

!

Treatment Firms

I test for the parallel trends between control firms and treatment firms’ share of female
labor and total female workers prior to the CIT change. Figure 1 visualizes the parallel trend for
average share of female labor between the control and treatment firms, and fails to reject the null
hypothesis that there is a parallel trend. Figure 2 visualizes the parallel trends for average female
workers, and rejects the null hypothesis. The lack of parallel trend in growth of total female
workers between the control and treatment firms violates the assumption of the difference-indifferences identification, and the coefficient estimates should only be taken as suggestive.

Identification Strategy for Employee Regression
To estimate the effect the tax change at the employee-level, I construct a triple difference
estimate, similar to what Muralidharan & Prakash use to estimate the effect of the Cycle program
on girl’s average schooling. 14 The first difference is between eligible and ineligible firms; the
second difference compares outcomes before and after implementation of the tax change. The
third difference compares female and male workers. Then, the triple difference estimate (!β1) of
the effects of a CIT change is as follows:
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where y! ijdc is the outcome variable for a worker i! at firm j! in district d
! and province c! ; Post
!
ijdc is
an indicator for being in 2015; T! reatijdc is an indicator for being in the treatment group;

Fem
aleijdc is an indicator taking a value of 1 if the worker is female, and 0 if the worker is
!
male. ω
! j is a fixed-effect at the firm-level, which accounts for common time-invariant
characteristics among workers in a firm. C
! ijdc is a set of controls for job characteristics, and D
! ijdc
is a set of controls for worker demographics; the inclusion of these terms minimizes the risk of
omitted variable bias and prevents intensifying the coefficient estimate. Standard errors are
robust to heteroscedasticity.

Table 2–Descriptive Statistics, Employee-level Data: 2011 and 2013
Male
VARIABLES

N

Mean

Female
SD

N

Mean

SD

Panel A: Outcome Variables
Monthly Wage in 1000 VND

213

7,327

49,65
5

233

3,683 1,626

Derived monthly wage (log)

213

8.222 0.516

233

8.131 0.394

Panel B: Explanatory Variables
Age

214

34.18 8.253

233

32.01 8.035

Employee has formal labor contract

214

0.930 0.256

233

0.936 0.246

Number of years working at current firm

214

6.439 4.504

233

6.004 5.481

Employee lives and works in same province

214

0.771 0.421

233

0.815 0.389

Employee receives on-the-job training

214

0.477 0.501

233

0.343 0.476

Employee is a union member

126

0.825 0.381

159

0.893 0.310

Employee owns a house

214

0.710 0.455

233

0.742 0.438
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Notes: Data have been restricted to include only employees working at firms whose total labor size is close to 200.
The remaining observations included employees in firms whose sizes range from 50 employees to 500 employees;
the choice of bounds was arbitrary and only reflected a more balanced sample for control and treatment firms.

I provide summary statistics for male and female workers in 2011 and 2013 in Table 2, to
observe any differences between the two groups prior to the tax change. I observe that prior to
the tax change, female workers earn 4 million VND less than male workers every month
(approximately $175 at the current exchange rate). However, other attributes such as average
age, years working at current firm, union membership, and homeownership are very similar
between the two groups. For the triple-difference regression, the main outcome variable of
interest is the log of monthly wage rate, derived by scaling hourly, daily, and weekly wages to a
monthly basis.15 The log-transformation is used since the distribution of wages is highly rightskewed.
Table 3–Testing Parallel Trends Assumption, Triple Difference Estimate
(1)
VARIABLES

Post x Treated x Female

Derived Monthly Wage (log)

-0.256
(0.158)

Post x Female

0.119
(0.101)

Treated x Female

-0.0684
(0.105)

Post x Treated

0.219
(0.161)

Post

0.207*
(0.110)

Treated

0.232*
(0.138)
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Female

-0.127*
(0.0703)

Constant

8.032***
(0.464)

Observations

210

R-squared

0.766
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Notes: Regression includes firm fixed-effect and controls for job characteristics and worker demographics. These
include job junctions, whether the worker has a formal contract, number of years working in current firm, whether
the worker's residence is in the same province as the firm, whether the worker receives on-the-job training, and the
sector of the worker's previous job, as well as relationship with owner, age, education level, whether the worker is in
a union, house ownership status, and type of housing. Standard errors are robust.

I test for parallel trends between female workers in eligible firms and male workers in
ineligible firms by derived wage rate for the years prior to the CIT change. Since a triple
difference estimate can be difficult to visualize, result for the test of parallel trends is
summarized in Table 3. I find that the coefficient for the triple interaction term is not
significantly different from zero, and do not reject the null hypothesis that there is a parallel trend
in wages between female workers in eligible firms and male workers in ineligible firms.

Results
Impact on Female Labor Demand
The difference-in-differences estimates for the impact of the CIT reduction based on
equation (1) are presented in Table 4. Column 1 and 2 present the effect of a two-percentage
points reduction in CIT on share of female labor. Column 3 and 4 present the effect of the CIT
reduction on total female workers. The estimates with only province fixed-effect are presented in
column 1 and 3. The estimates with province fixed-effect and controls for firm’s characteristics
are presented in column 2 and 4. My preferred method will be the difference-in-differences
regression with both province fixed-effect and firm-level controls.
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Table 4–Diff-in-diff Regression for Share of Female Labor and Total Female Workers
Share of Female Labor

Total Female Workers

VARIABLES

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

Post x Treated

0.0169

-0.0137

-7.110

-6.185

(0.0476)

(0.0657)

(7.704)

(8.477)

0.000659

0.0584

5.086

11.23**

(0.0233)

(0.0379)

(6.060)

(4.803)

0.0703**

0.0778

-6.785

8.952

(0.0340)

(0.0580)

(6.049)

(6.513)

0.399***

0.764***

46.56***

11.94

(0.0247)

(0.162)

(6.367)

(29.32)

346

170

346

170

0.079

0.231

0.065

0.608

No

Yes

No

Yes

Post

Treated

Constant

Observations
R-squared
Controls for Firms' Characteristics

Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Notes: All regressions include province fixed-effect; other controls for firm's characteristics include total labor size,
firm's investment (in million VND), log of last year's debt (in million VND) per worker (plus one), log of last year's
asset (in million VND) per worker (plus one), log of last year's net profit (in million VND) per worker (plus one),
log of last year's tax payment (in million VND) per worker (plus one), share of union workers and whether firms
have road access. Robust standard errors are clustered at the district level.

Table 4 shows that the additional two-percentage points reduction in CIT reduces the
share of a firm’s female labor by 1 percentage point and the total number of female workers by 6
workers. However, the estimates of β
! 1 do not significantly differ from zero, which suggests that
eligibility for the differential CIT rate does not affect firms’ female labor size. A few points are
worth noting:
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When estimating for share of female labor, the β! 1 estimate falls by 0.02 when including
controls for firm’s characteristics, from 0.017 to -0.014, which raises concerns over omitted
variables even though the parallel trends assumption is met. In addition, the sign of β! 1 changes
from positive to negative, but since its magnitude remains relatively close to zero, I conclude that
the effect of the CIT reduction is ambiguous or absent.
When estimating for total number of female workers, the β! 1 estimate falls from -7.11 to
-6.19. However, both coefficient estimates are statistically insignificant, and since the parallel
trends assumption does not hold, the result should only be suggestive.

Impact on Female Workers’ Wages
To study the effect of the CIT reduction on employees, I use equation (2) to estimate the
impact of a firm being eligible on its worker’s derived monthly wage. Table 5 presents the triple
difference coefficient estimates without any controls (column 1), with controls for job
characteristics (column 2), with controls for worker demographics (column 3), and with both
types of control (column 4). All four regressions include a firm fixed-effect to account for any
common time-invariant attributes of workers in a single firm.
The inclusion of controls for job characteristics raises the β
! 1 estimate from 0.236 to 0.386
(column 1 to column 2). This might suggest that job characteristics are correlated with being a
female worker in an eligible firm and with a worker’s wage rate, but in different direction. For
example, female workers at an eligible firm might be more likely to live and work in the same
province, but workers who live in the same province generally receive lower wages, since
employers do not need to compensate for traveling expenses.
The inclusion of worker demographics also increases the estimated β! 1 coefficient from
0.236 to 0.439 (column 1 to column 3). Then, worker demographics are also correlated with
worker’s gender in an eligible firm and with wage rate, and in opposite direction. For instance,
having a better education will likely raise wage rate, but male workers on average might have
higher educational attainment than female in Vietnam.
When including both types of controls, the estimated coefficient β
! 1 increases from 0.236
to 0.688 (column 1 to column 4), and becomes statistically significant at the 1% level. Then,
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including both controls in the model must further explain the remaining variation in wage rates,
and it is ideal to include them in later regressions. In the context of the paper, when considering
common time-invariant attributes of workers in a single firm and other characteristics of the
workers’ job and demographic, an additional two-percentage points reduction in CIT rate leads to
an increase of 69% in monthly wage rate for female workers (relative to male workers at an
ineligible firm).

Robustness Checks
Selection Bias
It is possible that firms can adjust their hiring decision prior to the implementation of the
CIT change. This would lead to a selection bias, where firms whose labor size and annual
revenue are near the threshold might contract their output and employment to receive the
additional tax benefits. One solution is to identify eligibility of a firm prior to the announcement
of the tax change, assuming the eligibility status of firms remains constant prior to and after the
announcement of the pending tax change.

Table 5–Triple Difference Regression for Derived Monthly Wage (log)
Derived Monthly Wage (log)
VARIABLES

Post x Treated x Female

Post x Female

Treated x Female

Post x Treated

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

0.236

0.386**

0.439**

0.688***

(0.144)

(0.159)

(0.208)

(0.226)

-0.219**

-0.226**

-0.177

-0.188

(0.0960)

(0.111)

(0.126)

(0.141)

-0.0689

-0.215*

-0.382**

-0.476***

(0.100)

(0.121)

(0.189)

(0.167)

-0.215

-0.174

-0.374

-0.476

(0.160)

(0.151)

(0.245)

(0.404)
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Post

0.354***

0.375***

0.414***

0.422***

(0.124)

(0.143)

(0.151)

(0.131)

-0.161

0.0390

-0.256

-0.153

(0.164)

(0.256)

(0.310)

(0.305)

0.0211

0.0711

0.0383

0.0564

(0.0605)

(0.0817)

(0.0955)

(0.0995)

8.876***

8.851***

7.440***

8.239***

(0.180)

(0.389)

(0.652)

(0.688)

442

313

283

205

0.597

0.676

0.641

0.751

Controls for Job Characteristics

No

Yes

No

Yes

Controls for Worker Demographics

No

No

Yes

Yes

Treated

Female

Constant

Observations
R-squared

Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Notes: All regressions include firm fixed-effect; controls for job characteristics include job functions, whether the
worker has a formal contract, number of years working in current firm, whether the worker's residence is in the same
province as the firm, whether the worker receives on-the-job training, and the sector of the worker's previous job;
controls for worker demographics include relationship with owner, age, education level, whether the worker is in a
union, house ownership status, and type of housing.

First, I set up a panel data of firms with data in both 2013 and 2015. I then determined a
firm to be “eligible” if their labor size in 2013 is less than 200 employees and their annual
revenue in 2013 is less than 20 billion VND. Eligibility status for a firm will be carried over to
that same firm in year 2015. Then, equation (1) and (2) will be used to estimate the regressions
on share of female labor and log of derived monthly wage. Table 6 and Table 7 present the
regression results.

Table 6–Testing for Selection Bias, Enterprise-level
(1)
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VARIABLES

Share of Female Labor

Post x Treated

-0.0276
(0.0733)

Post

0.0440
(0.0400)

Treated

0.0340
(0.0775)

Constant

0.957***
(0.257)

Observations

116

R-squared

0.226
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Notes: Regression includes province fixed-effect and other controls for firm's characteristics: total labor size, firm's
investment (in million VND), log of last year's debt (in million VND) per worker (plus one), log of last year's asset
(in million VND) per worker (plus one), log of last year's net profit (in million VND) per worker (plus one), log of
last year's tax payment (in million VND) per worker (plus one), share of union workers and whether firms have road
access. Robust standard errors are clustered at the district level.

Table 7–Testing for Selection Bias, Employee-level
(1)
VARIABLES

Post x Treated x Female

Derived Monthly Wage (log)

0.601*
(0.338)

Post x Female

-0.158
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(0.161)
Treated x Female

-0.220
(0.191)

Post x Treated

-0.105
(0.355)

Post

0.449***
(0.143)

Treated

0.168
(0.265)

Female

0.0992
(0.110)

Constant

8.302***
(0.930)

Observations

153

R-squared

0.798
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Notes: Regression includes firm fixed-effect, controls for job characteristics and worker demographics. Controls for
job characteristics include job junctions, whether the worker has a formal contract, number of years working in
current firm, whether the worker's residence is in the same province as the firm, whether the worker receives on-thejob training, and the sector of the worker's previous job. Controls for worker demographics include relationship with
owner, age, education level, whether the worker is in a union, house ownership status, and type of housing.

If there is selection bias, then we might expect the coefficient estimate in Table 4 column
2 to be more negative if firms intentionally fire workers to reduce labor size. However, the new
estimation of β! 1 in Table 6 is -0.0276, which is very similar to, if not smaller than the β! 1
estimation of -0.0137 in Table 4. This suggests that firms might not intentionally contract their
output and employment to receive differential tax treatment. In addition, since both estimations
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are statistically insignificant, I conclude that selection bias does not significantly influence the
regression results.
Similarly, if selection bias significantly influences female worker’s wages, then we would
observe a drastic change in the coefficient estimate β! 1 in equation (2) from Table 5 to Table 7.
However, an estimate of 0.601 is hardly different from 0.688 (in Table 5 column 4), even though
this estimate is only significant at the 10% level. The loss of significance likely suggests that the
new definition of eligibility may not have the most predictive power. In short, selection bias does
not significantly affect wage rates of female workers in eligible firms relative to male workers in
ineligible firms.

Heterogeneity in Wage Rates by Pay Period
Another limitation of this paper stems from the calculation of monthly wage rate. And
while this calculation might be prone to measurement errors, it is at greater risks of violating
another crucial assumption: that workers paid on an hourly, daily, and monthly basis are similar.
If this assumption is violated, the estimated coefficient might be overestimated.
To test for any heterogeneity among workers by their pay period, I re-run the regression
using equation (2), with the inclusion of a fixed-effect for pay period (hourly, daily, monthly).
Table 8 presents the regression result; I find that there is a decline in the coefficient estimate β
! 1,
from 0.688 to 0.577, when difference in pay period is considered. I observe that workers paid on
an hourly basis receive a derived monthly wage rate six times greater than workers paid daily.
Then, the calculation of monthly wage for workers paid hourly is inflated, which biases the
coefficient estimate of the triple-difference upward. However, the direction of the tripledifference coefficient is still positive, and its magnitude still large. When controlled for
heterogeneity by pay period, female workers in an eligible firm receive a monthly wage 58%
greater than male workers in an ineligible firm. In other words, differences among workers by
pay period do not significantly change our conclusion on the wage increase for female workers
in eligible firms.
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Heterogeneity from Other Policies
A threat to the internal validity of this paper is the presence of other policies between
2013 and 2015 that could confound the effect of the CIT change on female labor and female
wages. Two examples of such policies are Decree 05/2015/ND-CP and Decree 85/2015/ND-CP.
The first decree, implemented in March 2015, details rules regarding contract negotiations, such
as wage equality, overtime compensation, and other non-wage benefits.16 The second decree,
implemented in November 2015, details several articles of the Labor Code regarding company
policies toward female workers.17 The timing of these policies might confound the impact of the
CIT reduction, since firms could adjust their wage negotiations process with female workers; the
coefficient estimate might be biased upward.
As an attempt to correct for these confounding policy implementations, I proxy the
impact of these policies using a firm owner’s self-reported knowledge about gender equality
laws. The assumption behind this proxy is that in firms that are more affected by gender equality
laws, their owners will have a better understanding of these laws. Table 9 summarizes the
owners’ self-reported knowledge of these laws.
Table 8–Testing for Heterogeneity in Pay Period
(1)
VARIABLES
Post x Treated x Female

Derived Monthly Wage (log)
0.577***
(0.188)

Pay Period FE (Base Case = Daily)
Pay Period = Hourly

6.021***
(0.301)

Pay Period = Monthly

1.360***
(0.0633)

Constant

7.666***
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(0.405)
Observations

205

R-squared

0.905
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Notes: Regression includes firm and pay period fixed-effects, and controls for job characteristics and worker
demographics. Controls for job characteristics include job junctions, whether the worker has a formal contract,
number of years working in current firm, whether the worker's residence is in the same province as the firm, whether
the worker receives on-the-job training, and the sector of the worker's previous job; controls for worker
demographics include relationship with owner, age, education level, whether the worker is in a union, house
ownership status, and type of housing. Standard errors are robust.

Using the values from Table 9, I create a dummy variable taking value of 1 if the owner
has average or good knowledge about gender equality laws, and 0 if the owner has poor or no
knowledge about these laws. I then construct a quadruple-difference regression similar to
Muralidharan & Prakash as follows:

where Above
!
Aver ageijdc is the dummy variable created above; other terms in the model are as
described in equation (2).18 Table 10 presents the triple-difference estimate for Post x Treated x
Female, and the quadruple-difference coefficient estimate. The coefficient estimate for the
quadruple-interaction is negative but not significantly different from zero. Then, for firms whose
owners have at least average knowledge of gender equality laws, being a female and working in
a firm eligible for the additional CIT reduction does not lead to any changes in wages. However,
the triple-difference estimate for Post x Treated x Female remains highly positive and significant
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at the 1% level. The magnitude of this estimate suggests that for all eligible firms regardless of
owners’ knowledge about gender equality laws, the presence of the CIT reduction raises wages
for female workers by 72%.

Table 9–Descriptive Statistics, Self-reported Knowledge of Gender Equality Laws
(1)
VALUES

Frequency

Good

27

Average

121

Poor

143

No Knowledge

229

Total

520

Notes: Data have been restricted to include only observations closely positioned around the threshold of 200. The
remaining observations included firms whose sizes range from 50 employees to 500 employees; the choice of
bounds was arbitrary and only reflected a more balanced sample for control and treatment firms.

These results could hint at a lack of heterogeneity caused by these confounding policies,
but more likely they suggest that owner’s knowledge of these policies is not an accurate proxy of
these policies’ actual effect. Further research, and perhaps a more comprehensive data source, is
needed to account for confounding policy effects.
Table 10–Heterogeneity from Other Policies
(1)
VARIABLES

Post x Treated x Female x Above Average

Derived Monthly Wage
(log)

-0.322
(0.446)

Post x Treated x Female

0.723***
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(0.246)
Constant

8.528***
(0.871)

Observations

205

R-squared

0.768
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Notes: Regression includes firm fixed-effect, controls for job characteristics, worker demographics and fixed-effect
for owner's knowledge about gender equality laws. Controls for job characteristics include job junctions, whether
the worker has a formal contract, number of years working in current firm, whether the worker's residence is in the
same province as the firm, whether the worker receives on-the-job training, and the sector of the worker's previous
job; controls for worker demographics include relationship with owner, age, education level, whether the worker is
in a union, house ownership status, and type of housing

Conclusion

This paper studies the impact of a two-percentage points CIT reduction on female labor
demand and female wages in small- and medium-sized firms. The difference-in-differences
estimate suggests an insignificant change in female labor size. On the other hand, the tripledifference estimate confirms an increase by 69% in female wages in eligible firms relative to
male wages in ineligible firms. One possible explanation is that when firms received two
additional percentage points reduction in CIT, they did not adjust their employment levels, and
the extra cash flow either allowed them to better compensate female workers, or allowed them to
replace previous unskilled female workers with new skilled female workers, whose wage
demand were higher.
This paper might support future corporate tax cuts in developing countries like Vietnam.
However, certain precautions must be taken in terms of econometrics and policy analysis. First,
there remains concerns about heterogeneity from confounding policies. There are most likely
unobservable effects from policy implementations or social movements in Vietnam that could
significantly drive the results. Without finding an accurate proxy or measurement of other
effects, no definite conclusions can be drawn about the true causal effect of a tax reduction.
Second, from a policy analysis perspective, the benefit of a corporate tax reduction could be
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outweighed by its cost in the government budget. Usually, a current tax cut would be followed by
a future tax hike, so that governments could reduce its budget deficit. At the same time, lower tax
revenue might also imply reduced provision of necessary public services, which might have
long-term consequences for traditionally disadvantaged groups like female workers. This
intersection between econometric analysis and cost-benefit policy analysis would make an
excellent addition to any strands of literature studying the impact of taxes or the female labor
market.
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Framing the Urban-Rural Divide: The Role of Historical Myths and Metaphors in the Social and
Political Dynamics of North American Colonialism

Laura Supple
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Introduction
The story of North American colonial expansion is one written in the divide between urban
and rural landscapes. Western society has long struggled to define “optimal” human relationships
with urban and rural environments, often sparking heated debates between pastoralist and
metropolitan ideologies. To the wilderness romanticist, the natural landscape may represent a
sanctuary of timeless transcendence, a refuge from the chaos and filth of the industrial city, while
to the urbane idealist the wilderness may symbolize a primeval forest of exile, cut off from the
social and intellectual riches of industrial society.123 Although these opposing ideologies differed
in their impressions of urban and rural landscapes, commonalities in metropolitan and pastoral
ideological framings of progress, reserves, and human disposal demonstrate that these seemingly
adversarial characterizations of the urban-rural divide were in fact linked in their intention to
rationalize racist conceptualizations of who did or did not belong within the elite spaces of
society. Whether glorifying the metropolitan or agrarian, North American colonial mythologies
and metaphors from ostensibly antagonistic ideologies used to demarcate the boundaries between
urban and rural spaces worked in tandem to enable colonial expansion by facilitating the
dispossession, exclusion, and oppression of indigenous peoples.

Colonial Discourses of Progress
In both urban and rural contexts, dominant groups employ discourses of “progress” as
weapons of societal control to justify displacement, exclusion, and dispossession of groups seen
as impediments to “the ‘developing’ nation’s ascent into modernity’s pantheon.”4 White
supremacist logics of linear development understood this “pantheon” as a white space created by
and for European society, with the white European elite acting as gatekeepers to this privileged
space. Renowned writer and New York native James Baldwin summarized the concept in his
1955 essay “Stranger in the Village” in which he states, “[t]he idea of white supremacy rests
simply on the fact that white men are the creators of civilization (the present civilization, which
is the only one that matters; all previous civilizations are simply “contributions" to our own) and
are therefore civilization's guardians and defenders.”5 The racist conceptualization of
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“civilization” as the domain of white Western society was foundational to the rhetoric of
“progress” in both urbanists and pastoralists colonial ideologies. The elevation of white
European culture as the developmental benchmark in “advanced society” carried the implicit
assumption that this form of “progress” was inherently good and desirable. Throughout colonial
expansion, white colonizers utilized this logic of development to exonerate white society of
environmental injustices in the name of collective improvement on both urban and rural
frontiers.

The Colonial City as a “Civilized” Space
As European colonizers spread across the North American continent and built colonial cities
on conquered lands, deliberate measures were taken to enforce physical boundaries between
white settlers and indigenous peoples. Glen Sean Coulthard, associate professor in the First
Nations and Indigenous Studies Program and the Department of Political Science at the
University of British Columbia, described the fanatical obsession with which Canadian planners
sought to eradicate indigenous presence from the urban environment in his book Red Skin, White
Masks: Rejecting the Colonial Politics of Recognition: “Historically, Canadian cities were
originally conceived of in the colonial imagination as explicitly non-indigenous spaces – as
civilized spaces – and urban planners and Indian policy makers went through great efforts to
expunge urban centers of indigenous presence.”6 By explicitly distinguishing the city as both a
“non-indigenous” and “civilized” space, colonizers unequivocally expressed exactly who would
be included within the bounds of this “civilized” society as it progressed. Characterizations of
indigenous spaces as “impediments” to expanding cities underpinned early 20th century
development policies, such as a 1911 amendment to the Indian Act permitting the forced
expulsion of indigenous communities located within or adjacent to an incorporated town should
the displacement be deemed “in the interest of the public.”7 By the mid-twentieth century, as
urban spaces expanded into large suburban areas and indigenous increasingly took up residence
within cities, development ideologies shifted to enforce new segregations of settler and
indigenous spaces within the urban landscape, cordoning off inner city projects and zones for the
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urban poor and growing indigenous populations.8 By characterizing indigenous society as
antithetical to developmental ideals of progress, planners and policy makers justified the
expulsion and exclusion of indigenous peoples from spaces of opportunity and prosperity in the
urban environment, generating spatial divides that reinforced racialized social hierarchies
predicated on white supremacist ideologies of civilization and progress.

Civility and Society in American Pastoralism
Discourses of progress similarly bolstered racist ideologies of American pastoralist
society and facilitated the dispossession and oppression of indigenous peoples in pursuit of the
rural idyll. Thomas Jefferson was one of the most prominent espousers of the pastoral fascination
in the United States and a foundational figure in American ideologies of agrarianism. To
Jefferson, progress and civility were evidenced by the physical ordering of the landscape that
accompanied Western agricultural practices. He even referred to agrarian landowners as the
“chosen people of God,” apparently exonerating white landowners on the basis of some divine
mandate.9 European models of agriculture and animal husbandry that enabled biological control
of both plants and animals for human exploitation “elevated human societies beyond the
rudiments of savagery and barbarism,” in Jefferson’s view, and served as the defining
characteristics of civilized society.10 Jefferson’s conceptualization of the rural idyll thus built
upon a white supremacist logic of progress that discredited any form of rural subsistence
developed outside of this European model. Ignorant of ecological harmonies struck by
indigenous subsistence practices, Jeffersonian ideology denigrated indigenous ways of life – and,
by extension, indigenous peoples – as developmentally inferior to the European customs and
peoples, or “behind” in the timeline of progress for no reason other than a lack of conformity to
the peculiarities of European agriculture. The inherent injustice of this characterization would
appear at odds with Jefferson’s philosophical stance as an Enlightenment thinker, but as
environmental historian Carl Zimring notes, Jefferson justified this inconsistency with a
“deferred equality” caveat of sorts: red and black men, Jefferson believed, could one day “catch
up” to white men in the timeline of progress, given they recognized the cultural superiority of
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white settlers, abandoned all traces of their “backward” culture, and fully adopted the European
way of life.11 Through this thin veneer of an Enlightenment dogma of equality, the Jeffersonian
pastoral idyll claimed a moral preeminence while relying upon the same racist foundational
definition of progress to justify exclusion of nonwhites from the boundaries of “elevated human
society.” While permitting social mobility in theory, Jefferson’s form of social mobility hinged
upon the adoption of European livelihoods, predicating nonwhite access to environmental
resources on the abandonment of the very cultural practices that defined indigenous relationships
with the landscape for generations.

The Duality of the Reserve
As the rhetoric of progress and civilization served to define who belonged in
conceptualizations of urban and rural society, reserves facilitated projects of environmental and
social engineering, allowing urban planners and conservation biologists to dictate human access
to urban and rural spaces. Rob Nixon, author and professor of English at the Princeton
Environmental Institute, summarized the power of the reserve in enforcing policies of
environmental exclusion and oppression, saying “[t]he noun ‘reserve’ may refer to either a
sanctuary or a place of involuntary confinement – a refuge or a cage.” 12 The duality of the
reserve was especially pronounced in colonizer relationships with indigenous communities,
serving as a tool of confinement in one context and a means of expulsion in another.

The Reserve as a Cage – Quarantining Indigenous Society
As colonists built cities throughout North America according to European standards,
reservations served as the “cages” in which the settlers sought to quarantine indigenous people’s
society while the project of creating urban centers as exclusively “white” spaces carried on. Such
spaces of confinement served to enforce boundaries between indigenous communities and urban
elites while creating a discrete locale for metropolitan settler society to direct targeted
assimilation and cultural repression efforts. Characterizing reservations as concentrated spaces of
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“uncivilized” people and “uncivilized” lifestyles, the settler state systematically isolated
indigenous peoples and marked indigenous society for destruction, while simultaneously
harvesting the next generation of indigenous bodies for exploitation. The adoption and
enforcement of off-reservation boarding school policies exemplified this approach, physically
isolating indigenous children in the United States and Canada from their communities and
forcibly transplanting entire generations to environments dominated by the social engineering
forces of assimilation policy. The first of these off-reservation boarding schools, the Carlisle
Indian School, was founded in Pennsylvania in 1879 by Richard Pratt. Pratt believed extended
physical isolation of indigenous children from the reservation community could “kill the Indian
and save the man” and developed a boarding school system designed to “separate children from
their parents, inculcate Christianity and white cultural values, and encourage/force them to
assimilate into the dominant society.”1314 By enclosing indigenous society within reservations,
social engineers could simultaneously expunge indigenous presence from city spaces, withhold
metropolitan resources intended for white society, and isolate an “inferior” culture to enable its
eventual destruction. Like Jefferson’s problematic theory of social mobility built upon racist
formulations of progress, escape from the prison of the reservation for indigenous youth through
the boarding school system was predicated on the acceptance of white supremacist ideologies of
cultural superiority that not only disavowed the legitimacy of indigenous ancestral heritage but
defined the limits of indigenous peoples’ access to resources within the urban environment.

The Reserve as a Refuge – Exclusion from Natural Spaces
While reservations served as tools of exclusion from the urban environment, wilderness
reserves enforced the exclusion of Indigenous peoples from natural spaces, “reserving” areas of
ecological and cultural value for white elite society while denigrating and vilifying ecological
roles of Indigenous peoples as justification for their expulsion. Wilderness reserves in the United
States have served as exclusive recreational spaces for white society through the active efforts to
erase any history of Indigenous society from the “untouched wilderness” of the American West.
In Nixon’s critique of the mainstream environmentalist movement he writes, “[f]rom the
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perspective of North America’s First Peoples, the white soul-dream of ‘untouched country’ has
been a source of dispossession and cultural erasure.”15 The myth of “virgin” or “untouched”
wilderness espoused by preservationists carried the implicit refusal to acknowledge the influence
of centuries of indigenous societal development on the natural landscape, and built directly from
white supremacist conceptualizations of progress and civilization as inherently white domains. In
this mythological narrative, white settlers were recast as the rightful inheritors of “untouched”
land, responsible stewards entrusted with the duty of determining how different landscapes
should best serve the needs of settler society. The dispossession Nixon cites was thus twofold:
along with the physical expulsion of indigenous peoples from wilderness reserves and the
severing of long-standing ecological relationships between indigenous peoples and the
environment, indigenous society was expunged from historical conceptualizations of the rural
landscape to reproduce and reinforce the illusion of “pure” wilderness sought by environmental
transcendentalists. Reservation policies not only served to exclude indigenous peoples from the
physical resources of the natural environment, they actively pilfered the cultural resources of
history that could serve as sources of strength and resistance.

Waste and Human Disposal
Fixated on “progress” and the “reservation” of valued urban and rural spaces, colonizers
recognized indigenous presence within the settler state as a menacing threat to dreams of
continued expansion and conquest. Alongside justifications of physical exclusion or expulsion of
indigenous society from valued urban and rural spaces, metaphors of disposability reduced
indigenous peoples and culture to societal refuse in need of not only removal, but destruction.
Both urbanist and pastoralist ideologies became obsessed with purification of their respective
white enclaves, equating indigenous bodies to the most dreaded forms of pollution threatening
the health and vitality of these environments. The disdain for the ever-mounting waste of
industrial society in both ideological camps was redirected at indigenous society, followed by
increasingly extremist proposals for permanent eradication of the threat.
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Indigenous Bodies as Urban Pollution
Reservations provided an effective means of temporarily isolating indigenous bodies and
indigenous culture from deliberately white urban spaces, in some instances facilitating dramatic
intergenerational social engineering schemes used to further subjugate indigenous peoples.
Quarantine, however, could not provide a permanent solution to the racial anxiety afflicting
white settler society and the overwhelming apprehension with which colonizers viewed
Indigenous presence in the urban landscape. Long-term preservation of the whiteness of North
American cities, in the views of metropolitan idealists, depended upon not just isolation, but
destruction of Indigenous society. As Andrea Smith, associate professor of media and cultural
studies at the University of California, Riverside, explained in her book Conquest: Sexual
Violence and American Indian Genocide, this “cultural genocide” was viewed as the “more
sensitive” approach to the “Indian problem” – a euphemism for white settler anxiety towards
Indigenous presence – compared to physical extermination.16 In order to successfully engineer
cities as “non-Indigenous spaces,” urbanists applied a pollution-control mindset to attempt to
eliminate Indigenous presence from the view of white urban society and “purify” the “colonial
body” of Indigenous contamination.17 The inherent disposability of Indigenous peoples was
reinforced by myths of a “vanishing” culture and society, recast as a natural, evolutionary
extinction that ignored policies of active isolation and erasure, while the metaphor of pollution
invoked an urgency to rid the “colonial body,” and its cities, of this dangerous contamination. In
this frightened state, urban settler society sought to not only physically and socially isolate
Indigenous peoples, but permanently eradicate any form of “waste” threatening the vitality of the
colonial metropolis.

Cleansing the “Virgin Wilderness” of Indigenous Presence
While urbanists painted Indigenous peoples as metropolitan refuse to be discarded in the
backcountry “wastelands,” wilderness transcendental discourses of disposable peoples provoked
an equally-alarming rhetoric of mass extermination in the name of environmental sustainability.18
These extremist, Malthusian ideologies thinly obscured racist devaluation of nonwhite lives in
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the purportedly neutral scientific logic of carrying capacity and environmental sustainability. In
Nixon’s critique of the mainstream environmental movement, he highlights the disturbingly
radical views wilderness transcendentalists often showed towards the human species, particularly
the geographically distant or displaced:

Sometimes such hostility toward the displaced tilts over into a kind
of Malthusian sublime, as in Snyder’s suggestion that the project of
wilderness restoration would require ninety percent fewer humans…
Typically, here, the human cull begins with those dispensable,
anonymous, invisible inhabitants who reside in the ‘the world
beyond,’ never with any culling of the poetical, wilderness-expanded
egotistical male self.19

Despite an air of neutrality provided by allusions to ecological theory and environmental
science, Nixon illuminates the unmistakable prejudice underlying environmentalist discourses of
population reduction. Dispensable, anonymous, and invisible, those bluntly classified as “the
other” were marked for destruction in order to save the presumably indispensable, enlightened
environmentalist and the myth of “pristine” wilderness he so ardently defended. Like urbanist
metaphors of Indigenous peoples as a pollution to be cleansed from society, these Malthusian
authors and their racist theories of population control were predicated on the assumption that
environmental health and sustainability are threatened by “inherently ‘dirty’ or ‘polluting’”
peoples who must be disposed of. Just as a waste heap or smokestack infringing upon this
mythologically pure landscape would elicit anger and protest from the “wilderness-expanded
egotistical male self” Nixon describes, so too those peoples whose existence contradicts the
mythology of untouched wilderness would elicit the same anguish and backlash. As Smith
observes, populations deemed disposable were those with “the least institutional power or access
to resources in society,” often displaced and isolated from the landscapes and environments upon
which cultural strength and resilience depended, leaving them most vulnerable to the extremist
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policies of population control.20 Once ostracized from conceptualizations of the ideal society and
physically displaced from the “reserved” environments of the white settler state, the need to
dispose of unwelcome peoples in pursuit of such mythological idylls was wielded as justification
for increasingly atrocious crimes.

Conclusion
In both urbanist and pastoralist ideological framings of the urban-rural divide, mythologies
and tropes surrounding progress, reserves, and human disposal served to establish and fortify
racist hierarchies of human relationships with the environment and enforce barriers of entry to
urban and rural spaces. Underpinned by a white supremacist logic of “progress,” enacted through
duality of the reserve as both a refuge and a cage, and reinforced with metaphors of
“disposability,” seemingly adversarial glorifications of metropolitan or agrarian idylls worked in
tandem to facilitate the exclusion, dispossession, and oppression of Indigenous peoples. As the
ideological basis of modern societal perceptions of the urban-rural divide and the place of human
populations within those environments, tracking the legacies of these historical tropes and
mythologies in the social and political dynamics of modern environmental racism may help
illuminate nuanced psychological underpinnings of indigenous-settler relations and aid the work
of deconstructing persistent structural inequities in North America. 21
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